Printable Format8-285. "Habitual violator" defined; other definitions. Except as otherwise provided in this section, as used in this act, the words and phrases defined in K.S.A. 8-234a, and amendments thereto, shall have the meanings ascribed to them therein. The term "habitual violator" means any resident or nonresident person who, within the immediately preceding five years, has been convicted in this or any other state:
(a) Three or more times of:
(1) Vehicular homicide, as defined by K.S.A. 21-3405, prior to its repeal, or K.S.A. 21-5406, and amendments thereto, or as prohibited by any ordinance of any city in this state, any resolution of any county in this state or any law of another state which is in substantial conformity with that statute;
(2) violating K.S.A. 8-1567, and amendments thereto, or violating an ordinance of any city in this state, any resolution of any county in this state or any law of another state, which ordinance, resolution or law declares to be unlawful the acts prohibited by that statute;
(3) driving while the privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state has been canceled, suspended or revoked, as prohibited by K.S.A. 8-262, and amendments thereto, or while such person's privilege to obtain a driver's license is suspended or revoked pursuant to K.S.A. 8-252a, and amendments thereto, or, as prohibited by any ordinance of any city in this state, any resolution of any county in this state or any law of another state which is in substantial conformity with those statutes;
(4) perjury resulting from a violation of K.S.A. 8-261a, and amendments thereto, or resulting from the violation of a law of another state which is in substantial conformity with that statute;
(5) violating the provisions of the fifth clause of K.S.A. 8-142, and amendments thereto, relating to fraudulent applications, or violating the provisions of a law of another state which is in substantial conformity with that statute;
(6) any crime punishable as a felony, if a motor vehicle was used in the perpetration of the crime;
(7) failing to stop at the scene of an accident and perform the duties required by K.S.A. 8-1602 through 8-1604, and amendments thereto, or required by any ordinance of any city in this state, any resolution of any county in this state or a law of another state which is in substantial conformity with those statutes; or
(8) violating the provisions of K.S.A. 40-3104, and amendments thereto, relating to motor vehicle liability insurance coverage, or an ordinance of any city in this state or a resolution of any county in this state which is in substantial conformity with such statute.
(b) Three or more times, either singly or in combination, of any of the offenses enumerated in subsection (a).
For the purpose of subsection (a)(2), in addition to the definition of "conviction" otherwise provided by law, conviction includes, but is not limited to, a diversion agreement entered into in lieu of further criminal proceedings, or a plea of nolo contendere, on a complaint, indictment, information, citation or notice to appear alleging a violation of K.S.A. 8-1567, and amendments thereto, or an ordinance of a city in this state, a resolution of a county in this state or law of another state, which ordinance or law prohibits the acts prohibited by those statutes.
History: L. 1972, ch. 32, § 2; L. 1975, ch. 33, § 3; L. 1976, ch. 48, § 2; L. 1977, ch. 40, § 1; L. 1982, ch. 144, § 2; L. 1985, ch. 48, § 2; L. 2001, ch. 112, § 5; L. 2011, ch. 105, § 6; L. 2012, ch. 172, § 6; L. 2018, ch. 106, § 4; July 1.
Revisor's Note:
Section was also amended by L. 2011, ch. 30, § 89, but that version was repealed by L. 2011, ch. 105, § 36.
Cross References to Related Sections:
Diversion, see 12-4418, 22-2910, 22-2911.
Law Review and Bar Journal References:
"S.B. 699—A Comment on Kansas' New 'Drunk Driving' Law," Joseph Brian Cox and Donald G. Strole, 51 J.K.B.A. 230, 239, 240 (1982).
"The New Kansas Drunk Driving Law: A Closer Look," Matthew D. Keenan, 31 K.L.R. 409, 419 (1983).
Attorney General's Opinions:
Habitual violators; effect of prior conviction based on nolo contendere plea. 82-82.
Use of prior convictions in determining sentence for DUI offense. 82-182.
Habitual violators; suspension date of drivers' licenses. 87-29.
County attorney and county counselor; duties; juvenile matters. 92-67.
Person who has been charged with operating a vehicle under the influence and thereafter completes diversion is not disqualified from being a candidate for or holding the office of sheriff. 2012-8.
CASE ANNOTATIONS
1. Mentioned in appeal from order dismissing complaint seeking to declare defendant habitual violator of traffic laws; reversed. State v. Skeen, 3 Kan. App. 2d 231, 233, 234, 592, P.2d 150.
2. Terms "operate" and "drive" are synonymous. State v. Fish, 228 Kan. 204, 208, 209, 612 P.2d 180.
3. Violation of city ordinance counts toward habitual violator conviction only when specifically provided by section. State v. Wood, 231 Kan. 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 647 P.2d 1327 (1982).
4. Action filed to have defendant declared habitual violator as defined herein is civil not criminal proceeding. State v. Boos, 232 Kan. 864, 865, 870, 874, 659 P.2d 224 (1983).
5. Habitual violator proceeding cannot be based on an uncertified record of conviction. State v. Topping, 8 Kan. App. 2d 467, 468, 660 P.2d 578 (1983).
6. Statute, being integral part of whole subject of act (L. 1982, ch. 144), not violative of Kansas Constitution, Article 2, § 16. State v. Reves, 233 Kan. 972, 974, 980, 666 P.2d 1190 (1983).
7. To be habitual violator requires three or more separate convictions, each based on separate incident. State v. Underwood, 10 Kan. App. 2d 116, 123, 693 P.2d 1205 (1985).
8. Cited in holding convictions under city ordinances excluded from consideration for sentence enhancement. State v. Evans, 10 Kan. App. 2d 171, 172, 173, 694 P.2d 912 (1985).
9. Cited; entering into diversion agreement in lieu of criminal proceedings considered conviction for DUI sentence enhancement (K.S.A. 8-1567(i)). State v. Booze, 238 Kan. 551, 557, 558, 712 P.2d 1253 (1986).
10. Neither general civil nor general criminal statutes of limitations applies to habitual violator proceedings. State v. Graham, 12 Kan. App. 2d 803, 809, 758 P.2d 247 (1988).
11. Proceedings under K.S.A. 8-286 are civil since statute provides for determination of driver's status. State v. Whitehurst, 13 Kan. App. 2d 411, 414, 772 P.2d 1251 (1988).
12. Habitual violator finding (K.S.A. 8-286) not invalid because adjudication based in part on uncounseled misdemeanor violation. State v. Weber, 13 Kan. App. 2d 571, 572, 574, 775 P.2d 679 (1989).
13. Purpose of act stated; criminal constitutional considerations as inapplicable examined. State v. Hines, 14 Kan. App. 2d 100, 101, 783 P.2d 350 (1989).
14. Conviction resulting from nolo contendere plea is conviction hereunder. State v. Shaffer, 14 Kan. App. 2d 282, 285, 788 P.2d 1341 (1990).
15. Phrase "within the immediately preceding five years" construed; actual conviction dates control. State v. Walden, 15 Kan. App. 2d 139, 147, 803 P.2d 1054 (1991).
16. Use of collateral estoppel doctrine to preclude habitual violator conviction examined. State v. Day, 17 Kan. App. 2d 737, 738, 739, 843 P.2d 294 (1992).
17. Whether municipal ordinances substantially conform with state statutes to be admissible in habitual violator action examined. State v. Graham, 19 Kan. App. 2d 341, 342, 868 P.2d 1245 (1994).
18. A diversion agreement is considered a conviction when first entered into for habitual violator purposes. State v. Knoff, 22 Kan. App. 2d 85, 911 P.2d 822 (1996).
19. Licensee's actual knowledge of habitual violator declaration not required to sustain her conviction. State v. Lewis, 23 Kan. App. 2d 758, 767, 935 P.2d 1072 (1997).
20. Without information to the contrary, an investigatory traffic stop is reasonable when an officer pulls over a vehicle registered to a driver with a revoked license. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1190-1191 (2020).