Cross References to Related Sections:

Motorized bicycle driver's license, 8-235.

Attorney General's Opinions:

Habitual violators; effect of prior conviction based on nolo contendere plea. 82-82.

Use of prior convictions in determining sentence for DUI offense. 82-182.

County attorney and county counselor; duties; juvenile matters. 92-67.

Driving under influence of alcohol or drugs by persons under 21; proceedings for determining violation; filing abstracts of court records; penalties. 97-69.

CASE ANNOTATIONS

1. Term "forthwith" interpreted; applied to facts; not susceptible to fixed time definition; conviction hereunder affirmed. State v. Garton, 2 Kan. App. 2d 709, 710, 711, 586 P.2d 1386.

2. Procedure prescribed hereunder not exclusive; court may make determination of habitual violator; reversed. State v. Skeen, 3 Kan. App. 2d 231, 233, 592 P.2d 150.

3. Violation of city ordinance counts toward habitual violator conviction only when specifically provided by K.S.A. 8-285. State v. Wood, 231 Kan. 699, 702, 647 P.2d 1327 (1982).

4. Action hereunder is civil; constitutional guarantees applied in criminal proceedings are not applicable to the same extent. State v. Boos, 232 Kan. 864, 865, 867, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 659 P.2d 224 (1983).

5. Phrase "forthwith" is directory; trial court not authorized to dismiss proceedings; no statute of limitations applies. State v. Graham, 12 Kan. App. 2d 803, 806, 809, 758 P.2d 247 (1988).

6. Proceedings hereunder are civil since statute provides for determination of driver's status. State v. Whitehurst, 13 Kan. App. 2d 411, 414, 772 P.2d 1251 (1988).

7. One cannot, in proceeding hereunder, attack underlying violations on grounds of deprivation of right to counsel or knowing waiver thereof. State v. Weber, 13 Kan. App. 2d 571, 574, 775 P.2d 679 (1989).

8. Action hereunder civil in nature; constitutional guarantees in criminal proceedings inapplicable to same extent here. State v. Hines, 14 Kan. App. 2d 100, 101, 783 P.2d 350 (1989).

9. Procedure herein not exclusive; trial court can take judicial notice from own records. State v. Shaffer, 14 Kan. App. 2d 282, 285, 788 P.2d 1341 (1990).

10. Habitual violator action arises out of governmental function; actual conviction dates noted as controlling five-year period (K.S.A. 8-285). State v. Walden, 15 Kan. App. 2d 139, 145, 803 P.2d 1054 (1991).

11. Cited; use of same convictions to support successive habitual violator petitions in regard to collateral estoppel. State v. Day, 17 Kan. App. 2d 737, 739, 843 P.2d 294 (1992).

12. Earlier decision that certain DUI conviction was defendant's first for sentence enhancement immaterial for purpose of habitual violator determination. State v. Kolde, 18 Kan. App. 2d 525, 529, 855 P.2d 498 (1993).

13. Operating vehicle with revoked license must occur within three-year period following revocation for habitual violator purposes. State v. Proffitt, 261 Kan. 526, 528, 533, 930 P.2d 1059 (1997).

14. Revocation notice by regular mailing to defendant's last known address satisfied minimum due process requirements. State v. Lewis, 23 Kan. App. 2d 758, 759, 935 P.2d 1072 (1997).

15. Accused's knowledge of status as a habitual violator is an essential element of offense under K.S.A. 8-287. State v. Lewis, 263 Kan. 843, 847, 953 P.2d 1016 (1998).

16. Notice provisions of section comport with due process constitutional requirements. State v. Bateson, 25 Kan. App. 2d 90, 100, 958 P.2d 44 (1998).

17. Person who has never obtained a driver's license may not be convicted of crime containing element that person's driving privileges had been revoked. State v. Logan, 28 Kan. App. 2d 289, 14 P.3d 1193 (2000).