Printable Format8-1005. Evidence; test results admissible in prosecutions; weight to be given evidence. Except as provided by K.S.A. 8-1012, and amendments thereto, in any criminal prosecution for violation of the laws of this state relating to operating or attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, or the commission of vehicular homicide or manslaughter while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, or in any prosecution for a violation of a city ordinance relating to the operation or attempted operation of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, evidence of the concentration of alcohol or drugs in the defendant's blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance may be admitted and shall give rise to the following:
(a) If the alcohol concentration is less than .08, that fact may be considered with other competent evidence to determine if the defendant was under the influence of alcohol, or both alcohol and drugs.
(b) If the alcohol concentration is .08 or more, it shall be prima facie evidence that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that renders the person incapable of driving safely.
(c) If there was present in the defendant's bodily substance any narcotic, hypnotic, somnifacient, stimulating or other drug which has the capacity to render the defendant incapable of safely driving a vehicle, that fact may be considered to determine if the defendant was under the influence of drugs, or both alcohol and drugs, to a degree that renders the defendant incapable of driving safely.
History: L. 1955, ch. 279, § 1; L. 1967, ch. 60, § 2; L. 1970, ch. 51, § 3; L. 1973, ch. 42, § 1; L. 1976, ch. 49, § 1; L. 1982, ch. 144, § 4; L. 1985, ch. 48, § 7; L. 1986, ch. 40, § 4; L. 1986, ch. 41, § 1; L. 1988, ch. 47, § 15; L. 1993, ch. 259, § 16; L. 1993, ch. 291, § 269; July 1.
Law Review and Bar Journal References:
Act discussed, James H. Rexroad, 24 J.B.A.K. 232 (1956).
Procedure by court rules, Spencer A. Gard, 5 K.L.R. 42, 62 (1956).
"The Kansas Experience with Uniform State Laws," Paul L. Wilbert, 6 K.L.R. 338, 342 (1958).
Survey of criminal law and procedure, Paul E. Wilson, 8 K.L.R. 251 (1959).
Subsection (b) cited; traffic cases and license problems, William M. Ferguson, 39 J.B.A.K. 351, 354, 399 (1970).
"S.B. 699—A Comment on Kansas' New 'Drunk Driving' Law," Joseph Brian Cox and Donald G. Strole, 51 J.K.B.A. 230, 232 (1982).
"Admissibility of Delayed Chemical Analysis to Establish Alcohol Influence," Craig Shultz and Dan Monnat, 5 J.K.T.L.A. No. 5, 21 (1982).
"The New Kansas DUI Law: Constitutional Issues and Practical Problems," Gerard Little, Jr., 22 W.L.J. 340, 343 (1983).
"The New Kansas Drunk Driving Law: A Closer Look," Matthew D. Keenan, 31 K.L.R. 409, 415 (1983).
"Criminal Law: Rescinding Initial Refusals to Submit to Blood Alcohol Tests," Glen Peter Ahlers, 24 W.L.J. 386, 387 (1985).
"Forensic Psychiatry: Less Typical Applications," Roy B. Lacoursiere, M.D., 30 W.L.J. 29, 32 (1990).
"Automobile Collisions: Defendants Are Liable for Punitive Damages When They Are Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol at the Time of the Collision," Gary D. White, Jr., J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XX, No. 2, 12 (1996).
Attorney General's Opinions:
DUI; elements of offense. 84-44.
Driving under influence; "per se" violation. 85-133.
Tests for alcohol and drugs; weight to be given evidence. 86-59.
CASE ANNOTATIONS
1. Cited; city ordinance prohibiting driving under influence upheld. City of Garden City v. Miller, 181 Kan. 366, 311 P.2d 306.
2. Blood test admissible in evidence; presumption; chemist eligible witness; conviction upheld. State v. Bailey, 184 Kan. 704, 708, 710, 339 P.2d 45.
3. Driving while drunk; instructions on evidence of intoxication criticized but conviction upheld. City of Wichita v. Depee, 185 Kan. 22, 24, 25, 340 P.2d 924.
4. Result of test properly admitted as evidence; presumption. City of Wichita v. Showalter, 185 Kan. 181, 182, 341 P.2d 1001.
5. Mentioned in discussing evidence of intoxication in damage action. Johnson, Administrator v. Huskey, 186 Kan. 282, 284, 350 P.2d 14.
6. Purpose of act; constitutional exercise of police powers; license revocation upheld. Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 568, 358 P.2d 765.
7. Instruction hereunder in prosecution under K.S.A. 8-530 improper unless test taken. State v. Thomson, 188 Kan. 171, 174, 175, 360 P.2d 871.
8. Blood test may eliminate necessity of criminal prosecution. Marbut v. Motor Vehicle Department, 194 Kan. 620, 622, 400 P.2d 982.
9. D.W.I. alone insufficient to imply malice necessary for manslaughter. State v. Jansen, 197 Kan. 427, 446, 417 P.2d 273.
10. Witness evaluating results of chemical tests for alcoholic content of blood must be an expert. City of Abilene v. Hall, 202 Kan. 636, 640, 451 P.2d 188.
11. Result of test to determine blood alcohol content was admissible in evidence. City of Abilene v. Hall, 202 Kan. 636, 640, 451 P.2d 188.
12. Mentioned in workmen's compensation case involving intoxication of workman. Schmidt v. Jensen Motors, Inc., 208 Kan. 182, 184, 186, 490 P.2d 383.
13. Cited in reversing action for damages against joint tortfeasors. Hubbard v. Havlik, 213 Kan. 594, 600, 518 P.2d 352.
14. Referred to in applying K.S.A. 21-3108; double jeopardy in prosecutions for traffic offense and aggravated assault. State v. Becker, 1 Kan. App. 2d 671, 674, 573 P.2d 1096.
15. Admission of breathalyzer test results upheld; various objections overruled; conviction upheld. City of Shawnee v. Gruss, 2 Kan. App. 2d 131, 576 P.2d 239.
16. Applied in determining specific statute (K.S.A. 21-3405) controlled over general statute (K.S.A. 21-3404); involuntary manslaughter prosecution. State v. Makin, 223 Kan. 743, 747, 576 P.2d 666.
17. Cited; trial judge properly admitted blood alcohol test; conviction for involuntary manslaughter affirmed. State v. Parson, 226 Kan. 491, 492, 495, 601 P.2d 680.
18. Construed; statute requires person be found guilty of driving while intoxicated whenever his mental or physical function is impaired by the consumption of alcohol to the extent that he is incapable of safely driving a vehicle. City of Topeka v. Martin, 4 Kan. App. 2d 218, 219, 220, 221, 604 P.2d 73.
19. Terms "operate" and "drive" are synonymous. State v. Fish, 228 Kan. 204, 207, 208, 612 P.2d 180.
20. Safeguards built into statute do not require state to automatically furnish accused with breath sample for independent testing. State v. Young, 228 Kan. 355, 359, 363, 614 P.2d 441.
21. Instruction, while acceptable, should separate definitional portion from elements of offense. State v. Reeves, 233 Kan. 702, 704, 705, 664 P.2d 862 (1983).
22. The phrase "you shall presume," as used in statute, is permissive, not mandatory; does not violate due process clause of U.S. Constitution. State v. Price, 233 Kan. 706, 708, 710, 664 P.2d 869 (1983).
23. Statute, being integral part of whole subject of act, not violative of Kansas Constitution, Article 2, § 16. State v. Reves, 233 Kan. 972, 974, 980, 666 P.2d 1190 (1983).
24. Cited in holding blood tests from arrested driver, taken under appropriate conditions, admissible in civil action. Divine v. Groshong, 235 Kan. 127, 132, 138, 679 P.2d 700 (1984).
25. Two-hour lapse from driving time to blood test goes to weight, not admissibility, of evidence. State v. Armstrong, 236 Kan. 290, 689 P.2d 897 (1984).
26. Results of blood alcohol test properly suppressed where not delivered as required by K.S.A. 8-1002. State v. Wanttaja, 9 Kan. App. 2d 441, 444, 680 P.2d 922 (1984); reversed 236 Kan. 323.
27. Pretrial suppression of blood alcohol content substantially impairs state's ability to prosecute; interlocutory appeal (K.S.A. 22-3603) permitted; physician-patient issue (K.S.A. 60-427) raised. State v. Pitchford, 10 Kan. App. 2d 293, 294, 697 P.2d 896 (1985).
28. Suppression of blood alcohol test results and statutory presumption substantially impair state's case. State v. Hunninghake, 238 Kan. 155, 157, 708 P.2d 529 (1985).
29. Definition of "alcohol concentration" applicable to city ordinance; trial court correct by instructing jury to use definition herein. City of Ottawa v. Brown, 11 Kan. App. 2d 581, 584, 585, 730 P.2d 364 (1986).
30. Cited; blood alcohol concentration as cause of accident, but not presumptive of intoxication in workers compensation cases (K.S.A. 44-501) examined. Poole v. Earp Meat Co., 242 Kan. 638, 643, 750 P.2d 1000 (1988).
31. Consequences of a test failure examined; prima facie evidence of violation of criminal law regarding DUI noted. Podrebarac v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 15 Kan. App. 2d 383, 386, 807 P.2d 1327 (1991).
32. Testimony sufficient to equate breath test result with statutory definition of alcohol concentration examined. State v. Almond, 15 Kan. App. 2d 585, 589, 811 P.2d 529 (1991).
33. Unlike K.S.A. 8-1567(a)(1), subsection (a)(3) does not limit the introduction of "other competent evidence" to that found in K.S.A. 8-1013(f)(2). State v. Stevens, 285 Kan. 307, 319, 322, 172 P.3d 570 (2007).
34. Cited; DUI jury instruction PIK Crim. 3d 70.02 discussed, no instructional error. State v. Garcia, 40 Kan. App. 2d 870, 872, 196 P.3d 943 (2008).