44-501

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44-501. Compensation; disallowances; substance abuse testing; exceptions, pre-existing conditions; public service benefits protection act, coronary disease or cerebrovascular injury benefits for firefighters and law enforcement officers; liability limited for construction design professional; benefits reduced for certain retirement benefits. (a) (1) Compensation for an injury shall be disallowed if such injury to the employee results from:

(A) The employee's deliberate intention to cause such injury;

(B) the employee's willful failure to use a guard or protection against accident or injury which is required pursuant to any statute and provided for the employee;

(C) the employee's willful failure to use a reasonable and proper guard and protection voluntarily furnished the employee by the employer;

(D) the employee's reckless violation of their employer's workplace safety rules or regulations; or

(E) the employee's voluntary participation in fighting or horseplay with a co-employee for any reason, work related or otherwise.

(2) Subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) shall not apply when it was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances to not use such equipment, or if the employer approved the work engaged in at the time of an accident or injury to be performed without such equipment.

(b) (1) (A) The employer shall not be liable under the workers compensation act where the injury, disability or death was contributed to by the employee's use or consumption of alcohol or any drugs, chemicals or any other compounds or substances, including, but not limited to, any drugs or medications which are available to the public without a prescription from a health care provider, prescription drugs or medications, any form or type of narcotic drugs, marijuana, stimulants, depressants or hallucinogens.

(B) In the case of drugs or medications which are available to the public without a prescription from a health care provider and prescription drugs or medications, compensation shall not be denied if the employee can show that such drugs or medications were being taken or used in therapeutic doses and there have been no prior incidences of the employee's impairment on the job as the result of the use of such drugs or medications within the previous 24 months.

(C) It shall be conclusively presumed that the employee was impaired due to alcohol or drugs if it is shown that, at the time of the injury, the employee had an alcohol concentration of .04 or more, or a GCMS confirmatory test by quantitative analysis showing a concentration at or above the levels shown on the following chart for the drugs of abuse listed:

	Confirmatory test cutoff levels (ng/ml)
Marijuana metabolite 1	15
Cocaine metabolite 2	150
Opiates: Morphine Codeine	2000 2000
6-Acetylmorphine 4	10 ng/ml
Phencyclidine	25
Amphetamines: Amphetamine Methamphetamine 3	500 500
1 Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol-9-carboxylic acid.
2 Benzoylecgonine.
3 Specimen must also contain amphetamine at a concentration greater than or equal to 200 ng/ml.
4 Test for 6-AM when morphine concentration exceeds 2,000 ng/ml.

(D) If it is shown that the employee was impaired pursuant to subsection (b)(1)(C) at the time of the injury, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the accident, injury, disability or death was contributed to by such impairment. The employee may overcome the presumption of contribution by clear and convincing evidence.

(E) An employee's refusal to submit to a chemical test at the request of the employer shall result in the forfeiture of benefits under the workers compensation act if the employer had sufficient cause to suspect the use of alcohol or drugs by the claimant or if the employer's policy clearly authorizes post-injury testing.

(2) The results of a chemical test shall be admissible evidence to prove impairment if the employer establishes that the testing was done under any of the following circumstances:

(A) As a result of an employer mandated drug testing policy, in place in writing prior to the date of accident or injury, requiring any worker to submit to testing for drugs or alcohol;

(B) during an autopsy or in the normal course of medical treatment for reasons related to the health and welfare of the injured worker and not at the direction of the employer;

(C) the worker, prior to the date and time of the accident or injury, gave written consent to the employer that the worker would voluntarily submit to a chemical test for drugs or alcohol following any accident or injury;

(D) the worker voluntarily agrees to submit to a chemical test for drugs or alcohol following any accident or injury; or

(E) as a result of federal or state law or a federal or state rule or regulation having the force and effect of law requiring a post-injury testing program and such required program was properly implemented at the time of testing.

(3) Notwithstanding subsection (b)(2), the results of a chemical test performed on a sample collected by an employer shall not be admissible evidence to prove impairment unless the following conditions are met:

(A) The test sample was collected within a reasonable time following the accident or injury;

(B) the collecting and labeling of the test sample was performed by or under the supervision of a licensed health care professional;

(C) the test was performed by a laboratory approved by the United States department of health and human services or licensed by the department of health and environment, except that a blood sample may be tested for alcohol content by a laboratory commonly used for that purpose by state law enforcement agencies;

(D) the test was confirmed by gas chromatography-mass spectroscopy or other comparably reliable analytical method, except that no such confirmation is required for a blood alcohol sample;

(E) the foundation evidence must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the test results were from the sample taken from the employee; and

(F) a split sample sufficient for testing shall be retained and made available to the employee within 48 hours of a positive test.

(c) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), compensation shall not be paid in case of coronary or coronary artery disease or cerebrovascular injury unless it is shown that the exertion of the work necessary to precipitate the disability was more than the employee's usual work in the course of the employee's regular employment.

(2) For events occurring on or after July 1, 2014, in the case of a firefighter as defined by K.S.A. 40-1709(b)(1), and amendments thereto, or a law enforcement officer as defined by K.S.A. 74-5602, and amendments thereto, coronary or coronary artery disease or cerebrovascular injury shall be compensable if:

(A) The injury can be identified as caused by a specific event occurring in the course and scope of employment;

(B) the coronary or cerebrovascular injury occurred within 24 hours of the specific event; and

(C) the specific event was the prevailing factor in causing the coronary or coronary artery disease or cerebrovascular injury.

(d) Except as provided in the workers compensation act, no construction design professional who is retained to perform professional services on a construction project or any employee of a construction design professional who is assisting or representing the construction design professional in the performance of professional services on the site of the construction project, shall be liable for any injury resulting from the employer's failure to comply with safety standards on the construction project for which compensation is recoverable under the workers compensation act, unless responsibility for safety practices is specifically assumed by contract. The immunity provided by this subsection to any construction design professional shall not apply to the negligent preparation of design plans or specifications.

(e) An award of compensation for permanent partial impairment, work disability, or permanent total disability shall be reduced by the amount of functional impairment determined to be preexisting. Any such reduction shall not apply to temporary total disability, nor shall it apply to compensation for medical treatment.

(1) Where workers compensation benefits have previously been awarded through settlement or judicial or administrative determination in Kansas, the percentage basis of the prior settlement or award shall conclusively establish the amount of functional impairment determined to be preexisting. Where workers compensation benefits have not previously been awarded through settlement or judicial or administrative determination in Kansas, the amount of preexisting functional impairment shall be established by competent evidence.

(2) In all cases, the applicable reduction shall be calculated as follows:

(A) If the preexisting impairment is the result of injury sustained while working for the employer against whom workers compensation benefits are currently being sought, any award of compensation shall be reduced by the current dollar value attributable under the workers compensation act to the percentage of functional impairment determined to be preexisting. The "current dollar value" shall be calculated by multiplying the percentage of preexisting impairment by the compensation rate in effect on the date of the accident or injury against which the reduction will be applied.

(B) In all other cases, the employer against whom benefits are currently being sought shall be entitled to a credit for the percentage of preexisting impairment.

(f) If the employee receives, whether periodically or by lump sum, retirement benefits under the federal social security act or retirement benefits from any other retirement system, program, policy or plan which is provided by the employer against which the claim is being made, any compensation benefit payments which the employee is eligible to receive under the workers compensation act for such claim shall be reduced by the weekly equivalent amount of the total amount of all such retirement benefits, less any portion of any such retirement benefit, other than retirement benefits under the federal social security act, that is attributable to payments or contributions made by the employee, but in no event shall the workers compensation benefit be less than the workers compensation benefit payable for the employee's percentage of functional impairment. Where the employee elects to take retirement benefits in a lump sum, the lump sum payment shall be amortized at the rate of 4% per year over the employee's life expectancy to determine the weekly equivalent value of the benefits.

History: L. 1927, ch. 232, § 1; L. 1967, ch. 280, § 1; L. 1974, ch. 203, § 1; L. 1975, ch. 258, § 1; L. 1979, ch. 156, § 1; L. 1985, ch. 175, § 1; L. 1987, ch. 187, § 1; L. 1990, ch. 182, § 1; L. 1993, ch. 286, § 24; L. 1996, ch. 79, § 1; L. 2000, ch. 160, § 5; L. 2005, ch. 54, § 1; L. 2011, ch. 55, § 3; L. 2014, ch. 25, § 1; July 1.

Source or prior law:

L. 1911, ch. 218, § 1; L. 1917, ch. 226, § 27; R.S. 1923, 44-501.

Law Review and Bar Journal References:

Mental illness under act, 11 K.L.R. 259, 261 (1962).

Case of Taylor v. Centrix Construction Co., 191 K. 130, 379 P.2d 217[analyzed below under Case Annotation 376] discussed in comment, 2 W.L.J. 309 (1963).

Survey of law of municipal corporations, Albert B. Martin, 10 K.L.R. 260 (1961).

Recovery for traumatic cancer, Jerry G. Elliott, 13 K.L.R. 79, 93 (1964).

"Changes in Workmen's Compensation," William F.Morrissey, 36 J.B.A.K. 173, 175 (1967).

The unusual-exertion requirement now in the statute is an obvious manifestation of legislative discontent with previous decisional law, William A. Kelly, 16 K.L.R. 411, 416 (1968).

"Assaults by Fellow Employees—The Kansas Experience," William A. Kelly, 39 J.B.A.K. 361, 405 (1970).

"Workmen's Compensation—Accelerated Payment—Need for Statutory Change," Sheila R. Miller, 18 K.L.R. 940, 941 (1970).

"Torts—Fellow Servant Rule," Richard S. Hyter, 9 W.L.J. 488 (1970).

Child dependency under the workmen's compensation act, 11 W.L.J. 471, 474 (1972).

"No-Fault Automobile Insurance," Barry W. McCormick and Lynn Franklin Taylor II, 23 K.L.R. 141, 168 (1974).

"Potential Federalization of State Workmen's Compensation Law—The Kansas Response," James C. Wright and James P. Rankin, 15 W.L.J. 244, 263 (1976).

Survey of workmen's compensation, Ann Hoover, 15 W.L.J. 409 (1976).

Recovery under workmen's compensation, 25 K.L.R. 158, 161, 165 (1976).

"Workmen's Compensation—An Introduction to Changes in the Kansas Statute," Bryce B. Moore, 24 K.L.R. 603, 604 (1976).

"Workmen's Compensation—Major Changes in Employments Covered, Benefits, Defenses, Offsets, and Other Changes," Alvin D. Herrington, 24 K.L.R. 611, 620 (1976).

"Workmen's Compensation—Permanent Partial Disability Benefits—The Dilemma," George E. McCullough, 24 K.L.R. 627, 629, 632 (1976).

"Workmen's Compensation—The Workmen's Compensation Fund," Charles J. Woodin, 24 K.L.R. 641 (1976).

Recovery for mental injury caused by mental impact, 16 W.L.J. 552, 556 (1977).

This and following sections discussed in note, "Employer Liability to Third Parties under the Workmen's Compensation and Comparative Negligence Statutes," Ruth C. Nelson, 26 K.L.R. 485, 486, 487 (1978).

"Brown and Miles: At Last, An End to Ambiguity in the Kansas Law of Comparative Negligence," Hal D. Meltzer, 27 K.L.R. 111, 131 (1978).

"Survey of Kansas Law: Workers' Compensation," William A. Kelly, 27 K.L.R. 377, 390 (1979).

"The Kansas Tort Claims Act and School Districts," Susan C. Jacobson, 28 K.L.R. 619, 627 (1980).

"New Standard for 'Usual Work' Under Heart Amendment," Gary L. Jordan, 1 J.K.T.L.A. No. 3, 10, 11 (1977).

"Major Legislative Changes in Workers' Compensation Law," Gary L. Jordan, 3 J.K.T.L.A. No. 1, 14, 15 (1979).

"Architects' Liability for Construction Site Accidents," Wyatt A. Hoch, 30 K.L.R. 429, 440 (1982).

"Workers' Compensation: The Dual Capacity Doctrine—California's Exception to the Exclusivity of Workers' Compensation Coverage," Pamela S. Yeary, 22 W.L.J. 168, 171 (1982).

"Workers' Compensation: Reconsidering the 'Right to Control' as the Exclusive Test for Employment Status," Catherine M. Foster, 23 W.L.J. 379, 380 (1984).

"Workers' Compensation: The Exclusive Remedy Rule Is Alive and Well in Kansas [Hormann v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 236 Kan. 190, 689 P.2d 837 (1984)]," Janet K. Kerr, 25 W.L.J. 192, 193, 195, 196 (1985).

"Analysis of Bill Drafted by Interim Committee on 1984 Labor and Industry," Gary L. Jordan, Vol. VIII, No. 3, J.K.T.L.A. 11 (1984).

"Workers' Compensation—A Salute to the Trial Lawyers of Kansas," Gary L. Jordan, 10 J.K.T.L.A. No. 6, 9 (1987).

"Workers' Compensation: A New Era," Tom Hammond, 11 J.K.T.L.A., No. 2, 6, (1987).

"Should You Take A Chiropractor To Court?" Steven M. Dickson, J.K.T.L.A., Vol. XIII, No. 3, pp. 19-20 (1990).

"Concurrent Jurisdiction: Should Your Compensation Claim Be Filed In Kansas, Missouri, Or Both," William W. Hutton, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XIV, No. 6, 15, 16 (1991).

"Workers' Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XV, No. 1, Review p. 4 (1991).

"Corporate Criminal Liability for Injuries and Death," Patrick Hamilton, 40 K.L.R. 1091, 1115 (1992).

"Workers Compensation Review", Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVI, No. 2, Special section, 3 (1992).

"An Overview of the 1993 Amendments to the Kansas Workers Compensation Act," David J. Rebein, 62 J.K.B.A. No. 5, 30, 31, 34 (1993).

"Preventing Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens: The Final OSHA Standard," Jeffrey A. Chanay, 62 J.K.B.A. No. 8, 26, 32 (1993).

"Enforcement Remedies of Workers' Compensation Awards," Beth Regier Foerster, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVI, No. 3, 6, 11 (1993).

"Workers' Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Work. Comp. Review Section, 1, 2 (1994).

"Workers' Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Work. Comp. Review Section, 1, 2, 3 (1995).

"Worker's Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVIII, No. 6, Work. Comp. Review Section, 1 (1995).

"Tort Action Or Workers' Compensation Claim? Private Animosity Defeats The Exclusive Remedy Rule," Frank D. Taff, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVIII, No. 6, 27 (1995).

"Will Debtors Win the Battle as Creditors Win the War?: Retroactive Recovery of Attorney Fees in Consumer Credit Contracts in Kansas," Tamara Putnam and Jonathan Lautt, 34 W.L.J. 556, 567, 568 (1995).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XIX, No. 2, Review Section, 1, 7, 10, 11 (1995).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XIX, No. 4, Review Section, 12 (1996).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XIX, No. 5, Review Section, 1, 8 (1996).

"New Work Comp Laws Now In Effect," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XIX, No. 5, 4 (1996).

"Bosses Beware—It's a Jungle Out There: Supervisor Liability in Employment Litigation," Celia Garrett and Scott Nehrbass, 65 J.K.B.A. No. 10, 20 (1996).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XX, No. 1, Review Section, 3 (1996).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XX, No. 2, Review Section, 28, 32 (1996).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XX, No. 3, Review Section, 30, 34, 36 (1997).

"Worker's Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XX, No. 4, Review Section, 27, 29 (1997).

"Combatting the Preexisting Impairment Defense," Kendra L. Walker, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XX, No. 6, 16 (1997).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XX, No. 6, Review Section, 29, 33 (1997).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 1, Review Section, 24, 27, 28, 29 (1997).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 2, Review Section, 30 (1997).

"Workers Compensation Law: Constitutionality of the 1993 Kansas Workers Compensation Act," Nicole M. Zomberg, 37 W.L.J. 829 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 3, Review Section, 24, 28 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 4, Review Section, 27 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 5, Review Section, 18, 19 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Law Update: The Multiple Employer Rule and Liberal Construction," Beth Regier Foerster, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 6, 13 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 6, Review Section, 20, 26, 28 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 1, 21 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 2, 25 (1998).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 4, 26 (1999).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 5, 24 (1999).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 6, 25, 27, 28, 32 (1999).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 6, 21 (1999).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXIII, No. 1, 20 (1999).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXIII, No. 2, 25 (1999).

"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXIII, No. 4, 21 (2000).

"New K.S.A. 44-503(g): Has the Immunity Windfall for Statutory Employers Been Curtailed?" Donald W. Vasos and Michael R. Wallace, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 23, No. 6, 14 (2000).

"Workers Compensation Review," Patrick R. Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 23, No. 6, 20 (2000).

"Heart Attacks and Strokes Under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act," Timothy A. Short, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 24, No. 1, 8 (2000).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 24, No. 4, 21 (2001).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 24, No. 5, 23 (2001).

"Survey of Kansas Tort Law: Part I," William E. Westerbeke and Stephen R. McAllister, 49 K.L.R. 1037 (2001).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 25, No. 3, 17, 18 (2002).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 25, No. 6, 20 (2002).

"The Clash Between Workers' Compensation Benefits and Underinsured Motorists Benefits Under Kansas Law," Brooke A. Bennett, 51 K.L.R. 155 (2002).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 26, No. 1, 21 (2002).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 26, No. 2, 19 (2002).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 26, No. 4, 26 (2003).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 26, No. 5, 18 (2003).

"Cold-Hearted Application of the Heart Amendment Leaves Kansas Workers' Compensation Claimants Gasping [Mudd v. Neosho Memorial Regional Medical, 62 P.3d 236 (Kan. 2003)]," Shannon L. Bell, 43 W.L.J. 171 (2003).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 26, No. 6, 23 (2003).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 2, 21 (2003).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 3, 25 (2004).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 4, 18 (2004).

"The Immunity Provisions in the Kansas Tort Claims Act: The First Twenty-Five Years," William E. Westerbeke, 52 K.L.R. 939 (2004).

"Litigating a Defense of Alcohol or Drug Impairment Under the Workers Compensation Act," Hon. Bruce E. Moore, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 6, 6, 10 (2004).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 6, 19 (2004).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 28, No. 1, 19 (2004).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 28, No. 4, 24 (2005).

"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 28, No. 5, 18 (2005).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 29, No. 3, 23 (2006).

"Making the Most Out of the Cap: Maximizing Non-Economic Damages," Bradley J. Prochaska, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 29, No. 6, 8 (2006).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 30, No. 2, 18 (2006).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 30, No. 5, 15 (2007).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 30, No. 6, 25 (2007).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 31, No. 1, 23 (2007).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 31, No. 5, 18 (2008).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 33, No. 6, 31 (2010).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 34, No. 4, 19 (2011).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 34, No. 3, 23 (2011).

"The 2011 Kansas Workers Compensation Act: Too Sharp a Right Turn?" Tim Alvarez, 81 J.K.B.A. No. 1, 25 (2012).

"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Kathleen J. Cossairt, Jan Fisher, Jon W. Stapleton, Jr., Stephanie J. Wilson, and David H. Ferris, 36 J.K.A.J. No. 6 (2013).

Attorney General's Opinions:

County extension council; extension agent and other employees status under tort claims and workers compensation acts. 84-56.

Kansas civil air patrol; tort claims act; workers compensation. 91-124.

Requirement for medical examinations; differences between Americans with Disabilities Act and Kansas Workers Compensation Act. 1999-35.

Authority of legislature to transfer money from special revenue funds into state general fund. 2002-45.

"Paid Loss Reporting Forms" is public record available for public inspection. 2004-1.

CASE ANNOTATIONS

Explanation, see Revisor's Note under article title, ch. 44, art. 5.

Cases through 1973

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

—Constitutionality (1-8)

1. Act of 1911, as amended by 1913 Act, is constitutional under state and federal constitutions. Shade v. Cement Co., 92 K. 146, 139 P. 1193 (1914); rehearing 93 K. 257, 261, 144 P. 249 (1914).

2. Act of 1911, as amended in 1913, constitutional and valid. Hovis v. Refining Co., 95 K. 505, 511, 148 P. 626 (1915).

3. Act does not violate due process or equal protection clauses of federal constitution; does not deprive of right to trial by jury. Shade v. Cement Co., 93 K. 257, 259, 260, 144 P. 249 (1914).

4. Title does not violate article 2 of section 16 of the constitution. Swader v. Flour Mills Co., 103 K. 378, 380, 176 P. 143 (1918); rehearing 103 K. 703, 176 P. 143 (1918); Shade v. Cement Co., 93 K. 257, 261, 144 P. 249 (1914).

5. Statute is optional and does not infringe constitutional due process provisions. Baker v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 145 K. 273, 280, 65 P.2d 284 (1937).

6. Those in nonhazardous class not required to post notice they are under act; constitutional. Schmeling v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 137 K. 573, 574, 576, 577, 578, 21 P.2d 337 (1933); rehearing denied, 138 K. 281, 282, 26 P.2d 265 (1933).

7. Employer electing to accept act cannot question constitutionality. Slick v. Hamaker, 28 F.2d 103 (1928).

8. No violation of state or federal constitution in 44-504 on basis of unreasonable classification or equal protection of laws. Elam v. Bruenger, 165 K. 31, 193 P.2d 225 (1948).

—Act complete (9-12)

9. The workmen's compensation act establishes its own procedure and furnishes a remedy which is substantial, complete and exclusive from the inception of the claim to final judgment thereon. Taylor v. Taylor, 156 K. 763, 765, 766, and Syl. 1, 137 P.2d 147 (1943).

10. Act is complete and exclusive and code provisions do not apply. Cruse v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Rly. Co., 138 K. 117, 23 P.2d 471 (1933).

11. Act establishes own procedure and provides substantial, complete and exclusive remedy. Wilson v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 185 K. 725, 347 P.2d 235 (1959).

12. Act establishes a procedure of its own which provides a remedy that is substantial, complete and exclusive in compensation cases. Peschka v. Wilkinson Drilling Co., 192 K. 126, 131, 386 P.2d 509 (1963).

—Exclusive remedy (15-27)

15. Remedies under compensation act exclusive where both parties under act. Shade v. Cement Co., 92 K. 146, 147, 139 P. 1193 (1914); McRoberts v. Zinc Co., 93 K. 364, 367, 144 P. 247 (1914).

16. Remedies provided by act are exclusive as to all injuries within its purview. Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 K. 79, 80, 85, 89, 174 P.2d 78 (1946).

17. Traveling entertainer found to be under compensation act; sole remedy under act. Neugen v. Associated Chautauqua Co., 70 F.2d 605 (1934).

18. Where workman and employer under act remedies thereunder are exclusive. Kelly v. Summers, 210 F.2d 665, 668 (1954).

19. Inhaling poison gas from day to day was cause of death; not injury by accident within compensation statute; common law action proper. Echord v. Rush, 124 K. 521, 261 P. 820 (1927).

20. Compensation allowed; no bar to suit against physician for malpractice. Cooke v. Bunten, 135 K. 558, 11 P.2d 1016 (1932).

21. Exclusive remedy is under compensation act when employer is operating thereunder. Spade v. VanSickle, 175 K. 557, 563, 265 P.2d 860 (1954).

22. Mentioned in holding employer not liable in common law action for damages. Whitaker v. Douglas, 179 K. 64, 65, 70, 292 P.2d 688 (1956).

23. Employer and employee compulsorily under act; employee's remedy against employer exclusive thereunder. Wilburn v. Boeing Airplane Co., 188 K. 722, 729, 366 P.2d 246 (1961).

24. Employer and workman both under act; compensation case found no personal injury by accident; dependents may bring wrongful death action and compensation act is not a bar. Contrary was held in first opinion and reversed on rehearing. Echord v. Rush, 122 K. 260, 251 P. 1112 (1927); reversed 124 K. 521, 261 P. 820 (1927).

25. Remedy under act is not exclusive if injury complained of is not within its provisions. Echord v. Rush, 124 K. 521, 523, 261 P. 820 (1927).

26. Plaintiff statutory employee of defendant; remedy exclusive. Coe v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 348 F.2d 1, 2 (1965).

27. Employee had no common law remedy in negligence after accidental injury. Sade v. Northern Natural Gas Company, 458 F.2d 210 (1972).

—Legislative intent (28-37)

28. Background and theory of compensation act discussed. Truman v. Railroad Co., 98 K. 761, 767, 161 P. 587 (1916).

29. Purpose of act; liberal construction in favor of workman. Hilyard v. Lohmann-Johnson Drilling Co., 168 K. 177, 180, 183, 211 P.2d 89 (1949).

30. English cases fixed the meaning of terms in this section before their adoption by Kansas legislature. Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 K. 771, 777, 180 P. 793 (1919).

31. The phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" is borrowed from the English act; legislative intent and purpose discussed. Kansas City Fibre Box Co. v. Connell, 5 F.2d 398, 399 (1925).

32. Act founded upon considerations of public policy; purpose; liberal construction. Matlock v. Hollis, 153 K. 227, 232, 109 P.2d 119 (1941).

33. Act liberally construed to effectuate legislative intent. Thuillez v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 187 K. 618, 619, 621, 622, 358 P.2d 676 (1961).

34. The purpose of the compensation law is not to pay the workman for the injury, but to compensate him in a way for his loss of earning power. Blythe v. State Highway Comm., 148 K. 598, 601, 83 P.2d 678 (1938).

35. Purpose of act considered in holding dispute between two insurance carriers to be settled in separate action. Kuhn v. Grant County, 201 K. 163, 439 P.2d 155 (1968).

36. Considered and quoted in part in construing provisions of 44-512a. Shinkle v. State Highway Commission, 202 K. 311, 315, 448 P.2d 12 (1968).

37. Enactment of last sentence of statute by legislature intended as curb on recent court decisions in heart attack cases (dissent). Brannum v. Spring Lakes Country Club, Inc., 203 K. 658, 669, 455 P.2d 546 (1969).

—Liability arises on contract (38-39)

38. Rights and duties under compensation act are contractual in nature. Neville, Administratrix, v. Wichita Eagle, 179 K. 197, 199, 201, 294 P.2d 248 (1956).

39. Liability of employer for injury to employee arises on contract. Johnson, Guardian, v. Milling Co., 116 K. 731, 229 P. 359 (1924).

—Liberal interpretation (40-43)

40. Statute will be liberally construed to make effective legislative intent. Clifford v. Eacrett, 163 K. 471, 475, 183 P.2d 861 (1947).

41. Liberal construction of act in order to award compensation to workman where it is reasonably possible to do so. Bright v. Bragg, 175 K. 404, Syl. 6, 264 P.2d 494 (1953).

42. If the trial court fails in its application of the rule of liberal construction, appellate court has the duty to correct such failure. Bender v. Salina Roofing Co., 179 K. 415, 422, 295 P.2d 662 (1956).

43. Workmen's compensation act to be liberally interpreted and flexibly applied. Palmer v. Fincke, 122 K. 825, 826, 253 P. 583 (1927).

—Miscellaneous (45-50)

45. Cited in case holding that where findings of fact entered by a district court in a workmen's compensation proceeding are supported by substantial competent evidence they will not be set aside on appellate review. Calvert v. Darby Corporation, 207 K. 198, 200, 483 P.2d 491 (1971).

46. There are three parties interested in act; the employer, the employee and the public. Miles v. Wyatt, 138 K. 863, 864, 28 P.2d 748 (1934).

47. Disability awarded hereunder does not control disability benefits under federal Social Security Act. Sampson v. Flemming, 189 F.Supp. 725, 726, 728 (1960).

48. Liability barred in three years under statute of limitations. Taylor v. Swift & Co., 114 K. 431, 219 P. 516 (1923).

49. Compensation claim cannot be barred by 3-year statute of limitations. Cruse v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Rly. Co., 138 K. 117, 23 P.2d 471 (1933).

50. Death as a result of injury must occur within three years after the date of the accident or no death benefits may be allowed. Forcade v. List & Clark Construction Co., 172 K. 119, 123, 238 P.2d 549 (1951).

—Obligation (51-55)

51. Mentioned in setting forth the "obligation" to workman by his employer under workmen's compensation act. Johnson v. Warren, 192 K. 310, 313, 387 P.2d 213 (1963).

52. Nature of obligation considered. Roda v. Williams, 195 K. 507, 512, 407 P.2d 471 (1965).

53. Section cited; action against negligent coemployee. Tully v. Estate of Gardner, 196 K. 137, 140, 409 P.2d 782 (1966).

54. "Obligation" of act considered; no provision for restitution or "recover back" of payments made pending appeal. Tompkins v. Rinner Construction Co., 196 K. 244, 247, 249, 252, 409 P.2d 1001 (1966).

55. Obligation under act does not affect rights of employee against person other than employer. Houk v. Arrow Drilling Co., 201 K. 81, 82, 84, 91, 439 P.2d 146 (1968).

—Historical jury trial (60-67)

60. Verdict entirely inconsistent with evidence and findings set aside. Penn v. Swift & Co., 108 K. 336, 195 P. 620 (1921).

61. Decision of arbitrator final upon issues properly before him. Palmer v. Fincke, 122 K. 825, 826, 253 P. 583 (1927).

62. Employer entitled to trial on question of fact and law not submitted. Williams v. Wilson, 124 K. 331, 259 P. 702 (1927).

63. Special findings of jury under act; time of filing motions. Mickens v. Hill, 126 K. 794, 271 P. 279 (1928).

64. Special finding as to cause of death not inconsistent with general verdict. Riggs v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 131 K. 244, 289 P. 410 (1930).

65. Defense of contributory negligence raised; recovery not barred thereby; comment on comparative negligence. Ballou v. Railway Co., 95 K. 761, 763, 765, 152 P. 284 (1915).

66. Allegations negativing conditions of this section, barring recovery, held unnecessary. Oliver v. Christopher, 98 K. 660, 662, 159 P. 397 (1916).

67. Plaintiff need not allege matters of defense. Oliver v. Christopher, 98 K. 660, 662, 159 P. 397 (1916).

ACCIDENT, IN GENERAL

—Definition "accident" (70-78)

70. An accident is simply an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character and often accompanied by a manifestation of force. Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 K. 771, 773, 180 P. 793 (1919).

71. Accident defined; a certain time, place or circumstance when accident happened, took place or occurred required as one element. Barker v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 132 K. 776, 781, 297 P. 418 (1931).

72. "Arising out of" and "in course of employment" defined; death resulting from physical structure giving way from exertion constitutes accident. Carney v. Hellar, 155 K. 674, 677, 127 P.2d 496 (1942).

73. "Injury by accident" defined; "accident" liberally construed. Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 K. 503, 505, 506, 203 P.2d 171 (1949).

74. Meaning of term "by accident" discussed. Bender v. Salina Roofing Co., 179 K. 415, 295 P.2d 662 (1956).

75. Physical structure of the man gave out under the stress of his usual labor. Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 K. 771, 777, 180 P. 793 (1919).

76. "Injury by accident" means simply accidental injury or accident in the popular sense. Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 K. 771, 774, 180 P. 793 (1919).

77. Deafness of traumatic origin; a series of accidents, being a series of pistol shots; accidental injury within act. Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 K. 503, 505, 506, 203 P.2d 171 (1949).

78. Terms "personal injury" and "accident," defined. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 K. 295, 300, 301, 302, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

—Miscellaneous (80-87)

80. When injury may be deemed to be "by accident" considered. Monson v. Battelle, 102 K. 208, 211, 170 P. 801 (1918).

81. "By accident" construed; coronary thrombosis caused by lifting merchandise held accident. Peterson v. Safeway Stores, 158 K. 271, 272, 273, 274, 146 P.2d 657 (1944).

82. Coronary occlusion, coronary thrombosis, cerebral hemorrhage, thrombosis or hemorrhage, or heart failure-acute may be personal injury by accident. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 K. 295, 300, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

83. A cough or cold is not an accident within meaning of act. Shoemaker v. Hardwick, 189 K. 72, 73, 366 P.2d 1008 (1961).

84. Injury resulting from wanton conduct of employer within act; remedy exclusive. Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 K. 79, 80, 85, 89, 174 P.2d 78 (1946).

85. Workman breathed cement dust resulting in weakness; heart attack while climbing a ladder in employment; accident arising out of employment. Riggs v. Ash Grove L. & P. C. Co., 127 K. 91, 272 P. 153 (1928).

86. Lifting flour sacks by 40-year-old man unaccustomed to heavy work resulted in his dropping dead; physical structure of the man gave way under stress of his usual labor; compensable. Harmon v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 134 K. 143, 4 P.2d 406 (1931).

87. Claimant has the burden of establishing, among other things, that the injury to the workman occurred as a result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of the workman's employment. McMillan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 157 K. 385, Syl. 1, 139 P.2d 854 (1943).

—Occupational disease (90-92)

90. Occupational diseases not accidental injuries within meaning of compensation act. Chop v. Swift & Co., 118 K. 35, 233 P. 800 (1925); Watson v. International Milling Co., 190 K. 98, 372 P.2d 287 (1962).

91. "Personal injury by accident" ordinarily does not include occupational disease. El Dorado Refining Co. v. United States Fidelity & G. Co., 157 K. 198, 202, 139 P.2d 369 (1943).

92. Finding lead poisoning was occupational disease not accidental injury upheld. Vocke v. Eagle-Picher Co., 168 K. 708, 215 P.2d 185 (1950).

—Personal injury (96-100)

96. Term "personal injury" defined. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 K. 295, 300, 301, 302, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

97. Finding of personal injury by accident does not require finding of disability. Howerton v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 191 K. 449, 452, 381 P.2d 365 (1963).

98. Act liberally construed to effectuate legislative intent; "accident" and "personal injury" defined. Thuillez v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 187 K. 618, 619, 621, 622, 358 P.2d 676 (1961).

99. Aggravation of pre-existing heart condition constitutes "personal injury by accident." McIver v. State Highway Commission, 198 K. 678, 681, 684, 426 P.2d 118 (1967).

100. Existence of accidental, compensable personal injury is question of fact; trial court's finding supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed. Ippolito v. Katz Drug Co., 199 K. 309, 310, 429 P.2d 101 (1967).

PARTICULAR ACCIDENTS

—Assault (102-110)

102. Injury resulting from assault by fellow workman not within act; exception. Johnson v. Guggenheim Packing Co., 168 K. 702, 704, 215 P.2d 178 (1950).

103. Altercation between workmen; injury did not arise out of employment. Romerex v. Swift & Co., 106 K. 844, 189 P. 923 (1920).

104. Injury in fight with another employee; not compensable, when. Addington v. Hall, 160 K. 268, 160 P.2d 649 (1945).

105. Injury intentionally inflicted upon workman by foreman; not within act because wrongful conduct was not habitual. Peavy v. Contracting Co., 112 K. 637, 211 P. 1113 (1923).

106. Ticket agent, while on duty, was fatally assaulted by unknown person; employment invited assault; accident and death arose out of employment. Phillips v. Kansas City, L. & W. Rly. Co., 126 K. 133, 134, 267 P. 4 (1928).

107. Traveling man intentionally assaulted by person outside employment; not within act. Covert v. John Morrell & Co., 138 K. 592, 27 P.2d 553 (1933).

108. Assault on the job by a fellow workman, known by employer to have fighting propensities, is compensable. Hallett v. McDowell & Sons, 186 K. 813, 817, 352 P.2d 946 (1960).

109. Mentioned in finding injury resulted from assault of fellow employee. Carter v. Alpha Kappa Lambda Fraternity, 197 K. 374, 375, 417 P.2d 137 (1966).

110. Recovery granted to employee injured by assault of fellow employee. Brannum v. Spring Lakes Country Club, Inc., 203 K. 658, 660, 455 P.2d 546 (1969).

—Automobiles (113)

113. Auto accident while on job did not aggravate a pre-existing coronary condition which caused death a month later. Embry v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S., 451 F.2d 472 (1971).

—Falls (115-117)

115. Sixty-two-year-old man fell on concrete when chair slipped out from under him; suffered cerebral hemorrhage; arose out of employment. Burk v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 160 K. 519, 163 P.2d 402 (1945).

116. Eighty-year-old man fell from chair, developed pneumonia and died; was doing nothing within employment; compensation denied. Gamble v. Board of Public Utilities, 137 K. 227, 19 P.2d 729 (1933).

117. Foreman sent workman on an errand; in performing errand workman fell into a vat of hot water; accident and death arose in the course of employment. McDonnell v. Swift & Co., 124 K. 327, 328, 329, 259 P. 695 (1927).

—Gas and poison (120-123)

120. Death resulting from carbon monoxide gas in mine; accidental injury within act. Scott v. Devine, 132 K. 834, 835, 297 P. 669 (1931).

121. Suicide which results from carbon monoxide poisoning constitutes an accident; insufficient evidence thereof. Gardner v. Ark Warehouse Co., 148 K. 190, 193, 80 P.2d 1066 (1938).

122. Finding lead poisoning was occupational disease not accidental injury upheld. Vocke v. Eagle-Picher Co., 168 K. 708, 215 P.2d 185 (1950).

123. Truck driver killed by carbon monoxide fumes in the cab of his truck parked by highway found to be compensable. McGhay v. Eaton, 146 K. 686, 687, 688, 689, 692, 73 P.2d 15 (1937).

—Miscellaneous (125-133)

125. Injury from electrical shock, death occurring later, held within act. Casebeer v. Coal Co., 110 K. 728, 731, 205 P. 626 (1922).

126. Injury by firearms held not to arise out of employment. Finck v. Galloway, 139 K. 173, 29 P.2d 1091 (1934).

127. Claimant flying airplane for personal reasons; failure to sustain burden of proof of causal connection to employment. Whitely v. King Radio Corporation, Inc., 190 K. 439, 375 P.2d 593 (1962).

128. Salesman contacted high voltage wire and was killed on the highway; causal connection between employment and injury. Kennedy v. Hull & Dillon Packing Co., 130 K. 191, 285 P. 536 (1930).

129. Jerking, jarring and jolting of maney caused driver's back injury; accidental injury within compensation act. Barker v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 132 K. 776, 781, 297 P. 418 (1931).

130. Gun carried for deceased's own protection accidentally discharged; accident did not arise out of employment. Hudson v. Salina Country Club, 148 K. 697, 701, 84 P.2d 854 (1938).

131. Deafness caused by series of pistol explosions held injury by accident. Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 K. 503, 505, 506, 203 P.2d 171 (1949).

132. Incapacity resulting from unskillful medical treatment does not arise out of employment. Cooke v. Bunten, 135 K. 558, 11 P.2d 1016 (1932).

133. Workman abandoned his employment to go into a dangerous part of electrical plant and was injured by electrical current there; accident did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Haas v. Light & Power Co., 109 K. 197, 205, 198 P. 174 (1921).

—Overexertion (140-150)

140. Pull on wrench resulting in heart attack is accident and arose out of employment. Hill v. Etchen Motor Co., 143 K. 655, 56 P.2d 103 (1936).

141. Exertion aggravated existing heart condition; personal injury arising out of and in course of employment. Bohanan v. Schlozman Ford, Inc., 188 K. 795, 798, 366 P.2d 28 (1961).

142. Work requiring extreme exertion by golf course superintendent found to have resulted in cardiac failure; compensable. Price v. McSpaden, 188 K. 578, 579, 580, 363 P.2d 533 (1961).

143. Lifting flour sacks by 40-year-old man unaccustomed to heavy work resulted in his dropping dead; physical structure of the man gave way under stress of his usual labor; compensable. Harmon v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 134 K. 143, 4 P.2d 406 (1931).

144. Workman breathed cement dust resulting in weakness; heart attack while climbing a ladder in employment; accident arising out of employment. Riggs v. Ash Grove L. & P. C. Co., 127 K. 91, 272 P. 153 (1928).

145. Necessary for workman to break off rock by blows of a 16-pound sledge; suffered pulmonary hemorrhage; essential attributes of an accident present. Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 K. 771, 773, 180 P. 793 (1919).

146. Evidence held sufficient to connect exertion and hemorrhage in eye. Shapland v. Ferguson Furniture Co., 139 K. 768, 33 P.2d 145 (1934).

147. Valvular heart lesion suffered while lifting and jerking lever; compensable. Earhart v. Wible Ice & Cold Storage Co., 150 K. 695, 95 P.2d 366 (1939).

148. Increase in blood pressure from exertion of sawing boards contributed to cerebral hemorrhage; compensation allowed. Carney v. Hellar, 155 K. 674, 676, 127 P.2d 496 (1942).

149. Workman, while stacking merchandise, strained himself and suffered coronary thrombosis; personal injury by accident. Peterson v. Safeway Stores, 158 K. 271, Syl. 1, 146 P.2d 657 (1944).

150. Cold weather and exertion precipitated coronary attack. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 K. 295, 299, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

—Weather (155-166)

155. Death from lightning while passing from quarry to quarry within act. Mathis v. Ash Grove L. & P. C. Co., 127 K. 93, 272 P. 183 (1928).

156. Injury from storm held not to be within act. Rush v. Empire Oil & Refining Co., 140 K. 198, 200, 34 P.2d 542 (1934).

157. Storm blew down high voltage wires and salesman's car contacted them killing the salesman; accidental injury within act. Kennedy v. Hull & Dillon Packing Co., 130 K. 191, 285 P. 536 (1930).

158. Causal connection between employment and injury by tornado; compensable. Faulkner v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 187 K. 667, 668, 359 P.2d 833 (1961).

159. Employee slipping on ice on entering plant; within act. Teague v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 K. 434, 312 P.2d 220 (1957).

160. Claimant's fingers frozen while digging ditch; injury within act; accident. Murphy v. I. C. U. Const. Co., 158 K. 541, 148 P.2d 771 (1944).

161. Overheated workman drinking ice water; death held within compensation act. Gilliland v. Zinc Co., 112 K. 39, 209 P. 658 (1922).

162. Heatstroke held accidental injury within act. Tabor v. Tole Landscape Co., 181 K. 616, 619, 313 P.2d 290 (1957).

163. Exposure to cold at farm auction resulting in death held compensable. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 K. 295, 300, 301, 302, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

164. Wound infected by walking through flood waters at place of employment; accidental injury within act. Monson v. Battelle, 102 K. 208, 211, 170 P. 801 (1918).

165. Workman's toes froze on 28-degree day; Buerger's disease (circulatory); no accidental injury within compensation act. Wright v. Keith, 136 K. 393, 395, 15 P.2d 429 (1932).

166. Injury from excessive heat followed by pneumonia, not within act. Hoag v. Laundry Co., 113 K. 513, 215 P. 295 (1923).

IN COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT

—Burden of proof (175-176)

175. Claimant has the burden of establishing, among other things, that the injury to the workman occurred as a result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of the workman's employment. McMillan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 157 K. 385, Syl. 1, 139 P.2d 854 (1943).

176. Death held not compensable; burden of proof as to causal connection. Rorabaugh v. General Mills, 187 K. 363, 367, 356 P.2d 796 (1960).

—Definition "in course of" (178-183)

178. Phrase "in the course of his employment" defined. Schooley v. Swanson, 147 K. 758, 760, 762, 78 P.2d 858 (1938).

179. Terms "out of" and "in the course of" defined. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 K. 295, 300, 301, 302, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

180. An accident happens "in the course of the employment" when it occurs while the workman is doing the duty he was employed to perform. Hudson v. Salina Country Club, 148 K. 697, 701, 84 P.2d 854 (1938).

181. The phrase "in the course of employment" relates to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident occurred, and means that the accident happened while the workman was at work in his employer's service. Carney v. Hellar, 155 K. 674, Syl. 3, 127 P.2d 496 (1942).

182. Purpose of act; liberal construction in favor of workman; "out of" and ''in course of" construed. Hilyard v. Lohmann-Johnson Drilling Co., 168 K. 177, 180, 183, 211 P.2d 89 (1949).

183. Distinction made between injury arising "out of" and "in the course of" employment; both conditions must exist before compensation allowable. Siebert v. Hoch, 199 K. 299, 303, 429 P.2d 825 (1967).

—Place of injury (186-198)

186. Workman going from one mine to another not within act. Bevard v. Coal Co., 101 K. 207, 208, 165 P. 657 (1917).

187. Injury on runway between factories held within provisions of act. Gadberry v. Egg Case Filler Co., 104 K. 72, 177 P. 834 (1919).

188. Miner injured while leaving mine; injury in course of employment. Chance v. Coal & Mining Co., 108 K. 121, 193 P. 889 (1920).

189. Accidental fall and injury in dressing room held incident of employment. Corpora v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 129 K. 690, 284 P. 818 (1930).

190. Traveling man injured on highway within territory is within act. Kennedy v. Hull & Dillon Packing Co., 130 K. 191, 285 P. 536 (1930).

191. Night watchman fell through roof to death; circumstantial evidence carried burden of proof; acting within scope of employment; within act. Supica v. Armour & Co., 131 K. 756, 293 P. 483 (1930).

192. Workman injured just before arrival at working place, injury not within act. Harrison v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 158 K. 129, 131, 145 P.2d 147 (1944).

193. Mechanic killed in automobile collision while returning from another city; injury incident to employment and compensable. Blair v. Shaw, 171 K. 524, 233 P.2d 731 (1951).

194. Employee slipping on ice on entering plant; within act. Teague v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 K. 434, 312 P.2d 220 (1957).

195. Injury in adjoining alley held not compensable under 44-508 (k). Murray v. Ludowici-Celadon Co., 181 K. 556, 558, 313 P.2d 728 (1957).

196. Workman requested foreman's permission to move foreman's car and foreman yielded to the request; workman killed moving car; accident did not arise out of employment. Sellers v. Reice Construction Co., 124 K. 550, 551, 555, 262 P. 19 (1927).

197. Trip to doctor's office for treatment of injury suffered in employment is an activity in the course of employment. Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 K. 130, 379 P.2d 217 (1963).

198. Workman killed while trespassing on other grounds not within act. Mazeffe v. Railway Co., 106 K. 796, 798, 189 P. 917 (1920).

—Time of injury (201-203)

201. Miner injured while ascending to top of mine at day's end; compensable. Sedlock v. Mining Co., 98 K. 680, 681, 159 P. 9 (1916).

202. Employee injured during noon intermission; liability of employer considered. Thomas v. Manufacturing Co., 104 K. 432, 179 P. 372 (1919).

203. Workman injured just before arrival at working place; injury not within act. Harrison v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 158 K. 129, 131, 145 P.2d 147 (1944).

ARISES OUT OF EMPLOYMENT

—Aggravation (204-227)

204. Claim that diabetes was caused or accelerated by accident; no evidence to support claim; compensation disallowed. Whitaker v. Panhandle Eastern P. L. Co., 142 K. 314, 315, 46 P.2d 862 (1935).

205. Evidence that pre-existing diabetes made a double hernia inoperable is not evidence of aggravation of diabetes, barring subsequent complications. Rogers v. Board of Public Utilities, 158 K. 693, 702, 149 P.2d 632 (1944).

206. Aggravation of pre-existing hernia is compensable. Kronig v. Nolan Motor Co., 186 K. 534, 535, 536, 351 P.2d 1 (1960).

207. Injury contributed to and aggravated pre-existing multiple sclerosis (a disease); compensable. Blackburn v. Brick & Tile Co., 107 K. 722, 193 P. 351 (1920).

208. Running drill in employment intensified affliction. Lee v. Lone Star Cement Co., 142 K. 349, 46 P.2d 864 (1935).

209. Injury aggravating existing Hodgkins disease resulting in death is compensable. Hall v. Kornfeld-Harper Well Servicing Co., 159 K. 70, 151 P.2d 688 (1944).

210. Injury resulting in disability within act though employee afflicted with disease. Warlop v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 24 F.2d 926 (1928).

211. Workman's lungs weakened by flu; had a pulmonary hemorrhage while sawing lumber in his employment; injury arose out of employment. Stringer v. Mining Co., 114 K. 716, 717, 718, 720, 220 P. 168 (1923).

212. Arthritis of back aggravated by jarring, jolting and jerking of workman; accidental injury arising out of employment. Barker v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 132 K. 776, 781, 297 P. 418 (1931).

213. Pipe slipped and crushed workman resulting in hemorrhage from stomach; pre-existing gastric ulcers; injury contributed to death; compensable. Baxter v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Rly. Co., 139 K. 443, 32 P.2d 451 (1934).

214. Accident intensified or aggravated affliction or contributed to death; compensable. Lee v. Lone Star Cement Co., 142 K. 349, 351, 46 P.2d 864 (1935).

215. Shock of accident constituted a new factor which operated on the existing condition and contributed to death; compensable. Vera v. Swift & Co., 143 K. 593, 601, 604, 56 P.2d 96 (1936).

216. Furnace door fell on claimant; it "aggravated, activated and set in motion" an existing condition which resulted in cancer. Waltrip v. Acme Foundry & Machine Co., 147 K. 781, 783, 78 P.2d 898 (1938).

217. Scraping and bruising a protrusion on leg aggravated it; malignant tumor found in treating resulting abscess; compensable. Johnson v. Skelly Oil Co., 180 K. 275, 276, 277, 280, 303 P.2d 172 (1956); affirmed, 181 K. 655, 312 P.2d 1076 (1957).

218. Increase in blood pressure from exertion of sawing boards contributed to cerebral hemorrhage; pre-existing arterio-sclerosis; compensation allowed. Carney v. Hellar, 155 K. 674, 678, 127 P.2d 496 (1942).

219. Traumatic neurosis totally incapacitated injured workman; mental affliction caused or accelerated by injury; subject reviewed. Morris v. Garden City Co., 144 K. 790, 791, 792, 62 P.2d 920 (1936).

220. Accidental injury aggravating or intensifying or precipitating pre-existing mental disease is compensable. Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 K. 355, 365, 139 P.2d 846 (1943).

221. Mental affliction brought about or caused to recur as a result of fall and injury to spine; compensable. Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 K. 355, 139 P.2d 846 (1943).

222. Accidental injury to potential psychoneurotic was exciting cause which precipitated traumatic neurosis, being a chronic anxiety state. Hayes v. Garvey Drilling Co., 188 K. 179, 181, 183, 360 P.2d 889 (1961).

223. Traumatic neurosis (conversion hysteria or psychoneurosis) is compensable, even if trauma merely aggravated a pre-existing condition. Barr v. Builders, Inc., 179 K. 617, 622, 627, 296 P.2d 1106 (1956).

224. Accidental injuries are compensable where the accident only serves to aggravate or accelerate an existing disease, or intensifies an affliction. Kauffman v. Co-operative Refinery Assn., 170 K. 325, Syl. 4, 225 P.2d 129 (1950).

225. Exertion aggravated existing heart condition; personal injury arising out of and in course of employment. Bohanan v. Schlozman Ford, Inc., 188 K. 795, 798, 366 P.2d 28 (1961).

226. Workman injured in course of employment entitled to compensation notwithstanding pre-existing disease. Warlop v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 24 F.2d 926 (1928).

227. Work on assembly line; claimant suffered cerebral vascular accident; compensable. Kirksey v. General Motors Corporation, 190 K. 806, 378 P.2d 91 (1963).

—Burden of proof (228-233)

228. It must appear that injury arose out of and in course of employment. Sedlock v. Mining Co., 98 K. 680, 681, 159 P. 9 (1916).

229. Burden on claimant to prove injury arose out of employment; failed to do so. Gamble v. Board of Public Utilities, 137 K. 227, 19 P.2d 729 (1933).

230. Claimant made "proof of more than possibility the infection resulted from the wound." Smith v. Cudahy Packing Co., 145 K. 36, 40, 64 P.2d 582 (1937).

231. Claimant has the burden of establishing, among other things, that the injury to the workman occurred as a result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of the workman's employment. McMillan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 157 K. 385, Syl. 1, 139 P.2d 854 (1943).

232. Claimant flying airplane for personal reasons; failure to sustain burden of proof of causal connection to employment. Whitely v. King Radio Corporation, Inc., 190 K. 439, 375 P.2d 593 (1962).

233. Evidence failed to establish causal connection between work being done and workman's death by coronary occlusion. Transmeier v. Blaw-Knox Construction Co., 191 K. 321, 380 P.2d 332 (1963).

—Causal connection (235-254)

235. Injury arises out of employment when there is a causal connection between the conditions required by the work and the resulting injury. Cox v. Refining Co., 108 K. 320, 323, 195 P. 863 (1921).

236. Accident had its origin in a risk connected with employment and flowed from that source as a rational consequence. Whetlaufer v. Howse, 146 K. 500, 505, 71 P.2d 879 (1937).

237. Personal acts, disassociated from employment, did not arise out of employment. Burns from using coal oil to start dwelling stove not within act. Holloway v. Consolidated Gas, Oil & Mfg. Co., 152 K. 129, 133, 102 P.2d 987 (1940).

238. Superintendent of drilling took indirect route between wells; was suffering from loss of sleep to perform job; accident en route arose out of employment. Mitchell v. Mitchell Drilling Co., 154 K. 117, 114 P.2d 841 (1941).

239. Fact that employee happened to be doing something incidental to or in connection with his work does not mean accident arose out of employment. Repstine v. Hudson Oil Co., 155 K. 486, 489, 126 P.2d 225 (1942).

240. Injury to left leg and bone graft taken from right hip by surgery; disability in right hip was occasioned by accidental injury arising out of and in course of employment; causal connection was traceable. Duncan v. Davidson Construction Co., 170 K. 520, 525, 227 P.2d 95 (1951).

241. Probability that exertion caused heart attack. Workman v. Johnson Bros. Construction Co., 164 K. 478, 479, 190 P.2d 863 (1948).

242. Finding cerebral hemorrhage did not arise out of employment upheld. Neff v. Henry Wagner Transport Co., 177 K. 738, 743, 281 P.2d 1109 (1955).

243. Causal connection between employment and injury by tornado; compensable. Faulkner v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 187 K. 667, 668, 359 P.2d 833 (1961).

244. Ticket agent, while on duty, was fatally assaulted by unknown person; employment invited assault; accident and death arose out of employment. Phillips v. Kansas City, L. & W. Rly. Co., 126 K. 133, 134, 267 P. 4 (1928).

245. "Arising out of" requires causal connection between incident of employment and the accident. Pearson v. Electric Service Co., 166 K. 300, 302, 303, 304, 305, 201 P.2d 643 (1949).

246. Workman required to go back and forth between stone quarries of employer was killed en route; causal connection between injury and condition under which deceased required to work; within act. Mathis v. Ash Grove L. & P. C. Co., 127 K. 93, 272 P. 183 (1928).

247. Brush salesman returned home feeling bad and died five days later of angina pectoris or myocarditis; death was not result of accidental injury arising out of employment. Zelinkoff v. Mountain States Brush Mfg. Corp., 135 K. 247, 9 P.2d 649 (1932).

248. Automobile accident while moving own household goods at request of employer; accident had its origin in a risk connected with employment. Stapleton v. State Highway Comm., 147 K. 419, 423, 76 P.2d 843 (1938).

249. Suicide which results from carbon monoxide poisoning constitutes an accident; insufficient evidence thereof. Gardner v. Ark Warehouse Co., 148 K. 190, 193, 80 P.2d 1066 (1938).

250. Injuries happening through curiosity or pranks of immature boy coworkers arise out of employment. Kansas City Fibre Box Co. v. Connell, 5 F.2d 398, Syl. 2 (1925).

251. Court may consider lay testimony in determining connection between work and coronary occlusion; corollary to Mein v. Meade County, 197 K. 810. Hanna v. Edward Gray Corporation, 197 K. 793, 421 P.2d 205 (1966).

252. Evidence sufficient to support causal relationship between employment and heart attack. Mein v. Meade County, 197 K. 810, 421 P.2d 177 (1966).

253. Causal connection between work and coronary; evidence supported finding. Lyon v. Wilson, 201 K. 768, 773, 443 P.2d 314 (1968).

254. Question of causal relation of exertion to cerebrovascular injury is one of fact. Dolan v. Steele, 207 K. 640, 642, 643, 644, 485 P.2d 1318 (1971).

—Definition "arises out of" (255-260)

255. The words "out of" employment point to origin of the injury and require a showing of some causal connection between the injury and employment. Evans v. Western Terra Cotta Co., 145 K. 924, 925, 67 P.2d 426 (1937).

256. The phrase "out of" employment, points to the cause or origin of the accident and requires some causal connection between the accidental injury and employment. Carney v. Hellar, 155 K. 674, Syl. 4, 127 P.2d 496 (1942).

257. "Out of" and "in course of" construed. Hilyard v. Lohmann-Johnson Drilling Co., 168 K. 177, 180, 183, 211 P.2d 89 (1949).

258. Terms "out of" and "in the course of" defined. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 K. 295, 300, 301, 302, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

259. Compensable injury must both arise "out of" and "in the course of" employment; dissent as to appellate jurisdiction. Tompkins v. Rinner Construction Co., 194 K. 278, 281, 398 P.2d 578 (1965).

260. Clause "injuries arising out of and in the course of employment for wage or profit" appearing in group insurance policy held to have same meaning as in this act. Bienz, Administratrix v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 195 K. 422, 425, 426, 407 P.2d 222 (1965).

—Incompetent medical care (261-266)

261. Incapacity resulting from unskilled medical treatment not within compensation act. Ruth v. Witherspoon-Englar Co., 98 K. 179, 181, 157 P. 403 (1916); second appeal 100 K. 608, 164 P. 1064 (1917).

262. Incompetent surgical treatment furnished by employer; compensation not increased; such incapacity does not arise out of and in course of employment. Ruth v. Witherspoon-Englar Co., 98 K. 179, 181, 157 P. 403 (1916).

263. No neglect of physicians who treated claimant found; respondent not excused from liability. Weaver v. Shanklin Walnut Co., 131 K. 771, 774, 293 P. 950 (1930).

264. Disability from bone grafts for surgical repair of accidental injury do not as a matter of law constitute an independent, intervening cause; natural result traceable to the injury; compensable. Duncan v. Davidson Construction Co., 170 K. 520, 527, 227 P.2d 95 (1951).

265. Death resulting from an operation necessitated by an injury is compensable when death resulted from injury. Evans v. Western Terra Cotta Co., 145 K. 924, 927, 67 P.2d 426 (1937).

266. Workman bruised chest; sarcoma of sternum developed; death followed operation; compensable. Parker v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 146 K. 832, 73 P.2d 1032 (1937).

—Refusal of medical care (268-270)

268. Award may be modified or canceled, for refusal to submit to reasonable medical treatment; burden of proof on employer.

(a) Evans v. Cook & Galloway Drilling Co., 191 K. 439, 381 P.2d 341 (1963);

(b) McCullough v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 155 K. 629, 632, 127 P.2d 467 (1942);

(d) Strong v. Iron & Metal Co., 109 K. 117, 198 P. 182 (1921).

269. Refusal to submit to surgical operation; compensation held properly refused. Strong v. Iron & Metal Co., 109 K. 117, 198 P. 182 (1921).

270. Refusal to submit to reasonable medical treatment is grounds for cancellation of award; forfeiture provision; burden of proof upon employer. Evans v. Cook & Galloway Drilling Co., 191 K. 439, 444, 445, 381 P.2d 341 (1963).

—No standard of health (272-273)

272. No standard of health necessary to bring workman under act. Workman v. Johnson Bros. Construction Co., 164 K. 478, 479, 190 P.2d 863 (1948).

273. The statute establishes no standard of health for workman.

(a) Kirksey v. General Motors Corporation, 190 K. 806, 808, 378 P.2d 91 (1963);

(b) Bohanan v. Schlozman Ford, Inc., 188 K. 795, Syl. 1, 366 P.2d 28 (1961);

(d) Kauffman v. Co-operative Refinery Assn., 170 K. 325, Syl. 3, 225 P.2d 129 (1950);

(e) Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 K. 771, 778, 180 P. 793 (1919);

(f) Geurian v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 192 K. 589, 594, 389 P.2d 782 (1964).

PARTICULAR INJURIES, DISEASES AND CONDITIONS

—Back (280-283)

280. Miner fell while pushing car of coal; traumatic sciatica resulted; condition within act. Ertman v. Clemens Coal Co., 132 K. 803, 297 P. 431 (1931).

281. Issue of fact whether lifting or infection caused back disability. Voiles v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 141 K. 451, 41 P.2d 723 (1935).

282. Claimant had congenital back defect; injured back while loading ore; exactitude unnecessary whether he suffered from one or the other; compensable. Baker v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 145 K. 273, 281, 65 P.2d 284 (1937).

283. Minor back injury still compensable. Shepherd v. Gas Service Co., 186 K. 699, 702, 352 P.2d 48 (1960).

—Cancer (285-287)

285. Workman bruised chest; sarcoma of sternum developed; death followed operation; compensable. Parker v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 146 K. 832, 73 P.2d 1032 (1937).

286. Furnace door fell on claimant; it "aggravated, activated and set in motion" an existing condition which resulted in cancer. Waltrip v. Acme Foundry & Machine Co., 147 K. 781, 783, 78 P.2d 898 (1938).

287. Workman suffering from pre-existing cancer ruptured intestinal wall, which aggravated, worsened and intensified his affliction; compensable. Strasser v. Jones, 186 K. 507, Syl. 3, 350 P.2d 779 (1960).

—Diseases (290-301)

290. Workman afflicted with muscular atrophy (a disease); fell from scaffold and injured back; question of fact whether disability was caused by the injury. Brown v. Kansas Buff Brick Co., 120 K. 335, 243 P. 304 (1926).

291. Employee's disability occurring entirely by reason of disease not within act. Warlop v. Western Coal and Mining Co., 24 F.2d 926 (1928).

292. Epileptic workman had fit and fell, injuring himself; fit was not provoked, induced or rendered more likely to happen because of his work; accident did not arise out of employment. Cox v. Refining Co., 108 K. 320, 324, 325, 195 P. 863 (1921).

293. Insanity is a disease; injury was cause or forerunner or the circumstance which brought about recurrence of mental affliction; compensable. Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 K. 355, 365, 139 P.2d 846 (1943).

294. Arthritis of back aggravated by jarring, jolting and jerking of workman; accidental injury arising out of employment. Barker v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 132 K. 776, 781, 297 P. 418 (1931).

295. Workman's toes froze on 28-degree day; Buerger's disease (circulatory); no accidental injury within compensation act. Wright v. Keith, 136 K. 393, 395, 15 P.2d 429 (1932).

296. Claim that diabetes was caused or accelerated by accident; no evidence to support claim; compensation disallowed. Whitaker v. Panhandle Eastern P. L. Co., 142 K. 314, 315, 46 P.2d 862 (1935).

297. Diabetic workman stepped on nail; developed gangrene necessitating amputation of leg five inches below knee; scheduled injury compensation allowed. McKinney v. Rodney Milling Co., 177 K. 401, 403, 279 P.2d 221 (1955).

298. Evidence that pre-existing diabetes made a double hernia inoperable is not evidence of aggravation of diabetes, barring subsequent complications. Rogers v. Board of Public Utilities, 158 K. 693, 702, 149 P.2d 632 (1944).

299. Injury aggravating existing Hodgkin's disease resulting in death is compensable; evidence. Hall v. Kornfeld-Harper Well Servicing Co., 159 K. 70, 151 P.2d 688 (1944).

300. Workman suffering from syphilis and hypertrophic arthritis struck knee from which he suffered for a time; temporary total until time of trial allowed. Kelsey v. Armour & Co., 119 K. 837, 241 P. 453 (1925).

301. Whether disability was caused by trauma or by chancroid infection is a question of fact; found to be the latter. Gregg v. American Walnut Lbr. Co., 137 K. 201, 19 P.2d 463 (1933).

—Heart (305-324)

305. Workman breathed cement dust resulting in weakness; heart attack while climbing a ladder in employment; accident arising out of employment. Riggs v. Ash Grove L. & P. C. Co., 127 K. 91, 272 P. 153 (1928).

306. Cement plant worker's lungs and heart weakened by dust and gases; heart attack upon exertion in employment was within act. Riggs v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 131 K. 244, 289 P. 410 (1930).

307. Brush salesman returned home feeling bad and died five days later of angina pectoris or myocarditis; death was not result of accidental injury arising out of employment. Zelinkoff v. Mountain States Brush Mfg. Corp., 135 K. 247, 9 P.2d 649 (1932).

308. Heart pain resulting from exertion did not arise out of employment. Meredith v. Seymour Packing Co., 141 K. 244, 40 P.2d 325 (1935).

309. Pull on wrench resulting in heart attack is accident and arose out of employment. Hill v. Etchen Motor Co., 143 K. 655, 56 P.2d 103 (1936).

310. Valvular heart lesion suffered while lifting and jerking lever; compensable. Earhart v. Wible Ice & Cold Storage Co., 150 K. 695, 95 P.2d 366 (1939).

311. Pneumonia followed by heart attack; did not arise out of employment. McMillan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 157 K. 385, 139 P.2d 854 (1943).

312. Workman, while stacking merchandise, strained himself and suffered coronary thrombosis; personal injury by accident. Peterson v. Safeway Stores, 158 K. 271, Syl. 1, 146 P.2d 657 (1944).

313. "Accident" defined; death from heart attack held by accident. Workman v. Johnson Bros. Construction Co., 164 K. 478, 479, 190 P.2d 863 (1948).

314. Cold weather and exertion precipitated coronary attack. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 K. 295, 299, 303 P.2d 197 (1956).

315. Coronary occlusion suffered by car salesman held accidental injury. Ford v. Morrison, 182 K. 787, 324 P.2d 140 (1958).

316. Coronary artery disease caused death; not within act. Grow v. Musgrove Petroleum Corp., 184 K. 800, 339 P.2d 75 (1959).

317. Coronary occlusion; injury within act; judgment supported by evidence. Wilson v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 185 K. 725, 347 P.2d 235 (1959).

318. Coronary occlusion; death held not compensable; burden of proof; causal connection. Rorabaugh v. General Mills, 187 K. 363, 367, 356 P.2d 796 (1960).

319. Coronary occlusion held accidental injury "arising out of and in course of employment." Thuillez v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 187 K. 618, 619, 621, 622, 358 P.2d 676 (1961).

320. Work requiring extreme exertion by golf course superintendent found to have resulted in cardiac failure; compensable. Price v. McSpaden, 188 K. 578, 579, 580, 363 P.2d 533 (1961).

321. Exertion aggravated existing heart condition; personal injury arising out of and in course of employment. Bohanan v. Schlozman Ford, Inc., 188 K. 795, 798, 366 P.2d 28 (1961).

322. Evidence failed to establish causal connection between work being done and workman's death by coronary occlusion. Transmeier v. Blaw-Knox Construction Co., 191 K. 321, 380 P.2d 322 (1963).

323. Coronary thrombosis found to be an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Karle v. Board of County Commissioners, 188 K. 800, 366 P.2d 241 (1961).

324. Death resulting from acute coronary occlusion was accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Alpers v. George-Nielsen Motor Co., 182 K. 790, 794, 324 P.2d 177 (1958).

—Hemorrhage (325-338)

325. Provisions of 1967 amendment found inapplicable in appeal concerning death from coronary occlusion. Pratt v. Seis-Tech Exploration Co., 199 K. 732, 735, 433 P.2d 555 (1967).

326. 1967 amendment concerning coronary applies only prospectively to injuries subsequent to effective date. Lyon v. Wilson, 201 K. 768, 773, 443 P.2d 314 (1968).

327. Vascular accident resulting in coronary occlusion did not arise out of and in course of employment. Meyers v. Consolidated Printing & Stationery Co., 201 K. 806, 808, 443 P.2d 319 (1968).

328. Death of workman from coronary insufficiency; accidental injury arising out of and in course of employment. Osman v. City of Wichita, 203 K. 313, 314, 454 P.2d 427 (1969).

329. Death from pulmonary hemorrhage; injury arising out of employment; "accident." Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 K. 771, 773, 180 P. 793 (1919).

330. Death from hemorrhage of lungs within act. Stringer v. Mining Co., 114 K. 716, 220 P. 168 (1923).

331. Workman's head injured by falling from scaffold; testimony death resulted from cerebrospinal meningitis (a disease); presents issue as to which caused death. Doty v. Crystal Ice & Fuel Co., 118 K. 323, 324, 235 P. 96 (1925); second case 122 K. 653, Syl. 2, 122 P. 611 (1927).

332. Pipe slipped and crushed workman resulting in hemorrhage from stomach; pre-existing gastric ulcers; injury contributed to death; compensable. Baxter v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Rly. Co., 139 K. 443, 32 P.2d 451 (1934).

333. Evidence held sufficient to connect exertion and hemorrhage in eye. Shapland v. Ferguson Furniture Co., 139 K. 768, 33 P.2d 145 (1934).

334. Rupture of aneurysm result of aggravation of existing condition. McMillin v. City of Salina, 163 K. 575, 587, 184 P.2d 201 (1947).

335. Work on assembly line; claimant suffered cerebral vascular accident; compensable. Kirksey v. General Motors Corporation, 190 K. 806, 378 P.2d 91 (1963).

336. Increase in blood pressure from exertion of sawing boards contributed to cerebral hemorrhage; pre-existing arteriosclerosis; compensation allowed. Carney v. Hellar, 155 K. 674, 676, 127 P.2d 496 (1942).

337. Sixty-two-year-old man fell on concrete when chair slipped out from under him; suffered cerebral hemorrhage; arose out of employment. Burk v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 160 K. 519, 163 P.2d 402 (1945).

338. Finding cerebral hemorrhage did not arise out of employment upheld. Neff v. Henry Wagner Transport Co., 177 K. 738, 743, 281 P.2d 1109 (1955).

—Hernia (339-340)

339. Strangulated hernia arose out of and in course of employment. Evans v. Western Terra Cotta Co., 145 K. 924, 67 P.2d 426 (1937).

340. Hernia sustained while preparing for work on employers' premises within act. Kauffman v. Co-operative Refinery Assn., 170 K. 325, 329, 225 P.2d 129 (1950).

—Infections and pneumonia (341-349)

341. Infection of existing wound; accident arising out of employment. Monson v. Battelle, 102 K. 208, 211, 170 P. 801 (1918).

342. Pneumonia following injury held not an accident. Hoag v. Laundry Co., 113 K. 513, 517, 215 P. 295 (1923).

343. Mashed toe infected by tetanus causing death; within act. Bradshaw v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 121 K. 525, 247 P. 644 (1926).

344. Finding of ringworm on leg resulting from cut arm sustained. Smith v. Cudahy Packing Co., 145 K. 36, 64 P.2d 582 (1937).

345. Evidence sustained finding systematic infection resulted from cut finger and within act. Parks v. Swift & Co., 146 K. 510, 72 P.2d 82 (1937).

346. Issue of fact whether lifting or infection caused back disability. Voiles v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 141 K. 451, 41 P.2d 723 (1935).

347. A cough or a cold is not an accident within meaning of act. Shoemaker v. Hardwick, 189 K. 72, 73, 366 P.2d 1008 (1961).

348. Eighty-year-old man fell from chair, developed pneumonia and died; was doing nothing within employment; compensation denied. Gamble v. Board of Public Utilities, 137 K. 227, 19 P.2d 729 (1933).

349. Pneumonia followed by heart attack; did not arise out of employment. McMillan v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 157 K. 385, 139 P.2d 854 (1943).

—Intoxication (350)

350. Respondent has burden of establishing death of workman resulted solely from intoxication. Schmidt v. Jensen Motors, Inc., 208 K. 182, 183, 490 P.2d 383 (1971).

—Mental illness (351)

351. Mental illness resulting from solely mental stimuli considered; finding claimant did not sustain injury by accident arising out of employment supported by evidence. Jacobs v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 196 K. 613, 412 P.2d 986 (1966).

—Miscellaneous (352-359)

352. Workman fell and hurt side; muscle spasm produced disability; compensable. Hardwell v. St. Louis S. & R. Co., 146 K. 870, 73 P.2d 1120 (1937).

353. Developing sore arm not injury arising out of and in course of employment. Burton v. Western Iron and Foundry Co., 173 K. 506, 249 P.2d 688 (1952).

354. Compensation recoverable where inability to labor results from pain. Trowbridge v. Wilson & Co., 102 K. 521, 170 P. 816 (1918).

355. Pain which does not result in incapacity is not compensable. Dobson v. Apex Coal Co., 150 K. 80, 85, 91 P.2d 5 (1939).

356. Shock of accident constituted a new factor which operated on the existing condition and contributed to death; compensable. Vera v. Swift & Co., 143 K. 593, 601, 604, 56 P.2d 96 (1936).

357. Traumatic neurosis totally incapacitated injured workman; mental affliction caused or accelerated by injury; subject reviewed. Morris v. Garden City Co., 144 K. 790, 791, 792, 62 P.2d 920 (1936).

358. Deafness caused by series of pistol explosions held injury by accident. Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 166 K. 503, 505, 506, 203 P.2d 171 (1949).

359. Heatstroke held accidental injury within act. Taber v. Tole Landscape Co., 181 K. 616, 619, 313 P.2d 290 (1957).

DEFENSES RELATING TO PROVISO

—Clause (a), earning full wages (361-369)

361. Injured employee not barred from recovering compensation by remaining in service of employer. Gailey v. Manufacturing Co., 98 K. 53, 157 P. 431 (1916).

362. Workman not barred by finding other employment at higher wages. Dennis v. Cafferty, 99 K. 810, 813, 163 P. 461 (1917).

363. Judgment relieving defendant from payments while workman employed considered. Lombard v. Planing Mill Co., 102 K. 780, 172 P. 32 (1918).

364. Injured workman not barred because earnings same as before accident. Raffaghelle v. Russell, 103 K. 849, 850, 176 P. 640 (1918).

365. Workman's thumb injured; still able to work and receive same pay; not barred from recovery. Quillen v. Wichita Gas Co., 128 K. 9, 275 P. 1075 (1929).

366. Workman entitled to compensation although returned to work, at request of employer, at same remuneration. Harvey v. Eldridge & Majors Packing Co., 128 K. 403, 278 P. 16 (1929).

367. Right to compensation not lost by continuing in employment. Shepherd v. Gas Service Co., 186 K. 699, 702, 352 P.2d 48 (1960).

368. Partially incapacitated employee does not lose right to compensation by remaining at former wage. Howerton v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 191 K. 449, 452, 381 P.2d 365 (1963).

369. Claimant returned to similar work on other jobs at no decrease in pay; still entitled to compensation. Peschka v. Wilkinson Drilling Co., 192 K. 126, 133, 386 P.2d 509 (1963).

—Clause (a), minimum time (370-375)

370. Clause concerning two weeks total disability considered. Dennis v. Cafferty, 99 K. 810, 812, 163 P. 461 (1917).

371. Partial disability; total disability for two weeks not required. Raffaghelle v. Russell, 103 K. 849, 850, 176 P. 640 (1918).

372. Workman must be disabled for at least a week. Whitby v. Armour & Co., 114 K. 445, 447, 219 P. 253 (1923).

373. Workman losing no time from full pay, not within act. Chappell v. Morris & Co., 118 K. 210, 212, 235 P. 117 (1925).

374. Clause (a) of proviso construed and its intent and purpose stated. Alexander v. Chrysler Motor Parts Corp., 167 K. 711, 714, 715, 716, 717, 207 P.2d 1179 (1949).

375. Permanent partial disability; total disability for two weeks not required. Alexander v. Chrysler Motor Parts Corp., 167 K. 711, 714, 715, 716, 717, 207 P.2d 1179 (1949).

—Clause (b), use of guard (378-382)

378. Removal of guards to clean machines; defendant not barred. Messick v. McEntire, 97 K. 813, 815, 156 P. 740 (1916).

379. Whether guard sufficient and proper question of fact. Binger v. Read, 101 K. 303, 306, 165 P. 821 (1917).

380. Use of guard; negligence can be shown only by evidence. Binger v. Read, 101 K. 303, 306, 165 P. 821 (1917).

381. Guards removed for cleaning the machinery; not replaced; not "willful" negligence. Bersch v. Morris & Co., 106 K. 800, 803, 189 P. 934 (1920).

382. Intractableness necessary to show willful failure to use guard. Bersch v. Morris & Co., 106 K. 800, 803, 189 P. 934 (1920).

—Clause (b), intoxication (383-384)

383. Intoxication is a defense under statute; evidence thereof. Sayers v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 134 K. 872, 874, 8 P.2d 383 (1932).

384. Salesman abandoned employment; became intoxicated while pursuing his own pleasure; then had automobile accident; not within act. Woodring v. United Sash & Door Co., 152 K. 413, 417, 418, 103 P.2d 837 (1940).

—Clause (b), willful injury (385-388)

385. Defense of intentional and deliberate injury to self raised; unsupported by facts. Messick v. McEntire, 97 K. 813, 815, 156 P. 740 (1916).

386. Workman not guilty of willful negligence; failure to stop machinery. Thorn v. Zinc Co., 106 K. 73, 186 P. 972 (1920).

387. Voluntary and intentional omission to use guards not necessarily "willful." Bersch v. Morris & Co., 106 K. 800, 803, 189 P. 934 (1920).

388. Suicide which results from carbon monoxide poisoning constitutes an accident; insufficient evidence thereof. Gardner v. Ark Warehouse Co., 148 K. 190, 193, 80 P.2d 1066 (1938).

DEVIATIONS FROM EMPLOYMENT

—Abandonment (389-392)

389. Workman abandoned his employment to go into a dangerous part of electrical plant and was injured by electrical current there; accident did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Haas v. Light & Power Co., 109 K. 197, 205, 198 P. 174 (1921).

390. City employee does not abandon employment when he performs duty outside of city. Brenn v. City of St. John, 149 K. 416, 420, 87 P.2d 546 (1939).

391. Salesman abandoned employment; became intoxicated while pursuing his own pleasure; then had automobile accident; not within act. Woodring v. United Sash & Door Co., 152 K. 413, 417, 418, 103 P.2d 837 (1940).

392. Use of freight elevator was incidental, naturally and normally, to the work for which claimant employed; had not "departed" from employment. Bailey v. Mosby Hotel Co., 160 K. 258, 267, 160 P.2d 701 (1945).

—Errand outside scope of employment (393-394)

393. Injury suffered while lending aid to stranger held in course of employment. Floro v. Ticehurst, 147 K. 426, 430, 431, 76 P.2d 773 (1938).

394. Foreman sent workman on an errand; in performing errand workman fell into a vat of hot water; accident and death arose in the course of employment. McDonnell v. Swift & Co., 124 K. 327, 328, 329, 259 P. 695 (1927).

—Personal activities (395-401)

395. Automobile accident while moving own household goods at request of employer; accident had its origin in a risk connected with employment. Stapleton v. State Highway Comm., 147 K. 419, 423, 76 P.2d 843 (1938).

396. Injury sustained while chopping wood for own use not within act. Schooley v. Swanson, 147 K. 758, 760, 78 P.2d 858 (1938).

397. Workman injured while working on own automobile; injury arose out of employment. Hilyard v. Lohmann-Johnson Drilling Co., 168 K. 177, 180, 183, 211 P.2d 89 (1949).

398. Personal acts, disassociated from employment, did not arise out of employment; burns from using coal oil to start dwelling stove not within act. Holloway v. Consolidated Gas, Oil & Mfg. Co., 152 K. 129, 133, 102 P.2d 987 (1940).

399. Mechanic killed in automobile collision while returning from another city; injury incident to employment and compensable. Blair v. Shaw, 171 K. 524, 233 P.2d 731 (1951).

400. Claimant flying airplane for personal reasons; failure to sustain burden of proof of causal connection to employment. Whitely v. King Radio Corporation, Inc., 190 K. 439, 375 P.2d 593 (1962).

401. Trip to doctor's office for treatment of injury suffered in employment is an activity in the course of employment. Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 K. 130, 379 P.2d 217 (1963).

—"Sporting" (402-407)

402. Mortar playfully thrown into eye by fellow workman; question for jury. Stuart v. Kansas City, 102 K. 307, 171 P. 913 (1918); judgment clarified, 102 K. 563, 171 P. 913 (1918).

403. Injuries from sportive acts of coemployees; liability of employer considered. Stuart v. Kansas City, 102 K. 307, 310, 171 P. 913 (1918); White v. Stockyards Co., 104 K. 90, 177 P. 522 (1919).

404. Injury while engaged in amusement during noon hour within act. Thomas v. Manufacturing Co., 104 K. 432, 179 P. 372 (1919).

405. Injury resulting from voluntary sport and horseplay not within act. Neal v. Boeing Airplane Co., 161 K. 322, 323, 167 P.2d 643 (1946).

406. Injuries happening through curiosity or pranks of immature boy coworkers arise out of employment. Kansas City Fibre Box Co. v. Connell, 5 F.2d 398 (1925).

407. Active participant in "horseplay" is not entitled to compensation. Finck v. Galloway, 139 K. 173, 29 P.2d 1091 (1934).

—Volunteer activities (408-411)

408. Workman requested foreman's permission to move foreman's car and foreman yielded to the request; workman killed moving car; accident did not arise out of employment. Sellers v. Reice Construction Co., 124 K. 550, 551, 555, 262 P. 19 (1927).

409. Claimant assisted (without request) in felling a tree which struck and killed him; activity within employment; injury compensable. Fairchild v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 138 K. 651, 27 P.2d 209 (1933).

410. Employee going to bank for employer; helped move stalled car; injured returning to his car; injury within act. Roth v. Hudson Oil Co., 185 K. 576, 345 P.2d 627 (1959).

411. Workman injured when returning from ration board office; injury not covered. Brandon v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 K. 506, 509, 163 P.2d 384 (1945).

—Travel deviations, en route to or from work (415-416)

415. Workman ordered back to work at night; injured en route; injury not within act. Abbott v. Southwest Grain Co., 162 K. 315, 319, 176 P.2d 839 (1947).

416. Hernia sustained while preparing for work on employer's premises within act. Kauffman v. Co-operative Refinery Assn., 170 K. 325, 329, 225 P.2d 129 (1950).

—Travel deviations, indirect route (417-419)

417. Traveling salesman took indirect route and was killed in automobile accident; compensation allowed. Woods v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 141 K. 363, 41 P.2d 748 (1935); modified 141 K. 748, 43 P.2d 786 (1935).

418. Trip to doctor's office for treatment of injury suffered in employment is an activity in the course of employment. Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 K. 130, 379 P.2d 217 (1963).

419. Superintendent of drilling took indirect route between wells; was suffering from loss of sleep to perform job; accident en route arose out of employment. Mitchell v. Mitchell Drilling Co., 154 K. 117, 114 P.2d 841 (1941).

OLD CASES (largely outdated) (420)

420. Other early compensation cases primarily under arbitration and jury trial provisions are as follows:

(a) Welden v. Edgar Zinc Co., 127 K. 870, 275 P. 151 (1929); rehearing 129 K. 422, 283 P. 618 (1930);

(b) Williams v. Wilson, 129 K. 215, 282 P. 574 (1929);

(d) Fuller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Rly. Co., 124 K. 66, 257 P. 971 (1927);

(e) Nealey v. Wyandotte Elevator Co., 123 K. 189, 254 P. 377 (1927);

(f) Bonini v. Crowe Coal Co., 122 K. 731, 253 P. 570 (1927);

(g) Robertson v. Labette County Comm'rs, 122 K. 486, 252 P. 196 (1927); second case 124 K. 705, 261 P. 831 (1927);

(h) Powell v. Kansas-Mo. Rly. & T. Co., 121 K. 622, 249 P. 675 (1926);

(i) Wood v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 121 K. 128, 245 P. 1015 (1926);

(j) Albertsen v. Swift & Co., 117 K. 337, 230 P. 1057 (1924);

(k) Bowman v. Foundry Co., 117 K. 66, 230 P. 320 (1924);

(l) Francis v. Refining Corporation, 116 K. 723, 229 P. 357 (1924);

(m) Rogers v. Railway Co., 115 K. 815, 225 P. 108 (1924);

(n) Milling Co. v. Ellis, 115 K. 431, 223 P. 274 (1924);

(o) Kinzer v. Gas Co., 110 K. 574, 204 P. 999 (1922); second case 114 K. 440, 219 P. 278 (1923);

(p) Walls v. Zinc Co., 113 K. 700, 216 P. 308 (1923);

(q) Dolen v. Sand Co., 110 K. 142, 202 P. 846 (1921);

(r) Flanigan v. Railway Co., 108 K. 133, 193 P. 1077 (1920);

(s) Mayeur v. Mining Co., 106 K. 123, 186 P. 1035 (1920);

(t) Villalobos v. Packing Co., 105 K. 106, 181 P. 599 (1919);

(u) Matassarin v. Street Railway Co., 100 K. 119, 163 P. 796 (1917);

(v) Roberts v. Packing Co., 95 K. 723, 149 P. 413 (1915); second appeal 98 K. 750, 160 P. 221 (1916);

(w) Girten v. Zinc Co., 98 K. 405, 158 P. 33 (1916).

Cases after 1973

421. "Heart amendment" construed; whether exertion was more than usual work presents question of fact for trial court. Nichols v. State Highway Commission, 211 K. 919, 920, 921, 922, 508 P.2d 856.

422. Injuries arise "out of" employment when, considering all circumstances, there is apparent a causal connection between working conditions and resulting injuries. Craig v. Electrolux Corporation, 212 K. 75, 77, 510 P.2d 138.

423. Recovery for heart attack denied; unloading sheetrock was claimant's usual work in course of his regular employment. Simpson v. Logan-Moore Lumber Co., 213 K. 404, 405, 510 P.2d 1234.

424. "Heart amendment" considered; environmental heat shown to be cause of injury; compensation awarded even though immediate result of heat was cerebral hemorrhage. Dial v. C. V. Dome Co., 213 K. 262, 264, 265, 515 P.2d 1046.

425. Action hereunder; traumatic neurosis following physical injury and directly traceable to the injury is compensable. Rund v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 213 K. 812, 813, 518 P.2d 518.

426. Cited; workmen's compensation act provides exclusive remedy for accidental injuries arising out of and in course of employment. Lindsay, Administrator v. Hankamer Asphalt Co., Inc., 213 K. 855, 856, 518 P.2d 934.

427. Appeal from decision disallowing unauthorized medical expenses; traumatic neurosis; record examined; no error. Buck v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 215 K. 157, 158, 523 P.2d 697.

428. Exclusive remedy provision barred wife's recovery in common law action for loss of consortium. Fritzson v. City of Manhattan, 215 K. 810, 811, 812, 813, 528 P.2d 1193.

429. Act provides exclusive remedy; employer's election sufficient; common-law action barred; dismissal proper. Stonecipher v. Winn-Rau Corporation, 218 K. 617, 618, 620, 545 P.2d 317.

430. Evidence supported denial of claim for disability from myocardial infarction; intent of 1967 Heart amendment. Suhm v. Volks Homes, Inc., 219 K. 800, 801, 802, 804, 805, 549 P.2d 944.

431. Applied; granting summary judgment in wrongful death action error; factual issues unresolved. Woods v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 220 K. 479, 482, 553 P.2d 900.

432. Finding that exertion not more than usual work supported by substantial, competent evidence. Woods v. Peerless Plastics, Inc., 220 K. 786, 787, 556 P.2d 455.

433. Workman entitled to recover award for functional disability irrespective of its relationship to work disability. Anderson v. Kinsley Sand & Gravel, Inc., 221 K. 191, 194, 201, 558 P.2d 146.

434. Recovery under workman's compensation act is an exclusive remedy; common-law action for damages barred. Baker v. List and Clark Construction Co., 222 K. 127, 133, 136, 563 P.2d 431.

435. Action involving heart attack; what is "usual exertion" discussed. Lentz v. City of Marion, 222 K. 169, 170, 171, 563 P.2d 456.

436. Action by employee against negligent third party after compensation paid; reduction of liability when both employer and employee negligent; 60-258a applied. Beach v. M & N Modern Hydraulic Press Co., 428 F. Supp 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 963.

437. Third party action for indemnity against employer of injured worker held not maintainable. McCleskey v. Noble Corp., 2 K.A.2d 240, 577 P.2d 830.

438. Applied; common-law action barred if recovery available under workmen's compensation act. Fugit, Administratrix v. United Beechcraft, Inc., 222 K. 312, 314, 564 P.2d 521.

439. Workman suffering injury may maintain claim even though returns to work within one week. Gillig v. Cities Service Gas Co., 222 K. 369, 371, 564 P.2d 548.

440. Claim not precluded under this section; claimant's heart attack product of some external force. Makalous v. Kansas State Highway Commission, 222 K. 477, 479, 481, 565 P.2d 254.

441. Standard for determination of "unusual exertion"; work history of individual involved. Chapman v. Wilkenson Co., 222 K. 722, 724, 725, 567 P.2d 888.

442. Referred to in construing 44-510b; surviving legal spouse entitled to benefits without proof of dependency. Brinkmeyer v. City of Wichita, 223 K. 393, 394, 573 P.2d 1044.

443. Claim that employer failed to provide reasonable working conditions not exclusively within province of Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act. Cordon v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F.Supp. 1064, 1066.

444. Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act was held to be exclusive remedy for injured employee. Adams v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1182, 1183.

445. Contrasted with Kansas acts against discrimination. Van Scoyk v. St. Mary's Assumption Parochial School, 224 K. 304, 306, 580 P.2d 1315.

446. Section is not unconstitutional because coverage is compulsory. Boyd v. Barton Transfer and Storage, 2 K.A.2d 425, 426, 429, 430, 580 P.2d 1366.

447. Comparative negligence action; party immune from suit; considered for comparison only. Scales v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 2 K.A.2d 491, 499, 582 P.2d 300.

448. Fatal cardiovascular accident; finding of substantial external force which proximately caused death upheld. Hall v. City of Hugoton, 2 K.A.2d 728, 729, 587 P.2d 927.

449. Workman's death "arose out of" his employment when he was on a rooftop and hit by early shots of a nearby sniper. Hensley v. Carl Graham Glass, 226 K. 256, 257, 258, 597 P.2d 641.

450. Employee limited to relief under 44-528 for settlement and award obtained through fraud of employer. Yocum v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 228 K. 216, 218, 219, 224, 612 P.2d 699.

451. In recovery by injured workmen from third-party tort-feasor, employer subrogated to extent of compensation and medical aid provided; no reduction in amount of subrogation allowed regardless of concurrent negligence of employer. Negley v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 229 K. 465, 470, 625 P.2d 472.

452. Where employee hurt back getting out of truck, injury did not "arise out of" employment. Martin v. U.S.D. No. 233, 5 K.A.2d 298, 299, 615 P.2d 168.

453. Personal injury by accident arising out of and in course of employment which may have been occasioned by employer's wantonness does not give employee common-law action for damages. Lawrence v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 6 K.A.2d 272, 273, 627 P.2d 1168.

454. Where employee-at-will terminated for filing claim hereunder may maintain action for retaliatory discharge. Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 K.A.2d 488, 489, 630 P.2d 186 (1981).

455. Workmen's Compensation Act raised as defense to common-law negligence action. Orr v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 6 K.A.2d 335 (1981).

456. Employee entitled to exclusive remedy under act and precluded suit against United States under Federal Tort Claims Act. Griffin v. United States, 644 F.2d 846, 848 (1981).

457. To avoid one year statute of limitations, employee must plead cause of action for himself, his employer and workmen's compensation insuror; plaintiff allowed to amend complaint. Baird v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 535 F.Supp. 1371, 1374, 1376 (1981).

458. Mentioned in applying 44-503(a); employee of an independent contractor performing work which is part of principal's trade or business included as statutory employee. Robinson v. Flynn's Ferry Service, Inc., 6 K.A.2d 709, 711, 633 P.2d 1166 (1981).

459. Considered; liability of workmen's compensation fund derives from that of employer; settlement between claimant and employer precludes action against fund by claimant. Arduser v. Daniel International Corp., 7 K.A.2d 225, 231, 640 P.2d 329 (1982).

460. Defendant was not a statutory employer; plaintiff's remedy was not solely under workers' compensation act; reversed. Zehring v. Wickham, 8 K.A.2d 65, 66, 649 P.2d 1246 (1982).

461. Injured employee of subcontractor considered statutory employee of principal; common-law negligence action barred. Zehring v. Wickham, 232 K. 704, 705, 706, 658 P.2d 1004 (1983).

462. Act does not require injured worker to repay employer or insurance carrier when award judicially reduced. Johnston v. Tony's Pizza Service, 232 K. 848, 851, 658 P.2d 1047 (1983).

463. Mere coemployee status is not sufficient for immunity against suit. Wells v. Anderson, 8 K.A.2d 431, 432, 435, 659 P.2d 833 (1983).

464. Act held constitutional; civil damage action cannot be maintained by person against fellow employee for compensation for injury covered by this act. Rajala v. Doresky, 233 K. 440, 441, 442, 443, 661 P.2d 1251 (1983).

465. Recovery for loss of earning power, not compensatory damages for physical injury; purpose of act. Fogle v. Sedgwick County, 9 K.A.2d 129, 673 P.2d 465 (1984).

466. Act cited as exclusive remedy against employer for dependents of employee killed by trench cave-in. Balagna v. Shawnee County, 233 K. 1068, 1085, 668 P.2d 157 (1983).

467. Employer asked to be excused from trial attendance because liability limited hereunder; properly excused if no objection made. Powers v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 234 K. 89, 96, 671 P.2d 491 (1983).

468. Act does not violate plaintiff's due process or equal protection rights. Prince v. Leesona Corp., Inc., 720 F.2d 1166, 1172 (1983).

469. City employee injured by prison escapees not barred from suing state and county for failing to warn of escape. Cansler v. State, 234 K. 554, 573, 675 P.2d 57 (1984).

470. Absent physical injury, mental disorders not compensable personal injuries. Followill v. Emerson Electric Co., 234 K. 791, 792, 796, 674 P.2d 1050 (1984).

471. Summary judgment appropriate where coemployee/defendant immune from civil liability under act. Blank v. Chawla, 234 K. 975, 980, 678 P.2d 162 (1984).

472. Where injuries are intentional acts of insurers in terminating payments, acts arose outside of employment. Hormann v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 236 K. 190, 197, 689 P.2d 837 (1984).

473. Emphysema and chronic bronchitis distinguished; burden of proof for bronchitis is preponderance of evidence. Box v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 236 K. 237, 240, 242, 689 P.2d 871 (1984).

474. Where employer brings money suit, worker cannot claim offsets alleged due under act when provisions not utilized. Bethany Medical Center v. Knox, 10 K.A.2d 192, 194, 196, 694 P.2d 1331 (1985).

475. Dual-capacity doctrine applied where employer had assumed assets and liabilities of third-party tortfeasor. Kimzey v. Interpace Corp., 10 K.A.2d 165, 166, 170, 694 P.2d 907 (1985).

476. Exclusive remedy provision provides no employer, or employee thereof, is liable for injury where compensation paid under act; employee injured by third-party tortfeasor. Anderson v. National Carriers, Inc., 10 K.A.2d 203, 205, 207, 695 P.2d 1293 (1985).

477. Where injury by assault arose out of and in course of employment whether claimant was aggressor irrelevant. Springston v. IML Freight, Inc., 10 KA.2d 501, 506, 704 P.2d 394 (1985).

478. Cited; traumatic neuroses (or conversion hysteria) and knowledge of handicap discussed in detail. Ruse v. State, 10 K.A.2d 508, 509, 708 P.2d 216 (1985).

479. Cited; claimant has burden of proof with respect to traumatic neurosis claim. Wade v. Union Nat'l Bank, 10 K.A.2d 645, 649, 707 P.2d 1087 (1985).

480. Cited; election under 44-505d must be held before August 1 for coverage to start with next budget year. City of Wichita v. Wichita Firemen's Relief Ass'n, 238 K. 122, 127, 708 P.2d 201 (1985).

481. Restitution doctrine not in act; no recovery back of monies paid during appeal after appeal determines nonliability. Clouston v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs, 11 K.A.2d 112, 113, 715 P.2d 29 (1986).

482. Cited; self-employed persons and individual employers not intended to be covered by act as employees. Allen v. Mills, 11 K.A.2d 415, 417, 418, 724 P.2d 143 (1986).

483. Cited; tort of retaliatory discharge not extended to employees covered by collective bargaining agreement. Cox v. United Technologies, 240 K. 95, 99, 727 P.2d 456 (1986).

484. Cited; exclusivity of remedy stated in examining contracting out statute (44-503(a)). Hollingsworth v. Fehrs Equip. Co., 240 K. 398, 401, 729 P.2d 1214 (1986).

485. Cited; in retaliatory discharge suit state tort claim preempted by federal law where claim arose from collective bargaining agreement. Edwards v. Western Mfg. Div. of Mont. Elev., 641 F.Supp. 616, 617 (1986).

486. Cited; where subcontractor's employee held as employee of principal (44-503), provisions of act apply. Murphy v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 643 F.Supp. 269, 270 (1986).

487. Cited; duty to warn employee of danger working with familiar machinery purchased from former employer examined. Olson v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 649 F.Supp. 1511, 1513 (1986).

488. Violation of employer's instructions not "willful" as matter of law; element of intractableness must be included. Carter v. Koch Engineering, 12 K.A.2d 74, 75, 76, 84, 85, 735 P.2d 247 (1987).

489. Cited; proof required of employer to be relieved of liability for hiring or retaining handicapped employee (44-1567) examined. Denton v. Sunflower Electric Co-op, 12 K.A.2d 262, 269, 740 P.2d 98 (1987).

490. Cited; denial of tort action for retaliatory discharge to worker protected by collective bargaining agreement does not violate U.S. Constitution. Armstrong v. Goldblatt Tool Co., 242 K. 164, 167, 172, 747 P.2d 119 (1987).

491. Claims of estate representative of victim killed by parolee against state correction officials barred by exclusivity provisions of act where victim and officials state coemployees. Beck v. Kansas University Psychiatry Foundation. 671 F.Supp. 1563, 1575, 1576 (1987).

492. Blood alcohol concentration relevant as to cause of accident, but does not give rise to presumption of intoxication. Poole v. Earp Meat Co., 242 K. 638, 639, 646, 750 P.2d 1000 (1988).

493. Immunity of insurer in dual capacity as general liability insurer and workers' compensation carrier for alleged negligence in boiler inspection examined. Leroy v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspec. and Ins. Co., 695 F.Supp. 1120, 1122 (D. Kan. 1988).

494. Absence of distinction between phrases "accidental means" and "accidental results" determined. Whitaker v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 13 K.A.2d 279, 282, 768 P.2d 320 (1989).

495. Proof required to establish claim for traumatic neurosis examined. Love v. McDonald's Restaurant, 13 K.A.2d 397, 771 P.2d 557 (1989).

496. Group health insurance clause excluding injuries "arising out of and in the course of any employment for wage or profit" applicable where claimant denied coverage hereunder. Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co., 13 K.A.2d 452, 458, 773 P.2d 678 (1989).

497. Civil service board ruling as not res judicata against tort action brought under act against discrimination (44-1001 et seq.) examined. Parker v. Kansas Neurological Institute, 13 K.A.2d 685, 690, 778 P.2d 390 (1989).

498. Scope of review in workers compensation cases (44-556) as unaltered by act for judicial review (77-601 et seq.) determined. Reeves v. Equipment Service Industries, Inc., 245 K. 165, 168, 176, 777 P.2d 765 (1989).

499. Ambiguity of exclusionary clause in health and accident policy relative to application of workers compensation act examined. Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 245 K. 724, 733, 783 P.2d 900 (1989).

500. United States in same position as "statutory employer" under act with regards to claim by employee of contractor managing ammunition dump. Nofsinger v. U.S., 727 F.Supp. 586 (1989).

501. Director's action on claim for penalties and additional benefits, after trial court's affirmance of award, subject to review. Sawyer v. Oldham's Farm Sausage Co., 246 K. 327, 333, 787 P.2d 697 (1990).

502. Aggravation or additional injury from medical malpractice in treating compensable injury also compensable. Roberts v. Krupka, 246 K. 433, 442, 790 P.2d 422 (1990).

503. Provisions regarding attorney fees in 44-504 to be liberally construed. Lemery v. Buffalo Airways, Inc., 14 K.A.2d 301, 305, 789 P.2d 1176 (1990).

504. Cited by dissent where majority found loss of services subject to subrogation in third-party action under act. McGranahan v. McGough, Sausage Co., 246 K. 327, 333, 787 P.2d 697 (1990).

505. Claimant's burden to establish right to compensation award and to prove conditions of such right stated. Hughes v. Inland Container Corp., 247 K. 407, 410, 789 P.2d 1011 (1990).

506. Government entitled to exert exclusive remedy provision in act as defense to contractor employee's action under federal tort claims act. Matthews v. U.S., 756 F.Supp. 511, 513 (1991).

507. Interplay of 44-503 and 44-532a examined and applied concerning fund liability for certain employers. Workers Compensation Fund v. Silicone Distributing, Inc., 248 K. 551, 556, 809 P.2d 1199 (1991).

508. Computation of diminution of employer's subrogation interest for fault (44-504(d)) where worker obtains judgment against third party discussed and determined. Brabander v. Western Cooperative Electric, 248 K. 914, 915, 811 P.2d 1216 (1991).

509. Worker's action against third party for loss of services is for damages not recoverable under act; subrogation disallowed. McGranahan v. McGough, 249 K. 328, 338, 820 P.2d 403 (1991).

510. Worker's death must have been substantially caused by drug use or have deviated sufficiently from employment to have been off the job to deny compensation. Angleton v. Starkan, Inc., 250 K. 711, 717, 828 P.2d 933 (1992).

511. Act construed to include subcontractor's injured employee. Rodriquez v. John Russell Constr., 16 K.A.2d 269, 271, 275, 826 P.2d 515 (1992).

512. Claimant has burden of proof to establish the right to compensation. Perez v. IBP, Inc., 16 K.A.2d 277, 279, 826 P.2d 520 (1992).

513. Injury following epileptic seizure while driving company vehicle arose out of employment because condition of employment increased risk of injury. Bennett v. Wichita Fence Co., 16 K.A.2d 458, 459, 824 P.2d 1001 (1992).

514. Exclusive remedy defense applied in ruling Kansas workers compensation law applicable to injuries sustained by employees of federal contractors. Mahaffey v. U.S. 785 F.Supp. 148, 150 (1992).

515. Insolvent employer's obligation under Kansas workers compensation act was nontax in nature; not entitled to tax priority in bankruptcy. In Re Payne, 27 B.R. 809, 810, 812 (1983).

516. Personal injury negligence action arising in workers compensation setting; independent contractor status, dual-status employee, liability between employees, employer's vicarious liability examined. Bright v. Cargill, Inc., 251 K. 387, 389, 837 P.2d 348 (1992).

517. Benefit disqualification for suicide not automatic, chain-of-causation rule adopted, claimant failed burden of proof. Rodriguez v. Henkle Drilling & Supply Co., 16 K.A.2d 728, 730, 733, 734, 828 P.2d 1335 (1992).

518. Cited where term "wholly dependent child" (44-508(c), 44-510b) construed as including child whose parentage undetermined at time of worker's death. Killingsworth v. City of Wichita, 16 K.A.2d 801, 830 P.2d 70 (1992).

519. Impartial interpretation of act as result of 1987 amendment noted; claimant not automatically entitled to most advantageous calculation under 44-510a. Miner v. M. Bruenger & Co., Inc., 17 K.A.2d 185, 193, 836 P.2d 19 (1992).

520. Where plaintiff barred from tort claim as a matter of law, any settlement of tort suit is patently unreasonable. Murphy v. Silver Creek Oil & Gas, Inc., 17 K.A.2d 213, 215, 217, 837 P.2d 1198 (1992).

521. More than one employer in contractor-subcontractor-employer pyramid may qualify as injured worker's statutory employer. Selle v. The Boeing Co., 17 K.A.2d 543, 545, 840 P.2d 542 (1992).

522. Workers compensation judge may determine parentage for purposes of workers compensation benefits only. R.L.J. v. Western Sprinklers, Inc., 17 K.A.2d 749, 753, 844 P.2d 37 (1992).

523. Exclusive remedy defense applies to coemployees, bars common law actions against coemployees or employer. Thilla v. E.L. Farmer and Company, Inc., 958 F.2d 328, 329 (1992).

524. Presumption of validity of second marriage over prior common-law marriage examined. Chandler v. Central Oil Corp., 253 K. 50, 53, 853 P.2d 649 (1993).

525. Cited where disparate treatment between employees with nonresident alien dependents and others (44-510b(i)) declared unconstitutional. Jurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 253 K. 116, 126, 853 P.2d 669 (1993).

526. Limitation on remedies examined when employee has no spouse, children or dependents. Karhoff v. National Mills, Inc., 18 K.A.2d 302, 305, 851 P.2d 1021 (1993).

527. Employer's nonliability noted where permanency of claimant's condition does not result from work-related injury. West-Mills v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 18 K.A.2d 561, 563, 859 P.2d 392 (1993).

528. Personal injury negligence claim in workers compensation setting, effect of remand and settlement agreements examined. Bright v. LSI Corp., 254 K. 853, 854, 869 P.2d 686 (1994).

529. Whether employee was on the way to or from work for workers compensation coverage purposes examined. Thompson v. Law Offices of Alan Joseph, 19 K.A.2d 367, 368, 869 P.2d 761 (1994).

530. Whether employee covered by workers compensation injured by coemployee's negligent driving may sue coemployee separately examined. Bay v. Funk, 19 K.A.2d 440, 442, 871 P.2d 268 (1994).

531. On question certified, standard of proof required in retaliatory discharge action for filing workers compensation claim examined. Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 255 K. 513, 514, 518, 874 P.2d 1188 (1994).

532. Whether inherently dangerous exception to nonliability of landowner applies to independent contractor's employees covered by workers compensation examined. Dillard v. Strecker, 255 K. 704, 708, 877 P.2d 371 (1994).

533. Whether employee's injury in parking garage occurred on employer's premises examined; going and coming rule applied. Thompson v. Law Offices of Alan Joseph, 256 K. 36, 38, 883 P.2d 768 (1994).

534. Whether employer discharged employee in retaliation for filing workers compensation claim examined. Malek v. Martin Marrietta Corp., 859 F.Supp. 458, 465 (1994).

535. Whether KWCA (44-501 et seq.) is exclusive remedy for plaintiff's assault and battery claims examined. Bernard v. Doskocil Companies, Inc., 861 F.Supp. 1006, 1012 (1994).

536. Whether employee established connection between pursuit of workers compensation benefits and termination in retaliatory discharge claim examined. Rosas v. IBP, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 912, 915 (1994).

537. Whether special hazard exception to coming and going rule applies to worker injured crossing street to work examined. Chapman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 20 K.A.2d 962, 963, 894 P.2d 901 (1995).

538. Whether issues regarding whether plaintiff was discharged in retaliation for filing workers compensation claim precluded summary judgment examined. Hill v. IBP, Inc., 881 F.Supp. 521, 522 (1995).

539. Employer failed to prove that employee's intoxication was a substantial cause of fatal injury. Kindel v. Ferco Rental, Inc., 258 K. 272, 285, 899 P.2d 1058 (1995).

540. Special hazard exception to going and coming rule applied to worker injured while crossing street on way to work. Chapman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 K. 653, 655, 662, 664, 907 P.2d 828 (1995).

541. Injury sustained by employee assaulted by fellow worker does not arise out of employment unless foreseeable by employer. Harris v. Bethany Medical Center, 21 K.A.2d 804, 805, 909 P.2d 657 (1995).

542. Former employee terminated for filing claim under workers compensation act. Huffman v. Ace Elec. Co., Inc., 883 F.Supp. 1469, 1470 (1995).

543. Under facts, plaintiff's claim of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress not barred by KWCA. U.S. v. Moffet, 885 F.Supp. 237 (1995).

544. Personal injury claims should be brought under tort or workers compensation, not Americans with disabilities act (42 USCA § 12101 et seq.). Smith v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 894 F.Supp. 1463, 1469 (1995).

545. Issue concerning whether contractor's employee had implied contract with subcontractor precluded summary judgment on employee's negligence claim. Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. LaFever, 905 F.Supp. 904, 929 (1995).

546. Issue regarding whether employee was discharged in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims precluded summary judgment. Lyden v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc., 907 F.Supp. 343, 345 (1995).

547. Issue regarding whether employer discharged employee for exercising rights under KWCA precluded summary judgment. Ramirez v. IBP, Inc., 913 F.Supp. 1421, 1424 (1995).

548. Where injury does not disable employee for at least one week workers compensation benefits are limited to medical expenses. Boucher v. Peerless Products, Inc., 21 K.A.2d 977, 979, 911 P.2d 198 (1996).

549. Enforcement of indemnity contract not barred by exclusive remedy provision of workers compensation act (44-501 et seq.). Estate of Bryant v. All Temperature Insulation, Inc., 22 K.A.2d 387, 389, 394, 916 P.2d 1294 (1996).

550. Tort liability for employer's negligent treatment of employees nonwork-related injury barred by dual capacity doctrine. Scott v. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp., 23 K.A.2d 156, 158, 928 P.2d 109 (1996).

551. Evidence that employer offered prizes for injury free work sections admissable in relalictory discharge action. Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 941 F.Supp. 1000, 1002 (1996).

552. Remedy for increase in emotional distress raised by employee lies in tort or under workers compensation act. Smith v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 102 F.3d 1075, 1076 (1996).

553. Self-employed person is not covered by workers compensation act unless valid election is in effect. Aetna Life and Cas. v. Americas Truckway Systems, Inc., 23 K.A.2d 315, 317, 929 P.2d 803 (1997).

554. Rights under subsection (c) cannot be destroyed by retroactive legislation imposing liability not previously existing. Osborn v. Electric Corp. of Kansas City, 23 K.A.2d 868, 936 P.2d 297 (1997).

555. Undisputed testimony that primary injury worsened by aging and time sufficient to award benefits for increased injury under 44-528. Nance v. Harvey County, 23 K.A.2d 899, 902, 931 P.2d 1245 (1997).

556. Workers compensation board's offset of claimant's retirement insurance paid by employer from workers compensation benefits upheld. Bohanan v. U.S.D. No. 260, 24 K.A.2d 362, 372, 947 P.2d 440 (1997).

557. Exclusive remedy provision of worker's compensation act barred injured employee's negligence claim. Kiser v. Building Erection Services, Inc., 973 F.Supp. 1269, 1273 (1997).

558. Fact issue concerning type of work done by plaintiff awarded workers compensation precluded negligence summary judgment. Ascanio v. Allied Signal, Inc., 992 F.Supp. 1280, 1282 (1998).

559. Benefit calculation for employee whose permanent partial disability benefits change from work disability to functional impairment examined. Wheeler v. Boeing Co., 25 K.A.2d 632, 636, 967 P.2d 1085 (1998).

560. Evidence sufficient to support finding employee suffered work related injury for workers compensation claim purposes. Newell v. K-Mart Corp., 35 F.Supp.2d 1312, 1313 (1999).

561. Workers compensation act exclusive recovery provision is not applicable to intentional assaults by employer. Stapp v. Overnite Transp. Co., 995 F.Supp. 1207, 1216 (1998).

562. Employee may not recover wages in retaliatory discharge action while receiving temporary total disability compensation. Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.3d 1291 (1998).

563. ALJ's award misaddressed; not received before expiration of review application filing date; notice insufficient to satisfy due process. Nguyen v. IBP, Inc., 266 K. 580, 582, 972 P.2d 747 (1999).

564. Offset provision of section does not violate equal protection guarantees. Gadberry v. R.L. Polk & Co., 25 K.A.2d 800, P.2d (1998).

565. Settlement of claim with employee does not preclude Ch. 60 action to determine proportionate liability between two employers. U.S.D. No. 501 v. American Home Life Ins. Co., 25 K.A.2d 820, 971 P.2d 1210 (1999).

566. Offset provisions of 44-501(h) do not apply to social security retiree working part time who was injured in the course of employment. Dickens v. Pizza Co., 266 K. 1066, 1071, 974 P.2d 601 (1999).

567. Employer entitled to offset workers compensation award by retirement benefits received; plan was totally funded by employer. Treaster v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 267 K. 610, 626, 987 P.2d 325 (1999).

568. Act to be liberally construed; stewardess who had spent some unspecified time flying over Kansas and was entitled to compensation (carpal tunnel syndrome). Graff v. Trans World Airlines, 267 K. 851, 857, 860, 983 P.2d 258 (1999).

569. Employer exempted from workers compensation act who purchases workers compensation insurance is not deemed to have elected to be subject to act. Rivera v. Cimarron Dairy, 267 K. 875, 880, 988 P.2d 235 (1999).

570. Injured employee receiving workers compensation benefits as well as social security disability benefits is subject to social security setoff at age 65; social security benefits at age 65 are based on age not disability. Wishon v. Cossman, 268 K. 99, 108, 991 P.2d 415 (1999).

571. Former firefighters work-related disability benefits not subject to setoff in determining workers compensation benefits. Green v. City of Wichita, 26 K.A.2d 53, 54, 977 P.2d 283 (1999).

572. Under statute then in effect, claimant not entitled to workers compensation benefits if not disabled for at least one week from earning full wages. Matney v. Matney Chiropractic Clinic, 26 K.A.2d 69, 71, 977 P.2d 962 (1999).

573. Employer liable to compensate employee for injury where claimant was totally unable to return to work for one week. Overstreet v. Mid-West Conveyor Co., Inc., 26 K.A.2d 586, 587, 985 P.2d 142 (1999).

574. Workers compensation board dismissal of insurer appeal on policy coverage issue upheld; term "certain defenses" construed. Carpenter v. National Filter Service, 26 K.A.2d 672, 675, 994 P.2d 641 (1999).

575. Five nonconsecutive days off work satisfied condition that employee be disabled for one week for a compensable injury. Farrel v. U.S.D. No. 229, 26 K.A.2d 797, 798, 995 P.2d 881 (1999).

576. Under facts, claimant was disabled for a sufficient amount of time to qualify for permanent partial disability compensation. Curran v. Lawrence Paper Co., 26 K.A.2d 949, 950, 996 P.2d 358 (2000).

577. Employer had legitimate reason for terminating employee which was not in retaliation for filing workers compensation claim. Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 50 F.Supp.2d 1028, 1029 (1999).

578. Issue concerning whether employee was terminated in retaliation for filing workers compensation claim precluded summary judgment. McClurg v. GTech Corp., 61 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1162 (1999).

579. Employer's reason for terminating employee was legitimate and not in retaliation for filing workers compensation claim. Spradley v. Custom Campers, Inc., 68 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1235 (1999).

580. Corporate employer allowed to designate treatment provider for injured employee who is also a stockholder. Matney v. Matney Chiropractic Clinic, 268 K. 336, 338, 995 P.2d 871 (2000).

581. Employee of subcontractor who provided workers compensation benefits to employee may not sue principal contractor in tort for injuries sustained at job site. Robinett v. The Haskell Co., 270 K. 95, 12 P.3d 411 (2000).

582. Where work related injury causes aggravation of preexisting condition, compensation is allowed for entire disability less any amount of preexisting impairment established by employer (0 in this case). Hanson v. Logan U.S.D. 326, 28 K.A.2d 92, 11 P.3d 1184 (2000).

583. Trial court finding that employee was terminated in retaliation for asserting workers compensation claim upheld. Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 90 F.Supp.2d 1208, 1209 (2000).

584. Employee failed to prove employer based termination on filing of workers compensation claim. Dougherty v. Venator Group Retail, 94 F.Supp.2d 1206 (2000).

585. Employee failed to prove employer's reasons for termination were pretext for retaliation. Foster v. Allied Signal, Inc., 98 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1266 (2000).

586. Supervisor's comment on claimant's loss of hearing caused claimant to go to audiologist; attempt to make a cast of ear caused permanent hearing loss: held, injury not arising out of and in course of claimant's employment. Wilson v. Mercy Health Center, 28 K.A.2d 410, 15 P.3d 853 (2000).

587. Missouri resident working in Kansas for about six months rents room in hotel close to jobsite, held: accident occurring while going from hotel to jobsite is not an injury arising out of and in course of employment. Butera v. Fluor Daniel Const. Corp., 28 K.A.2d 542, 18 P.3d 278 (2001).

588. Defendant contractor is immune from negligence action brought by employee of temporary employment agency; defendant became a special employer for purposes of workers compensation act. Scott v. Altmar, Inc., 272 K. 1280, 38 P.3d 673 (2002).

589. Injury which occurred when employee returned to employer's premises to pick up paycheck is injury in course of employment. Palmer v. Lindberg Heat Treatment, 31 K.A.2d 1, 59 P.3d 352 (2002).

590. Employee with chronic lower back pain has compensable claim from injury sustained while getting into motor vehicle. Anderson v. Scarlett Auto Interiors, 31 K.A.2d 5, 61 P.3d 81 (2002).

591. Provision of estoppel as an affirmative defense, which must be specifically pled and cannot be raised by court, is extended to workers compensation cases. Coffman v. State, 31 K.A.2d 61, 59 P.3d 1050 (2002).

592. Unless employer shows probable cause that employee used or was impaired by alcohol while working, results of blood alcohol tests are inadmissible and no conclusive presumption of alcohol impairment arises. Evans v. Frakes Trucking, 31 K.A.2d 212, 64 P.3d 440 (2002).

593. Material fact issue concerning whether plaintiff was fired for exercise of workers compensation rights precluded summary judgment. Foster v. Allied Signal, Inc., 293 F.3d 1187, 1189 (2002).

594. Workers compensation benefits denied; under facts of case stress cannot be considered as an external factor; unusual stress is not supported by evidence. Mudd v. Neosho Memorial Regional Med. Center, 275 K. 187, 62 P.3d 236 (2003).

595. In repetitive micro-trauma case, last day worked prior to hearing is date of injury. Kimbrough v. University of Kansas Med. Center, 276 K. 853, 79 P.3d 1289 (2003).

596. Blood alcohol level of claimant erroneously excluded by workers compensation board; claimant not entitled to benefits. Foos v. Terminix, 31 K.A.2d 522, 67 P.3d 173 (2003).

597. In retaliatory discharge action, employee's absences from work caused by work related injury are considered protected activity in considering existence of causal connection between injury and termination. White v. Tomasic, 31 K.A.2d 597, 69 P.3d 208 (2003).

598. Fact issue concerning employer's vicarious liability to accident victim precluded summary judgment. O'Shea v. Welch, 350 F.3d 1101, 1103 (2003).

599. Kansas recognizes tort for retaliatory discharge for employee's exercise of rights under Federal Employers Liability Act. Hysten v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co., 277 K. 551, 85 P.3d 1183 (2004).

600. Private injury action not allowed; defendant had clocked out from job at Walmart but was still on premises assisting in apprehension of check forger. Servantez v. Shelton, 32 K.A.2d 305, 81 P.3d 1263 (2004).

601. Benefits denied under intoxication exception; section requires probable cause arise, exist or occur contemporaneously with collection of blood sample. Foos v. Terminix, 277 K. 687, 89 P.3d 546 (2004).

602. Claim of death as result of heart attack not successful; workers compensation benefits awarded. Titterington v. Brooke Insurance, 277 K. 888, 89 P.3d 643 (2004).

603. Cause of action for retaliatory discharge exists against employer other than employer against whom workers compensation claim made. Gonzalez-Centeno v. North Central Kansas Regional Juvenile Detention Facility, 278 K. 427, 101 P.3d 1170 (2004).

604. Federal social security benefits offset workers compensation benefits for injury sustained prior to date of retirement. McIntosh v. Sedgwick County, 32 K.A.2d 889, 91 P.3d 545 (2004).

605. Injuries resulting from fight between two workers at job site are compensable without regard to who was aggressor; employer had reason to anticipate incident; act to be liberally construed. Jordan v. Pyle, Inc., 33 K.A.2d 258, 101 P.3d 239 (2004).

606. Fatal injuries "did not arise out of and in course of employment"; incident occurred on employer's premises but 1 1 / 2 hours after termination of employment for day. Smith v. Winfield Livestock Auction, Inc., 33 K.A.2d 615, 106 P.3d 94 (2005).

607. Varicose vein condition was an injury which arose out of and was directly caused by his employment but appellant failed to make timely written claim of hearing loss. Poff v. IBP, Inc., 33 K.A.2d 700, 106 P.3d 1152 (2005).

608. No permanent partial disability award for employee developing allergic reaction to produce while working in grocery store. Casey v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 34 K.A.2d 66, 114 P.3d 182 (2005).

609. Retirement benefits received reduce weekly rate under 44-501 but do not limit weeks payable for permanent total disability compensation under 44-510. McIntosh v. Sedgwick County, 34 K.A.2d 684, 123 P.3d 740 (2005).

610. Employee permitted to keep employer's vehicle at his residence and use it to drive to and from work; this is an exception to going and coming rule that such injuries are not compensable. Sumner v. Meier's Ready Mix, Inc., 34 K.A.2d 850, 126 P.3d 1127 (2006).

611. Nonwork related injury to shoulder in 2004 deemed natural consequence of 1993 work injury. Logsdon v. Boeing Co., 35 K.A.2d 79, 128 P.3d 430 (2006).

612. Employee tortfeasor has fellow servant immunity for acts as long as acting within scope and course of employment. Scott v. Hughes, 281 K. 642, 652, 132 P.3d 889 (2006).

613. Where employee's drug and alcohol use not resolved in workers compensation proceeding, summary judgment against employee premature. Scott v. Hughes, 281 K. 642, 653, 132 P.3d 889 (2006).

614. Mentioned regarding employer and co-worker liability under workers compensation act. PMA Group v. Trotter, 281 K. 1344, 1346, 135 P.3d 1244 (2006).

615. Injured worker can recover from employer's insurance company for underinsurance coverage even if already received workers compensation benefits from employer. Stemple v. Maryland Casuality Co., 282 K. 405, 414, 144 P.3d 1273 (2006).

616. The two phases "out of" and "in the course of" employment have separate and distinct meanings; they are conjunctive, and each condition must exist before compensation is allowable. Rinke v. Bank of America, 282 K. 746, 752, 148 P.3d 553 (2006).

617. Plain meaning analysis; injuries do not arise out of employment if strain or physical exertion is normal activity of day-to-day living. Johnson v. Johnson County, 36 K.A.2d 786, 790, 147 P.3d 1091 (2006).

618. Tort of retaliatory discharge extended to encompass firing of injured employee likely to file claim in near future. Pendergraft v. Layne Christensen Canada, LTD., 446 F.Supp.2d 1214, 1217 (2006).

619. Employer did not meet its burden to offset employee's retirement benefits under subsection (h). Rash v. Heartland Cement Co., 37 K.A.2d 175, 187, 154 P.3d 15 (2006).

620. Construction design professional immunity provided by 44-501(f) discussed. Edwards v. Anderson Engineering, Inc., 284 K. 892, 166 P.3d 1047 (2007).

621. Offset provisions discussed; lump sum payment of retirement benefits apportioned over remaining life expectancy. Lleras v. Via Christi Regional Med. Center, 37 K.A.2d 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 154 P.3d 1130 (2007).

622. Mentioned, if decedents were employees rather than independent contractors then workers compensation applicable. Dye v. WMC, Inc., 38 K.A.2d 655, 666, 172 P.3d 49 (2007).

623. Workers compensation retaliation claim denied; employee's burden of proof in summary judgment motion discussed. Coleman v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan., 487 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1229, 1230 (2007).

624. Cited; when two parallel scheduled injuries occur and presumption of permanent total disability rebutted award is calculated under 44-510d. Hall v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 286 K. 778, 780, 189 P.3d 508 (2008).

625. Subsection (h) of 44-501 contemplates the retirement benefit offset must be calculated using the total of all such benefits. Robinson v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 39 K.A.2d 342 to 351, 180 P.3d 597 (2008).

626. Subsection (c) permits award to the extent the work-related injury causes increased disability, reduced by preexisting functional impairment. Payne v. Boeing Co., 39 K.A.2d 353, 355 to 363, 180 P.3d 590 (2008).

627. Workers compensation case appealed; recreational and social events exception of 44-508(f) construed and applied. Hizey v. MCI, 39 K.A.2d 609, 612, 181 P.3d 583 (2008).

628. Cited in workers compensation opinion discussing the "going and coming rule" and exceptions thereto. Halford v. Nowak Construction Co., 39 K.A.2d 935, 938, 186 P.3d 206 (2008).

629. Heart attack claimant failed to show negligent medical treatment by employer in rendering emergency care. Adee v. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 39 K.A.2d 1017, 1024 to 1027, 186 P.3d 840 (2008).

630. Cited; under 44-510e a worker's post-injury wage is to be based on actual hours worked. Nistler v. Footlocker Retail, Inc., 40 K.A.2d 831, 832, 836, 196 P.3d 395 (2008).

631. Choice of law case where injury in Kansas but Nebraska subcontractor paid workers compensation; claim against Kansas general contractor barred. Anderson v. Commerce Const. Services, Inc., 531 F.3d 1190, 1193 (2008).

632. Terms "out of" and "in the course of" employment construed; premise exception applied. McCready v. Payless Shoesource, 41 K.A.2d 79, 200 P.3d 479 (2009).

633. 44-508(f) construed and applied involving recreational or social events; claimant felt pressured to attend. Douglas v. Ad Astra Information Systems, 42 K.A.2d 441, 213 P.3d 764 (2009).

634. Employer is not liable for benefits when an employee's injuries were contributed to by the employee's drug use. Wiehe v. Kissick Construction Co., 43 K.A.2d 732, 232 P.3d 866 (2010).

635. Claimant failed to demonstrate the compensability of medical compensation and her post-award medical benefits were incurred outside the relation back period; awards reversed. Roles v. Boeing Co., 43 K.A.2d 619, 230 P.3d 771 (2010).

636. City retirement board's interpretation of city code requiring that any amounts received from workers' compensation be deducted from disability retirement benefit not arbitrary or capricious. Robinson v. City of Wichita Retirement Bd. of Trustees, 291 K. 247, 243 P.3d 326 (2010).

637. Amendments to the workers compensation act do not apply retroactively. Bryant v. Midwest Staff Solutions, Inc., 292 K. 585, 257 P.3d 255 (2011).

638. Evidence insufficient to support finding by Workers Compensation Board that claimant suffered permanent and total disability from exposure to chemicals and fumes at work. Chriestenson v. Russell Stover Candies, 46 K.A.2d 453, 263 P.3d 821 (2011).

639. Plaintiff's civil lawsuits are barred; defendant is entitled to fellow servant immunity. Scott v. Hughes, 294 K. 403, 275 P.3d 890 (2012).

640. The workers compensation board's findings in denying compensation held not supported by substantive evidence. Lake v. Jessee Trucking, 49 K.A.2d 820, 316 P.3d 796 (2013).

641. Provision in employment agreement shortening a 2-year statute of limitations for retaliatory discharge claim deemed void as against public policy. Pfeifer v. Federal Express Corporation, 297 K. 547, 304 P.3d 1226 (2013).

642. Employer's reason for discharging employee on grounds of dishonesty was not pretext for retaliation against him for filing a workers compensation claim. Macan v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 743 F.3d 708 (10th Cir. 2014).

643. Workers compensation award is not subject to setoff where an employee's benefits accrue regardless of whether any other income existed. Hoesli v. Triplett, Inc., 49 K.A.2d 1011, 321 P.3d 18 (2014).

644. With no evidence of contemporaneous impairment, the affirmative defense does not apply to the claimant under the facts of the case. Young v. Great Bend Cooperative Assn., 50 K.A.2d 158, 324 P.3d 306 (2014).

645. An award for workers compensation benefits, for work-related injury that causes increased disability by aggravating a preexisting condition, must be reduced by the amount of functional impairment determined to be preexisting. Ward v. Allen County Hospital, 50 K.A.2d 280, 324 P.3d 1122 (2014).

646. A person retired and receiving old-age social security benefits will have a workers compensation award offset subject to the social security offset provisions. Farley v. Above Par Transportation, 50 K.A.2d 866, 871, 334 P.3d 883 (2014).

647. Statute must be followed as written requiring that all workers compensation payments are subject to offset. Hoesli v. Triplett, Inc., 303 K. 358, 367, 361 P.3d 504 (2015).

648. An injured worker's award for both a total disability and permanent partial disability must be calculated before any preexisting functional impairment reductions can be made. Ballard v. Dondlinger & Sons Constr. Co., 51 K.A.2d 855, 865, 355 P.3d 707 (2015).

649. An insufficient urine sample, without evidence of an intent to thwart the purpose of a drug test, is not a refusal to submit to drug testing as used in the workers compensation act. Byers v. Acme Foundry, 53 K.A.2d 485, 388 P.3d 621 (2017), rev. denied (July 25, 2017).

650. Positive drug test results performed on sample collected by hospital were admissible, but clear and convincing evidence showed the presumed impairment did not contribute to accident. Woessner v. Labor Max Staffing, 312 K. 36, 471 P.3d 1 (2020).

651. Whether a worker's injury or disability was caused by unusual exertion or by external forces raises two separate theories of recovery. Larson v. Excel Indus., Inc., 59 K.A.2d 583, 483 P.3d 1067 (2021).

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