Printable Format44-508. Definitions. As used in the workers compensation act:
(a) "Employer" includes: (1) Any person or body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, and the legal representative of a deceased employer or the receiver or trustee of a person, corporation, association or partnership; (2) the state or any department, agency or authority of the state, any city, county, school district or other political subdivision or municipality or public corporation and any instrumentality thereof; and (3) for the purposes of community service work, the entity for which the community service work is being performed and the governmental agency that assigned the community service work, if any, if either such entity or such governmental agency has filed a written statement of election with the director to accept the provisions under the workers compensation act for persons performing community service work and in such case such entity and such governmental agency shall be deemed to be the joint employer of the person performing the community service work and both shall have the rights, liabilities and immunities provided under the workers compensation act for an employer with regard to the community service work, except that the liability for providing benefits shall be imposed only on the party that filed such election with the director or on both if both parties have filed such election with the director; for purposes of community service work, "governmental agency" shall not include any court or any officer or employee thereof and any case where there is deemed to be a "joint employer" shall not be construed to be a case of dual or multiple employment.
(b) "Workman" or "employee" or "worker" means any person who has entered into the employment of or works under any contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer. Such terms shall include, but not be limited to: Executive officers of corporations; professional athletes; persons serving on a volunteer basis as duly authorized law enforcement officers, emergency medical service providers, as defined in K.S.A. 65-6112, and amendments thereto, firefighters, but only to the extent and during such periods as they are so serving in such capacities; persons employed by educational, religious and charitable organizations, but only to the extent and during the periods that they are paid wages by such organizations; persons in the service of the state or any department, agency or authority of the state, any city, school district or other political subdivision or municipality or public corporation and any instrumentality thereof, under any contract of service, express or implied, and every official or officer thereof, whether elected or appointed, while performing official duties; persons in the service of the state as volunteer members of the Kansas department of civil air patrol, but only to the extent and during such periods as they are officially engaged in the performance of functions specified in K.S.A. 48-3302, and amendments thereto; volunteers in any employment, if the employer has filed an election to extend coverage to such volunteers; minors, whether such minors are legally or illegally employed; and persons performing community service work, but only to the extent and during such periods as they are performing community service work and if an election has been filed an election to extend coverage to such persons. Any reference to an employee who has been injured shall, where the employee is dead, include a reference to the employee's dependents, to the employee's legal representatives or, if the employee is a minor or an incapacitated person, to the employee's guardian or conservator. Unless there is a valid election in effect that has been filed as provided in K.S.A. 44-542a, and amendments thereto, such terms shall not include individual employers, limited liability company members, partners or self-employed persons.
(c) (1) "Dependents" means such members of the employee's family as were wholly or in part dependent upon the employee at the time of the accident or injury.
(2) "Members of a family" means only surviving legal spouse and children; or if no surviving legal spouse or children, then parents or grandparents; or if no parents or grandparents, then grandchildren; or if no grandchildren, then brothers and sisters. In the meaning of this section, parents include stepparents, children include stepchildren, grandchildren include stepgrandchildren, brothers and sisters include stepbrothers and stepsisters, and children and parents include that relation by legal adoption. In the meaning of this section, a surviving spouse shall not be regarded as a dependent of a deceased employee or as a member of the family, if the surviving spouse shall have for more than six months willfully or voluntarily deserted or abandoned the employee prior to the date of the employee's death.
(3) "Wholly dependent child or children" means:
(A) A birth child or adopted child of the employee except such a child whose relationship to the employee has been severed by adoption;
(B) a stepchild of the employee who lives in the employee's household;
(C) any other child who is actually dependent in whole or in part on the employee and who is related to the employee by marriage or consanguinity; or
(D) any child as defined in subsection (c)(3)(A), (3)(B) or (3)(C) who is less than 23 years of age and who is not physically or mentally capable of earning wages in any type of substantial and gainful employment or who is a full-time student attending an accredited institution of higher education or vocational education.
(d) "Accident" means an undesigned, sudden and unexpected traumatic event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate nature and often, but not necessarily, accompanied by a manifestation of force. An accident shall be identifiable by time and place of occurrence, produce at the time symptoms of an injury and occur during a single work shift. The accident must be the prevailing factor in causing the injury. "Accident" shall in no case be construed to include repetitive trauma in any form.
(e) "Repetitive trauma" refers to cases where an injury occurs as a result of repetitive use, cumulative traumas or microtraumas. The repetitive nature of the injury must be demonstrated by diagnostic or clinical tests. The repetitive trauma must be the prevailing factor in causing the injury. "Repetitive trauma" shall in no case be construed to include occupational disease, as defined in K.S.A. 44-5a01, and amendments thereto.
In the case of injury by repetitive trauma, the date of injury shall be the earliest of:
(1) The date the employee, while employed for the employer against whom benefits are sought, is taken off work by a physician due to the diagnosed repetitive trauma;
(2) the date the employee, while employed for the employer against whom benefits are sought, is placed on modified or restricted duty by a physician due to the diagnosed repetitive trauma;
(3) the date the employee, while employed for the employer against whom benefits are sought, is advised by a physician that the condition is work-related; or
(4) the last day worked, if the employee no longer works for the employer against whom benefits are sought.
In no case shall the date of accident be later than the last date worked.
(f) (1) "Personal injury" and "injury" mean any lesion or change in the physical structure of the body, causing damage or harm thereto. Personal injury or injury may occur only by accident, repetitive trauma or occupational disease as those terms are defined.
(2) An injury is compensable only if it arises out of and in the course of employment. An injury is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor. An injury is not compensable solely because it aggravates, accelerates or exacerbates a preexisting condition or renders a preexisting condition symptomatic.
(A) An injury by repetitive trauma shall be deemed to arise out of employment only if:
(i) The employment exposed the worker to an increased risk or hazard to which the worker would not have been exposed in normal non-employment life;
(ii) the increased risk or hazard to which the employment exposed the worker is the prevailing factor in causing the repetitive trauma; and
(iii) the repetitive trauma is the prevailing factor in causing both the medical condition and resulting disability or impairment.
(B) An injury by accident shall be deemed to arise out of employment only if:
(i) There is a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting accident; and
(ii) the accident is the prevailing factor causing the injury, medical condition and resulting disability or impairment.
(3) (A) The words "arising out of and in the course of employment" as used in the workers compensation act shall not be construed to include:
(i) Injury that occurred as a result of the natural aging process or by the normal activities of day-to-day living;
(ii) accident or injury that arose out of a neutral risk with no particular employment or personal character;
(iii) accident or injury that arose out of a risk personal to the worker; or
(iv) accident or injury that arose either directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes.
(B) The words "arising out of and in the course of employment" as used in the workers compensation act shall not be construed to include injuries to the employee occurring while the employee is on the way to assume the duties of employment or after leaving such duties, the proximate cause of which injury is not the employer's negligence. An employee shall not be construed as being on the way to assume the duties of employment or having left such duties at a time when the worker is on the premises owned or under the exclusive control of the employer or on the only available route to or from work that is a route involving a special risk or hazard connected with the nature of the employment, that is not a risk or hazard to which the general public is exposed and that is a route not used by the public except in dealings with the employer. An employee shall not be construed as being on the way to assume the duties of employment, if the employee is a provider of emergency services responding to an emergency.
(C) The words, "arising out of and in the course of employment" as used in the workers compensation act shall not be construed to include injuries to employees while engaged in recreational or social events under circumstances where the employee was under no duty to attend and where the injury did not result from the performance of tasks related to the employee's normal job duties or as specifically instructed to be performed by the employer.
(g) "Prevailing" as it relates to the term "factor" means the primary factor, in relation to any other factor. In determining what constitutes the "prevailing factor" in a given case, the administrative law judge shall consider all relevant evidence submitted by the parties.
(h) "Burden of proof" means the burden of a party to persuade the trier of facts by a preponderance of the credible evidence that such party's position on an issue is more probably true than not true on the basis of the whole record unless a higher burden of proof is specifically required by this act.
(i) "Director" means the director of workers compensation as provided for in K.S.A. 75-5708, and amendments thereto.
(j) "Healthcare provider" means any person licensed, by the proper licensing authority of this state, another state or the District of Columbia, to practice medicine and surgery, osteopathy, chiropractic, dentistry, optometry, podiatry, audiology or psychology.
(k) "Secretary" means the secretary of labor.
(l) "Construction design professional" means any person who is an architect, professional engineer, landscape architect or land surveyor who has been issued a license by the state board of technical professions to practice such technical profession in Kansas or any corporation organized to render professional services through the practice of one or more of such technical professions in Kansas under the professional corporation law of Kansas or any corporation issued a certificate of authorization under K.S.A. 74-7036, and amendments thereto, to practice one or more of such technical professions in Kansas.
(m) "Community service work" means: (1) Public or community service performed as a result of a contract of diversion or of assignment to a community corrections program or conservation camp or suspension of sentence or as a condition of probation or in lieu of a fine imposed by court order; or (2) public or community service or other work performed as a requirement for receipt of any kind of public assistance in accordance with any program administered by the secretary for children and families.
(n) "Utilization review" means the initial evaluation of appropriateness in terms of both the level and the quality of healthcare and health services provided to a patient, based on accepted standards of the healthcare profession involved. Such evaluation is accomplished by means of a system that identifies the utilization of healthcare services above the usual range of utilization for such services, that is based on accepted standards of the healthcare profession involved and that refers instances of possible inappropriate utilization to the director for referral to a peer review committee.
(o) "Peer review" means an evaluation by a peer review committee of the appropriateness, quality and cost of healthcare and health services provided a patient that is based on accepted standards of the healthcare profession involved and that is conducted in conjunction with utilization review.
(p) "Peer review committee" means a committee composed of healthcare providers licensed to practice the same healthcare profession as the healthcare provider who rendered the healthcare services being reviewed.
(q) "Group-funded self-insurance plan" includes each group-funded workers compensation pool that is authorized to operate in this state under K.S.A. 44-581 through 44-592, and amendments thereto, each municipal group-funded pool under the Kansas municipal group-funded pool act that is covering liabilities under the workers compensation act and any other similar group-funded or pooled plan or arrangement that provides coverage for employer liabilities under the workers compensation act and is authorized by law.
(r) On and after the effective date of this act, "workers compensation board" or "board" means the workers compensation appeals board established under K.S.A. 44-555c, and amendments thereto.
(s) "Usual charge" means the amount most commonly charged by healthcare providers for the same or similar services.
(t) "Customary charge" means the usual rates or range of fees charged by healthcare providers in a given locale or area.
(u) "Functional impairment" means the extent, expressed as a percentage, of the loss of a portion of the total physiological capabilities of the human body as established by competent medical evidence and based on the fourth edition of the American medical association guides to the evaluation of impairment, if the impairment is contained therein.
(v) "Authorized treating physician" means a licensed physician or other healthcare provider authorized by the employer or insurance carrier, or both, or appointed pursuant to court-order to provide those medical services deemed necessary to diagnose and treat an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.
(w) "Mail" means the use of the United States postal service or other land based delivery service or transmission by electronic means, including delivery by fax, e-mail or other electronic delivery method designated by the director of workers compensation.
History: L. 1927, ch. 232, § 8; L. 1965, ch. 319, § 1; L. 1968, ch. 102, § 2; L. 1974, ch. 203, § 7; L. 1976, ch. 370, § 18; L. 1977, ch. 175, § 2; L. 1979, ch. 156, § 2; L. 1983, ch. 167, § 1; L. 1985, ch. 175, § 2; L. 1986, ch. 189, § 1; L. 1987, ch. 187, § 2; L. 1988, ch. 167, § 5; L. 1990, ch. 183, § 1; L. 1991, ch. 144, § 2; L. 1993, ch. 286, § 28; L. 1995, ch. 1, § 4; L. 1996, ch. 79, § 3; L. 1997, ch. 125, § 3; L. 1998, ch. 120, § 3; L. 2000, ch. 160, § 6; L. 2001, ch. 121, § 1; L. 2002, ch. 122, § 1; L. 2004, ch. 179, § 15; L. 2005, ch. 55, § 1; L. 2011, ch. 55, § 5; L. 2013, ch. 104, § 4; L. 2014, ch. 115, § 193; L. 2019, ch. 64, § 8; June 6.
Source or prior law:
L. 1911, ch. 218, § 9; L. 1913, ch. 216, § 4; L. 1917, ch. 226, § 2; R.S. 1923, 44-508.
Law Review and Bar Journal References:
Conflicts of law in marriage, 4 K.L.R. 122 (1955).
1953-55 survey of family law, Dan Hopson, Jr., 4 K.L.R. 224, 238 (1955).
Paragraph (j) cited in comment on illegitimacy in Kansas, Donald W. Vasos, 14 K.L.R. 473, 490 (1966).
Clause (j); case in annotation No. 135 discussed in comment on illegitimacy in Kansas, Donald W. Vasos, 14 K.L.R. 473, 490 (1966).
Subsection (k) discussed in "Changes in Workmen's Compensation," William F. Morrissey, 36 J.B.A.K. 173 (1967).
Subsection (j) cited in comment on child dependency under the workmen's compensation act, 11 W.L.J. 471 (1972).
Section's definition of "dependents" in a discussion of "living together as husband and wife," 14 W.L.J. 164, 167 (1975).
"Potential Federalization of State Workmen's Compensation Law—The Kansas Response," James C. Wright and James P. Rankin, 15 W.L.J. 244, 255 (1976).
"Workmen's Compensation—Major Changes in Employments Covered, Benefits, Defenses, Offsets, and Other Changes," Alvin D. Herrington, 24 K.L.R. 611, 620, 621 (1976).
"Survey of Kansas Law: Workers' Compensation," William A. Kelly, 27 K.L.R. 377, 386 (1979).
"Major Legislative Changes in Workers' Compensation Law," Gary L. Jordan, 3 J.K.T.L.A. No. 1, 14, 15 (1979).
"Workers' Compensation: Reconsidering the 'Right to Control' as the Exclusive Test for Employment Status," Catherine M. Foster, 23 W.L.J. 379, 385, 387 (1984).
"Workers' Compensation: The Exclusive Remedy Rule Is Alive and Well in Kansas [Hormann v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 236 Kan. 190, 689 P.2d 837 (1984)]," Janet K. Kerr, 25 W.L.J. 192, 195, 196 (1985).
"Analysis of Bill Drafted by Interim Committee on 1984 Labor and Industry," Gary L. Jordan, Vol. VIII, No. 3, J.K.T.L.A. 11 (1984).
"Workers' Compensation—A Salute to the Trial Lawyers of Kansas," Gary L. Jordan, 10 J.K.T.L.A. No. 6, 9 (1987).
"Should You Take A Chiropractor To Court?", Steven M. Dickson, J.K.T.L.A., Vol. XIII, No. 3, 19, 20 (1990).
"Workers' Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XV, No. 5, Review p. 3 (1992).
"An Overview of the 1993 Amendments to the Kansas Workers Compensation Act," David J. Rebein, 62 J.K.B.A. No. 5, 30, 31 (1993).
"Workers' Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Work. Comp. Review Section, 1, 3 (1994).
"Workers' Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Work. Comp. Review Section, 1, 5 (1994).
"Workers' Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Work. Comp. Review Section, 1, 7 (1995).
"The Supreme Court Slams The Door on The Premises Debate: A Review ofThompson v. Law Offices of Alan Joseph," Kelly W. Johnston, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVIII, No. 3, 10, 11 (1995).
"Workers' Compensation Review," Patrick Nichols, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVIII, No. 5, Work. Comp. Review Section, 1, 2 (1995).
"Tort Action Or Workers' Compensation Claim? Private Animosity Defeats The Exclusive Remedy Rule," Frank D. Taff, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XVIII, No. 6, 27 (1995).
"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 1, Review Section, 27 (1997).
"Legislative Changes Hurt Many Small, Family-Owned Businesses," Roger A. Riedmiller, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 3, 13 (1998).
"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 5, Review Section, 18, 19 (1998).
"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXI, No. 6, Review Section, 21, 23 (1998).
"Workers Compensation Review," J.K.T.L.A. Vol. XXII, No. 4, 26 (1999).
"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 24, No. 5, 23 (2001).
"Differentiating Injury By Accident From Aging and Preexisting Conditions," Mitchell D. Wulfekoetter, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 26, No. 2, 6 (2002).
"Cold-Hearted Application of the Heart Amendment Leaves Kansas Workers' Compensation Claimants Gasping [Mudd v. Neosho Memorial Regional Medical, 62 P.3d 236 (Kan. 2003)]," Shannon L. Bell, 43 W.L.J. 171 (2003).
"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 2, 21 (2003).
"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 3, 25 (2004).
"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 5, 19, 21 (2004).
"The Immunity Provisions in the Kansas Tort Claims Act: The First Twenty-Five Years," William E. Westerbeke, 52 K.L.R. 939 (2004).
"Litigating a Defense of Alcohol or Drug Impairment Under the Workers Compensation Act," Hon. Bruce E. Moore, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 6, 6, 10 (2004).
"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 27, No. 6, 19 (2004).
"Workers Compensation Review," Jan L. Fisher, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 28, No. 2, 22 (2004).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 29, No. 2, 24 (2005).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 29, No. 3, 23 (2006).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seivert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 29, No. 5, 14 (2006).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 30, No. 1, 19 (2006).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 30, No. 3, 20 (2007).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 30, No. 4, 19 (2007).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 30, No. 5, 15 (2007).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.T.L.A. Vol. 30, No. 6, 25 (2007).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 31, No. 2, 16 (2007).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 31, No. 5, 18 (2008).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 33, No. 2 (2009).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 33, No. 5, 20 (2010).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 33, No. 6, 31 (2010).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 34, No. 2, 18 (2010).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 34, No. 3, 23 (2011).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Editor, J.K.A.J. Vol. 34, No. 4, 19 (2011).
"Workers Compensation Review," Joseph Seiwert, Kathleen J. Cossairt, Jan Fisher, Jon W. Stapleton, Jr., Stephanie J. Wilson, and David H. Ferris, 36 J.K.A.J. No. 6 (2013).
Attorney General's Opinions:
County extension council; extension agent and other employees status under tort claims and workers compensation acts. 84-56.
Performance of community service. 86-149.
Doctors of chiropractic cannot use the term "chiropractic physician." 87-42.
Kansas civil air patrol; tort claims act; workers compensation. 91-124.
Licensure and regulation of podiatrists; physicians defined. 94-148.
Persons required to submit certification of health; employees and persons under supervision of district who are in regular contact with pupils. 97-1.
CASE ANNOTATIONS
Explanation, see Revisor's Note under article title, chapter 44, article 5.
Cases through 1973
CLAUSE (a) Railway (1-2)
1. Employment on railways include work in depots. Phillips v. Kansas City, L. & W. Rly. Co., 126 Kan. 133, 137, 267 P. 4 (1928).
2. "Employment on railway" includes work in railway machine shops. Gimple v. Railroad Co., 108 Kan. 118, 119, 193 P. 1072 (1920).
CLAUSE (b) Factory (4-10)
4. Repair shop of taxicab company within act, provided requirements of K.S.A. 44-507 met. Thorp v. Victory Cab Co., 172 Kan. 384, 386, 388, 240 P.2d 128 (1952).
5. A monument works is a "factory" within clause (b). Pack v. Grimes, 107 Kan. 704, 706, 193 P. 330 (1920).
6. "Factory" limited to premises where power used in manufacturing; provision relating to "processes" extends act to other manufactories; dictum. Dodson v. Sales Co., 110 Kan. 481, 483, 204 P. 532 (1922).
7. Factory not using mechanical power held not a "factory" within act. Menke v. Hauber, 99 Kan. 171, 174, 160 P. 1017 (1916).
8. Injury 200 feet from factory was "in, on or about factory"; holding prior to 1927. Routh v. List & Weatherly Construction Co., 124 Kan. 222, 224, 257 P. 721 (1927).
9. Prior to 1927 amendment, injuries received several blocks from factory held not "in, on or about" factory. Carter v. Uhrich, 122 Kan. 408, 412, 252 P. 240 (1927).
10. Subsection (b) construed; filling station does not fall within statutory definition of factory. Einfeldt v. Augustine, 209 Kan. 728, 729, 498 P.2d 43 (1972).
CLAUSE (c) Mine (11-22)
11. Driller of zinc and lead prospect holes held working in mine and within act. Wells v. Eagle-Picher M. & S. Co., 148 Kan. 794, 799, 85 P.2d 22 (1938).
12. Definition of "mine" considered; superficies of mines particularly described. Bevard v. Coal Co., 101 Kan. 207, 210, 214, 215, 165 P. 657 (1917).
13. Mine owner is under act unless he has a substitute plan, regardless of election. Gust v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 136 Kan. 88, 93, 12 P.2d 831 (1932).
14. Act mandatory upon employer when engaged in mining business or an integral part thereof; subcontractor assayer held engaged in mining. Coble v. Williams, 177 Kan. 743, 748, 282 P.2d 425 (1955).
15. Damage action not maintainable as workman's remedy was under compensation act; joint mining operation under clause (c) and clause (h). Jennings v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 152 Kan. 469, 471, 105 P.2d 882 (1940).
16. Business of producing and marketing gas is within act regardless of number of employees. Clark v. Amos, 144 Kan. 115, 117, 58 P.2d 81 (1936).
17. Filling station operator in employ of employer who also operates refineries is within act. Stager v. Sinclair Refining Co., 143 Kan. 517, 518, 54 P.2d 969 (1936).
18. Prior to 1927 amendment of clause (c) an oil or gas well was not a "mine" within the meaning of act. Hollingsworth v. Berry, 107 Kan. 544, 545, 546, 547, 192 P. 763 (1920).
19. Prior to 1927 amendment number of workmen required to bring oil well within act considered. Stover v. Davis, 110 Kan. 810, 205 P. 605 (1922).
20. Prior to 1927 amendment workman hauling oil well pipe between wells was not within act. McIlvain v. Oil and Gas Co., 110 Kan. 266, 268, 203 P. 701 (1922).
21. Rock quarry is not a mine. Mitchener v. Daniels, 187 Kan. 765, 768, 359 P.2d 872 (1961).
22. Oil and gas drilling defined as "mine." Juergensen v. Isern Drilling Co., 197 Kan. 804, 807, 421 P.2d 11 (1966).
CLAUSE (d) Quarry (23-24)
23. Blasting work may be either "engineering work" clause (g) or "quarrying work" clause (d). Mendel v. Fort Scott Hydraulic Cement Co., 147 Kan. 719, 731, 732, 78 P.2d 868 (1938).
24. Prior to 1917 amendments employment about quarry on work for county was not within act. Gray v. Sedgwick County, 101 Kan. 195, 196, 197, 165 P. 867 (1917).
CLAUSE (e) Electrical (27-29)
27. "Electrical work" includes any kind of work in or directly connected with the operation of telephone or telegraph lines. Pegg v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 129 Kan. 413, 414, 283 P. 58 (1929).
28. Messenger boys of telegraph company within purview of act. Pegg v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 129 Kan. 413, 415, 283 P. 58 (1929).
29. Term "electrical work" discussed; employee working on telephone wires along public highway within act. Tierney v. Telephone Co., 114 Kan. 706, 708, 220 P. 190 (1923).
CLAUSE (f) Building work
—Decorating and remodeling (32-34)
32. Painting of buildings is "building work" within act; paint retailer who contracted for painting and paperhanging was engaged in building work as employer. Davis v. Julian, 152 Kan. 749, 758, 107 P.2d 745 (1940).
33. Painting and decorating business within act unless employer elects not to be under act. Palmer v. Julian, 161 Kan. 619, 629, 170 P.2d 813 (1946).
34. "Remodeling work" held to constitute "building work." Shrout v. Lewis, 147 Kan. 592, 594, 77 P.2d 973 (1938).
—In general (37-45)
37. Trimming a tree is not "building work" as defined in clause (f); to be "building work" within act, work must be expended on building or building appurtenance. Thayer v. Bowler, 144 Kan. 136, 137, 58 P.2d 59 (1936).
38. Farmer building barn not under workmen's compensation act unless habitually giving a substantial part of his time and labor to construction of barns or other structures. Giltner v. Stephens, 163 Kan. 37, 47, 180 P.2d 288 (1947).
39. Building a bridge is "engineering work" clause (g), but not "building work" clause (f); dictum. Harrel v. Quiring, 125 Kan. 249, 250, 264 P. 46 (1928).
40. Employer in plumbing, sheet metal and heating business; 5% of work on guttering; employee injured thereon was doing building work; compensable. Dolezal v. Rizek, 166 Kan. 119, 122, 199 P.2d 179 (1948).
41. "Building work" is within act only if it constitutes the trade or business of employer. Setter v. Wilson, 140 Kan. 447, 449, 37 P.2d 50 (1934).
42. Work on construction of addition to employer's grain-elevator was a germane and pertinent incident to grain-elevator business; not "building work." Johnson v. Voss, 152 Kan. 586, 588, 106 P.2d 648 (1940).
43. Erection of monument at grave in cemetery not "building work." Harrel v. Quiring, 125 Kan. 249, 264 P. 46 (1928).
44. Discussion of what constitutes "building work" prior to 1927 amendment. McIlvain v. Oil and Gas Co., 110 Kan. 266, 268, 203 P. 701 (1922).
45. Terms "building work," "employer" and "workman" construed and applied. Setter v. Wilson, 140 Kan. 447, 449, 37 P.2d 50 (1934).
—Repair and maintenance (47-48)
47. Repair and reroofing rental house "building work," but not within employer's trade or business; not within act. Martin v. Craig, 148 Kan. 882, 883, 884, 84 P.2d 853 (1938).
48. Repair of building is "building work" but is not necessarily within act. Setter v. Wilson, 140 Kan. 447, 449, 37 P.2d 50 (1934).
CLAUSE (g) Engineering (49-55)
49. Building a bridge is "engineering work" clause (g), but not "building work" clause (f); dictum. Harrel v. Quiring, 125 Kan. 249, 250, 264 P. 46 (1928).
50. The purpose for which work was being done determined its character as "engineering work" not "agricultural pursuit." Walker v. Finney County Water Users Ass'n, 150 Kan. 254, 256, 92 P.2d 11 (1939).
51. Water users association repairing diversion dam extension held engaged in "engineering work." Walker v. Finney County Water Users Ass'n, 150 Kan. 254, 255, 257, 92 P.2d 11 (1939).
52. Term "engineering work" discussed; includes excavating when power machinery is used. Sellers v. Reice Construction Co., 124 Kan. 550, 551, 262 P. 19 (1927).
53. Work as alleged in petition held "engineering work"; parties within act; remedy exclusive. Crawford v. Atchison, Topeka & S. F. Rly. Co., 166 Kan. 163, 164, 165, 199 P.2d 796 (1948).
54. Term "engineering work" discussed. Hoops v. Utilities Co., 116 Kan. 598, 599, 227 P. 332 (1924).
55. "Engineering work" includes moving buildings; workman held employee of independent contractor; principal not liable under K.S.A. 44-503. Lehman v. Grace Oil Co., 151 Kan. 145, 149, 98 P.2d 430 (1940).
CLAUSE (h) Employer
—In general (57-61)
57. Court will look through form to substance to determine employer-employee relationship. Neild v. Eldridge, 178 Kan. 159, 163, 283 P.2d 250 (1955).
58. Relationship of employer-employee existed. Wise v. Central Dairy Co., 121 Kan. 258, 261, 246 P. 501 (1926).
59. Meaning of "employer" may be determined by context of other portions of statute i.e., K.S.A. 44-505 and 44-503. Setter v. Wilson, 140 Kan. 447, 449, 37 P.2d 50 (1934).
60. Claimant was an employee of company that was in joint venture or similar arrangement with third party who negotiated employment agreement with claimant; compensation allowed against company. Johnson v. Arma Elevator Co., 146 Kan. 965, 73 P.2d 1018 (1937).
61. Clause (h), definition of "employer" considered. Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, 511, 407 P.2d 471 (1965).
—Special employers (62-66)
62. Employer-employee relationship existed; foreman not an independent contractor. Peoples v. Condie-Bray Glass & Paint Co., 121 Kan. 657, 658, 249 P. 603 (1926).
63. Workmen's compensation act does not differentiate between special and general employers, clause (h). Bright v. Bragg, 175 Kan. 404, 412, 264 P.2d 494 (1953).
64. Special employer within this act not liable to special employee under factory act. Bell v. Hall Lithographing Co., 154 Kan. 660, 666, 121 P.2d 281 (1942).
65. Loaned workman engaged in business of his general employer; liability. Mendel v. Fort Scott Hydraulic Cement Co., 147 Kan. 719, 727, 78 P.2d 868 (1938).
66. Act does not differentiate between special and general employers, clause (h); includes both; both are liable where joint right of supervision exists; joint and several liability. Mendel v. Fort Scott Hydraulic Cement Co., 147 Kan. 719, 724, 726, 78 P.2d 868 (1938).
—Receivers (68-70)
68. Receivers of company are "employers" within meaning of clause (h). Unrine v. Railroad Co., 104 Kan. 236, 237, 178 P. 614 (1919).
69. Successor corporation held not liable in later action on theory injury permanent. Welden v. American Steel & Wire Co., 143 Kan. 125, 128, 53 P.2d 1195 (1936).
70. Railroad operated by director-general held under workmen's compensation law. Gimple v. Railroad Co., 108 Kan. 118, 120, 193 P. 1072 (1920).
CLAUSE (i) Workman
—Employer-employee relationship (72-79)
72. Relationship of employer and employee requires the existence of a contractual relationship; claimant not a "workman" as defined in clause (i). Floro v. Ticehurst, 147 Kan. 426, 432, 76 P.2d 773 (1938).
73. Not every "workman" as defined in clause (i) is within act. Setter v. Wilson, 140 Kan. 447, 449, 37 P.2d 50 (1934).
74. Clause (i) requires employment of workman to be within act; question considered as to what in law makes a person an employee. Dorst v. City of Chanute, 185 Kan. 593, 598, 345 P.2d 698 (1959).
75. Establishment of employer and employee relationship; a substitute employee, with foreman assenting thereto, is within act. Carter v. Woods Bros. Construction Co., 120 Kan. 481, 483, 244 P. 1 (1926).
76. Workman held employed by defendant at time of injury; within act. Raynes v. Riss & Co., 152 Kan. 383, 103 P.2d 818 (1940).
77. Evidence sufficient to sustain finding claimant was an employee. Johnson v. Arma Elevator Co., 146 Kan. 965, 73 P.2d 1018 (1937).
78. "Workman" includes one holding stock in corporation and employed as laborer. Grigliono v. Hope Coal Co., 125 Kan. 581, 264 P. 1051 (1928).
79. Deceased owner of company was not "workman" hereunder. Roark v. Roark Motor Co., 196 Kan. 741, 743, 413 P.2d 1019 (1966).
—In general (80-85)
80. Workman paid by quantity of coal mined; within compensation act. McKinstry v. Coal Co., 116 Kan. 192, 225 P. 743 (1924).
81. Successive contracts of employment considered in deciding workman was employed in Kansas. Evans v. Tibbetts, 134 Kan. 131, 132, 4 P.2d 399 (1931).
82. Act does not apply to minor unlawfully employed; clause (i) construed; judgment for minor in common law action affirmed. Lee v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 137 Kan. 759, 768, 22 P.2d 942 (1933).
83. Prior to 1927 amendment of clause (i) a police officer of city was not a "workman." Griswold v. City of Wichita, 99 Kan. 502, 504, 505, 506, 162 P. 276 (1917).
84. Chautauqua entertainer held "employee" within act. Neugen v. Associated Chautauqua Co., 70 F.2d 605 (1934).
85. Application of clause (i) to employment by a city considered; act construed with statutes governing city's operations. Dorst v. City of Chanute, 185 Kan. 593, 598, 345 P.2d 698 (1959).
—Independent contractor (87-92)
87. Defense that workman was independent contractor rejected. Shindhelm v. Razook, 190 Kan. 80, 82, 83, 372 P.2d 278 (1962).
88. Claimant found to be independent contractor rather than an employee by the trial court, affirmed; "independent contractor" defined. Krug v. Sutton, 189 Kan. 96, 98, 366 P.2d 798 (1961).
89. Independent contractor not necessarily brought within terms of act. McIlvain v. Oil and Gas Co., 110 Kan. 266, 268, 203 P. 701 (1922).
90. Lessee of mine held independent contractor prior to 1917 amendment of clause (h). Maughlelle v. Mining Co., 99 Kan. 412, 161 P. 907 (1916).
91. Generally speaking an independent contractor is one who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to control of his employer except as to the result of his work. Snyder v. Smith, 191 Kan. 446, 448, 381 P.2d 508 (1963).
92. Driver-owner of truck leased on percent of gross freight revenue arrangement; relation of employer-workman existed; compensable. Wilbeck v. Grain Belt Transportation Co., 181 Kan. 512, 513, 514, 313 P.2d 725 (1957).
CLAUSE (j) Dependents
—Definition (101-103)
101. A "dependent" must be within the class named in the statute and must be in fact dependent on the workman at time of fatal accident. Wade v. Scherrer & Bennett Const. Co., 143 Kan. 384, 392, 54 P.2d 944 (1936).
102. Definition of term dependent includes the term to be defined; no definite standard of dependency, either total or partial. Fennimore v. Coal Co., 100 Kan. 372, 374, 164 P. 265 (1917).
103. The definition of "dependents" includes the word to be defined, so court looks to entire act and to general principles for a definition that will apply in each particular case. Spurgin v. Spurgin, 152 Kan. 212, 213, 103 P.2d 889 (1940).
—Determination, date (105-107)
105. Degree of dependency determined as of time of accident. Proffitt v. Aldridge, 154 Kan. 468, 473, 119 P.2d 523 (1941).
106. Dependency is to be determined as of date of the accident. Dean v. Hodges Bros., 170 Kan. 333, 336, 224 P.2d 1028 (1950).
107. Dependency is determined as of date of injury. Middleton v. National Compressed Steel Corp., 199 Kan. 574, 575, 431 P.2d 676 (1967).
—Determination, standard (108-111)
108. "Dependency" contemplates support according to previous standard of family. Fennimore v. Coal Co., 100 Kan. 372, 375, 164 P. 265 (1917).
109. If natural and legal dependence has no practical substantial value, there is no dependency. Wade v. Scherrer & Bennett Const. Co., 143 Kan. 384, 393, 394, 54 P.2d 944 (1936).
110. No dependency where cost of maintenance of minor equalled contributions to parent. Spurgin v. Spurgin, 152 Kan. 212, 213, 103 P.2d 889 (1940).
111. Cited; no error in trial court finding appellant not wholly dependent on decedent at time of accident. Richardson v. Robert Drummond Trucking, 204 Kan. 385, 386, 461 P.2d 754 (1969).
—In general (112-114)
112. The amount of a reasonable charge for board and room should be deducted from the amount paid by minor to parent, in order to determine whether any dependency at all existed. Spurgin v. Spurgin, 152 Kan. 212, 215, 103 P.2d 889 (1940).
113. When there are persons wholly dependent, neither the number of them nor their relation as "members of the family," increases or decreases the sum the employer required to pay. McCormick et al. v. Coal & Coke Co., 117 Kan. 686, 692, 232 P. 1071 (1925).
114. Widow and her four children totally dependent on workman; also two children by former marriage totally dependent on workman; all are "dependents" and participate in the award. Carrington v. British American Oil Producing Co., 157 Kan. 101, 106, 138 P.2d 463 (1943).
—Question of fact (115-118)
115. Whether one is a "dependent" and degree of dependency are questions of fact. Wade v. Scherrer & Bennett Const. Co., 143 Kan. 384, 393, 54 P.2d 944 (1936).
116. Who are dependents in a given case, and the extent of the dependency of any "member of the family" is a question of fact, see K.S.A. 44-513 also. McCormick et al. v. Coal & Coke Co., 117 Kan. 686, 690, 232 P. 1071 (1925).
117. A finding of partial dependency is conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support it. Fennimore v. Coal Co., 100 Kan. 372, 374, 164 P. 265 (1917).
118. District court finding as to dependency conclusive on appeal, when. Briney v. Hopper Construction Co., 146 Kan. 927, 73 P.2d 1110 (1937).
—Widow (120-126)
120. Term "legal widow" uses the word legal as meaning "good and effectual in law"; claimant found to be legal widow. Freeman v. Fowler Packing Co., 135 Kan. 378, 380, 11 P.2d 276 (1932); Gillaspie v. Blair Construction Co., 192 Kan. 455, 388 P.2d 647 (1964).
121. Term "legal widow" refers to woman married by marital contract valid in Kansas. Peters v. Peters, 177 Kan. 100, 105, 106, 107, 108, 276 P.2d 302 (1954).
122. After facts determined the question of abandonment by wife is a question of law. Tisdale v. Wilson & Co., 141 Kan. 885, 889, 43 P.2d 1064 (1935).
123. Wife who had abandoned husband allowed compensation as a "dependent"; clause on abandonment added to statute after case. Winchester v. Stanton-Wallace Construction Co., 124 Kan. 458, 260 P. 614 (1927).
124. Woman living with (but unmarried to) deceased workman cannot recover hereunder. Stokes v. Morris & Co., 107 Kan. 232, 233, 234, 191 P. 264 (1920).
125. Term "legal widow" considered; claimant divorced six days entered into illegal common law marriage with deceased workman; common law relationship became legal before death of workman; claimant was "legal widow" under the act. Gillaspie v. Blair Construction Co., 192 Kan. 455, 388 P.2d 647 (1964).
126. Common-law wife after disability removed held legal widow of decedent. Gillaspie v. Blair Construction Co., 192 Kan. 455, 458, 459, 460, 461, 388 P.2d 647 (1964).
—Children (128-138)
128. Children are "dependents" of father having legal duty to support them. Carrington v. British American Oil Producing Co., 157 Kan. 101, 106, 138 P.2d 463 (1943).
129. Child may be a "dependent" even if father has failed to use his wages to support child. Wade v. Scherrer & Bennett Const. Co., 143 Kan. 384, 393, 54 P.2d 944 (1936).
130. Ultimate fact to be determined in deciding whether one is a "dependent" is, "was child a dependent of the workman at time of his fatal injury?" Wade v. Scherrer & Bennett Const. Co., 143 Kan. 384, 393, 54 P.2d 944 (1936).
131. "Legal adoption" as used in clause (j) means adoption according to statutes. Ellis v. Coal Co., 100 Kan. 187, 188, 163 P. 654 (1917).
132. Taking child with agreement to adopt held not "legal adoption." Ellis v. Coal Co., 100 Kan. 187, 188, 163 P. 654 (1917).
133. Posthumous child of workman is a dependent, even though parents not lawfully married. Peters v. Peters, 177 Kan. 100, 105, 276 P.2d 302 (1954).
134. Unborn child of workman is a dependent and entitled to death benefit under act. Routh v. List & Weatherly Construction Co., 124 Kan. 222, 224, 225, 257 P. 721 (1927).
135. Illegitimate child and illegitimate posthumous child of workman are "dependents." Green v. Burch, 164 Kan. 348, 349, 354, 358, 359, 189 P.2d 892 (1948).
136. Compensation to adult son capable of self-support not intended. Taylor v. Sulzberger & Sons Co., 98 Kan. 169, 170, 172, 157 P. 435 (1916).
137. The family of the mother does not mean and include an adult married son living with his wife and children separate and apart from his mother. Taylor v. Sulzberger & Sons Co., 98 Kan. 169, 173, 157 P. 435 (1916).
138. Cited; where parental rights have been terminated, child is not entitled to workmen's compensation benefits upon death of parent. Roelfs v. Wallingford, Inc., 207 Kan. 804, 807, 486 P.2d 1371 (1971).
—Parents (140-144)
140. Parents may be partially dependent although capable of self support. Fennimore v. Coal Co., 100 Kan. 372, 375, 164 P. 265 (1917).
141. Mother held partially dependent upon son under facts stated. Smith v. Sash & Door Co., 96 Kan. 816, 819, 153 P. 533 (1915).
142. Finding of partial dependency of parents upheld as against claim of total dependency. Baker v. Western Power & Light Co., 147 Kan. 571, 576, 577, 578, 78 P.2d 36 (1938).
143. Mother, but not father and sister found to be "dependents" under facts. Young v. Shellabarger Mill and Elevator Co., 123 Kan. 628, 630, 631, 256 P. 992 (1927).
144. Partial dependency of mother may exist although supported by husband; legal obligation to support not proper test. Smith v. Sash & Door Co., 96 Kan. 816, 819, 153 P. 533 (1915).
—Brothers and sisters (145-147)
145. Invalid sister supported by workman for two years not a "dependent" since the sister had an able-bodied husband. Tisdale v. Wilson & Co., 141 Kan. 885, 892, 43 P.2d 1064 (1935).
146. Deceased workman's sister not "dependent"; parents "dependents," and therefore no compensation will lapse. Proffitt v. Aldridge, 154 Kan. 468, 472, 119 P.2d 523 (1941).
147. Thirty-year-old invalid brother could be a "dependent"; upon his recovery compensation is terminated. Dunnigan v. Coal Co., 115 Kan. 57, 60, 222 P. 109 (1924).
CLAUSE (k), "Arising out of" exception
—On way to work (150-154)
150. Workman killed going to work carrying company money; exception in clause (k) applied; compensation denied. Repstine v. Hudson Oil Co., 155 Kan. 486, 488, 126 P.2d 225 (1942).
151. Workman ordered back to work at night; injured en route; injury not within act; clause (k) applied. Abbott v. Southwest Grain Co., 162 Kan. 315, 320, 322, 323, 325, 327, 176 P.2d 839 (1947).
152. Trial court found claimant injured while en route from Kansas to work in Tennessee; clause (k) applied. Pearson v. Electric Service Co., 166 Kan. 300, 302, 303, 304, 305, 201 P.2d 643 (1949).
153. Limitation of clause (k) applied in denying compensation to workman killed on way to work. Mazeffe v. Railway Co., 106 Kan. 796, 798, 189 P. 917 (1920).
154. Injury received going to work not compensable; "zone of danger" rule rejected. Chapman v. Victory Sand & Stone Co., 197 Kan. 377, 380, 384, 416 P.2d 754 (1966).
—On way home (155-157)
155. Mechanic killed in automobile collision while returning from examination in another city; injury within act; clause (k) construed. Blair v. Shaw, 171 Kan. 524, 527, 529, 530, 233 P.2d 731 (1951).
156. Fact that workman was en route to the town where he lived to buy repair parts was pure coincidence; clause (k) no defense. Shindhelm v. Razook, 190 Kan. 80, 85, 372 P.2d 278 (1962).
157. Employee injured after leaving work; petition held to allege negligence; clause (k) applicable; remedy exclusive under act. Wilburn v. Boeing Airplane Co., 188 Kan. 722, 723, 730, 731, 732, 734, 735, 366 P.2d 246 (1961).
—On or near premises (160-168)
160. Clause (k) mentioned; injured while waiting to start work; act inapplicable. Cook v. Dobson Sheet Metal Works, 157 Kan. 576, 577, 142 P.2d 709 (1943).
161. Clause (k) inapplicable where injury sustained preparing for work on employer's premises. Kauffman v. Co-operative Refinery Assn., 170 Kan. 325, 330, 225 P.2d 129 (1950).
162. Miner injured within mine, not "leaving such duty"; within act. Sedlock v. Mining Co., 98 Kan. 680, 681, 159 P. 9 (1916).
163. Employee slipping on ice between parking lot and entrance to plant; clause (k) raised as defense and rejected by court. Teague v. Boeing Airplane Co., 181 Kan. 434, 312 P.2d 220 (1957).
164. Workman fell on ice and snow on public sidewalk abutting employer's premises while going to work; not compensable. Madison v. Key Work Clothes, 182 Kan. 186, 190, 191, 318 P.2d 991 (1957).
165. Independent contractor's workman hurt on hotel elevator on way to wax floor; injury compensable; clause (k) does not apply; judgment for defendant on pleadings in common law action. Bailey v. Mosby Hotel Co., 160 Kan. 258, 263, 160 P.2d 701 (1945).
166. Injury in adjoining alley held not compensable under clause (k). Murray v. Ludowici-Celadon Co., 181 Kan. 556, 558, 559, 313 P.2d 728 (1957).
167. Night watchman killed while crossing street to defendant's used car lot; clause (k) claimed as a defense but rejected by court. Kirkpatrick v. Yeamans Motor Co., 143 Kan. 510, 516, 54 P.2d 960 (1936).
168. Subsection (k) considered; no requirement that injury be sustained on or about employer's premises. Casebeer v. Casebeer, 199 Kan. 806, 811, 433 P.2d 399 (1967).
—In general (170-179)
170. Question whether accident is under clause (k), is one of fact. LaRue v. Sierra Petroleum Co., 183 Kan. 153, 154, 325 P.2d 59 (1958).
171. Oil well driller killed while hiring crew for employer within act; defense of clause (k) raised and rejected by court. Bell v. Allison Drilling Co., 175 Kan. 441, 442, 444, 445, 264 P.2d 1069 (1953).
172. Evidence speculative and conjectural as to circumstances of accident; place of accident was not within one of the zones of employer nor on his premises; not within act; clause (k) considered. Jones v. Lozier-Broderick & Gordon, 160 Kan. 191, 196, 160 P.2d 932 (1945).
173. Agent's negligence attributable to employer's agent; clause (k) applies; within act. Hanson v. Zollars, 189 Kan. 699, 703, 371 P.2d 357 (1962).
174. Employee injured on way to work by negligence of employer's agent; clause (k) applies; within act. Hanson v. Zollars, 189 Kan. 699, 703, 371 P.2d 357 (1962).
175. Claimant urged that petition in damage action alleged "nuisance" not "negligence," and therefore clause (k) did not apply; theory rejected. Wilburn v. Boeing Airplane Co., 188 Kan. 722, 730, 366 P.2d 246 (1961).
176. Injury on trip to doctor's office to care for work injury; not within clause (k); compensable. Taylor v. Centex Construction Co., 191 Kan. 130, 137, 140, 379 P.2d 217 (1963).
177. Exception in clause (k) apparently would apply, but case decided against claimant on other grounds. Davis v. Jacob Dold Packing Co., 140 Kan. 644, 646, 38 P.2d 107 (1934).
178. Mentioned; employee injured during lunch hour, off employer's premises, on own errand; accident does not arise out of and in course of employment. Walker v. Tobin Construction Co., 193 Kan. 701, 705, 396 P.2d 301 (1964).
179. Section cited in considering application of K.S.A. 44-503. Hanna v. CRA, Inc., 196 Kan. 156, 158, 409 P.2d 786 (1966).
Cases after 1973
180. Subsection (k) phrases "out of" and "in the course of employment" discussed in holding multiple employers liable. Newman v. Bennett, 212 Kan. 562, 563, 565, 566, 567, 569, 512 P.2d 497.
181. Subsection (f) of former law (L. 1968, ch. 102) mentioned; common law action barred; employer's election found sufficient; election not terminated. Stonecipher v. Winn-Rau Corporation, 218 Kan. 617, 621, 545 P.2d 317.
182. Refusal to recognize lessor-lessee relationship against former employer as vehicle to impose liability held proper. Ellis v. Fairchild, 221 Kan. 702, 703, 707, 709, 710, 711, 562 P.2d 75.
183. Applied in construing K.S.A. 44-567; failure to apply "but for" rule requiring fund to pay full award. Barke v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 223 Kan. 313, 317, 573 P.2d 1025.
184. Applied in determining that injury occurred as a result of a pre-existing condition; award reinstated. Demars v. Rickel Manufacturing Corporation, 223 Kan. 374, 379, 573 P.2d 1036.
185. Applied in construing K.S.A. 44-510b; surviving legal spouse entitled to benefits without proof of dependency. Brinkmeyer v. City of Wichita, 223 Kan. 393, 396, 397, 573 P.2d 1044.
186. Claim that employer failed to provide reasonable working conditions held not to be within definition of "accident" under subsection (d). Cordon v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 1064, 1066.
187. Payment to workmen's compensation fund under K.S.A. 44-570 is not compensation, but funeral expenses under K.S.A. 44-510b(f) are compensation for which an insurer may be subrogated. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 5 Kan. App. 2d 127, 128, 612 P.2d 1265.
188. Exclusive remedy provision of act does not violate Kansas constitution; corporate directors immune from liability because of provision. Davidson v. Hobart Corp., 643 F.2d 1386, 1387, 1388 (1981).
189. Mentioned; K.S.A. 44-503(a) includes as statutory employee an employee of an independent contractor performing work which is part of principal's trade or business. Robinson v. Flynn's Ferry Service, Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 709, 711, 633 P.2d 1166 (1981).
190. Claimant alleged disability caused by occupational disease but court awarded compensation based on accidental injury; employer not prejudiced when record shows investigation supports either position. Bahr v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 8 Kan. App. 2d 627, 630, 663 P.2d 1144 (1983).
191. Compensation for partial loss of use of arm manifested by injury to body at other situs is scheduled injury, not permanent partial general disability. Fogle v. Sedgwick County, 9 Kan. App. 2d 129, 130, 673 P.2d 465 (1984).
192. Absent physical injury, mental disorders not compensable personal injuries. Followill v. Emerson Electric Co., 234 Kan. 791, 792, 796, 674 P.2d 1050 (1984).
193. Summary judgment appropriate where coemployee/defendant immune from civil liability under act. Blank v. Chawla, 234 Kan. 975, 979, 678 P.2d 162 (1984).
194. Emphysema and chronic bronchitis distinguished; burden of proof for bronchitis is preponderance of evidence. Box v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 236 Kan. 237, 240, 242, 689 P.2d 871 (1984).
195. Basic exception to going and coming rule, (f), is when operation of vehicle integral part of employment. Messenger v. Sage Drilling Co., 9 Kan. App. 2d 435, 440, 680 P.2d 556 (1984).
196. Where employer brings money suit, worker cannot claim offsets alleged due under act when provisions not utilized. Bethany Medical Center v. Knox, 10 Kan. App. 2d 192, 195, 196, 694 P.2d 1331 (1985).
197. Cited in holding "employed" used in K.S.A. 44-511(b)(5) means time worker employed and on the job. Osmundson v. Sedan Floral, Inc., 10 Kan. App. 2d 261, 263, 265, 697 P.2d 85 (1985).
198. Evidence of pain and swelling experienced by claimant after earlier injury provided substantial evidence of second injury. Brozek v. Lincoln County Highway Dept., 10 Kan. App. 2d 319, 322, 323, 698 P.2d 392 (1985).
199. Self-employed persons and individual employers not intended to be covered by act as employees. Allen v. Mills, 11 Kan. App. 2d 415, 417, 418, 724 P.2d 143 (1986).
200. Cited; proof required of employer to be relieved of liability for hiring or retaining handicapped employee (K.S.A. 44-1567) examined. Denton v. Sunflower Electric Co-op, 12 Kan. App. 2d 262, 264, 269, 740 P.2d 98 (1987).
201. Cited; tests to determine liability of principal contractor for injury to employee of independent contractor (K.S.A. 44-503) examined. Thompson v. Harold Thompson Trucking, 12 Kan. App. 2d 449, 457, 748 P.2d 430 (1987).
202. Nature of claimant's burden of proof to establish right to compensation award stated. Hughes v. Inland Container Corp., 247 Kan. 407, 410, 799 P.2d 1011 (1990).
203. Claimant has burden of proof to establish the right to compensation by a preponderance of evidence. Perez v. IBP, Inc., 16 Kan. App. 2d 277, 279, 826 P.2d 520 (1992).
204. Burden of proof not met, chain-of-causation rule applied, suicide not benefit disqualified automatically. Rodriguez v. Henkle Drilling & Supply Co., 16 Kan. App. 2d 728, 730, 828 P.2d 1335 (1992).
205. Term "wholly dependent child" includes child whose claim to parentage undetermined at time of worker's death. Killingsworth v. City of Wichita, 16 Kan. App. 2d 801, 830 P.2d 70 (1992).
206. Workers compensation judge may determine parentage for purposes of workers compensation benefits only. R.L.J. v. Western Sprinklers, Inc., 17 Kan. App. 2d 749, 750, 751, 753, 844 P.2d 37 (1992).
207. Presumption of validity of second marriage over prior common-law marriage examined. Chandler v. Central Oil Corp., 253 Kan. 50, 53, 853 P.2d 649 (1993).
208. Employer's nonliability noted where permanency of claimant's condition does not result from work-related injury. West-Mills v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 18 Kan. App. 2d 561, 566, 859 P.2d 392 (1993).
209. Whether employee was on the way to or from work for workers compensation coverage purposes examined. Thompson v. Law Offices of Alan Joseph, 19 Kan. App. 2d 367, 368, 370, 869 P.2d 761 (1994).
210. Whether employee covered by workers compensation injured by coemployee's negligent driving may sue coemployee separately examined. Bay v. Funk, 19 Kan. App. 2d 440, 441, 871 P.2d 268 (1994).
211. On question certified, standard of proof required in retaliatory discharge action for filing workers compensation claim examined. Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 255 Kan. 513, 518, 874 P.2d 1188 (1994).
212. Whether employee's injury in parking garage occurred on employer's premises examined; going and coming rule applied. Thompson v. Law Offices of Alan Joseph, 256 Kan. 36, 38, 45, 883 P.2d 768 (1994).
213. Whether K.S.A. 44-510b violates equal protection by denying heirs death benefits for an employee without dependents examined. Riley v. National Mills, Inc., 19 Kan. App. 2d 541, 547, 873 P.2d 214 (1994).
214. Whether special hazard exception to coming and going rule applies to worker injured crossing street to work examined. Chapman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 20 Kan. App. 2d 962, 964, 966, 894 P.2d 901 (1995).
215. Special hazard exception to going and coming rule applied to worker injured while crossing street on way to work. Chapman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 Kan. 653, 654, 658, 664, 907 P.2d 828 (1995).
216. Comparable protection program is remedy for SRS assistance recipient who died while participating in mandatory work program. Gamblian v. City of Parsons, 261 Kan. 541, 543, 547, 931 P.2d 1238 (1997).
217. Self-employed person is not covered by workers compensation act unless valid election is in effect. Aetna Life and Cas. v. Americas Truckway Systems, Inc., 23 Kan. App. 2d 315, 318, 321, 929 P.2d 803 (1997).
218. Employee injured while returning to car after educational seminar constituted compensable injury. Brobst v. Brighton Place North, 24 Kan. App. 2d 766, 773, 955 P.2d 1315 (1997).
219. The going and coming rule is not applicable to providers of emergency services including volunteer firefighters. Estate of Soupene v. Lignitz, 265 Kan. 217, 218, 960 P.2d 205 (1998).
220. In action for surviving widow's death benefits where parties were separated for 22 years prior to worker's death, held: mutual abandonment may result even though one party instituted the separation. Redditt v. McDonald's Restaurant, 26 Kan. App. 2d 547, 553, 556, 990 P.2d 759 (1999).
221. Principal deemed employer of contractor's injured employee under either of the premises or special hazards exceptions to going and coming rule (employer liable for payment of benefits as principal is self-insured). Butera v. Fluor Daniel Constr. Corp., 31 Kan. App. 2d 108, 61 P.3d 95 (2003).
222. Claimant required to attend social event at which she received sales award; held: fall at event arose out of and in course of her employment. Beck v. MCI Business Services, Inc., 32 Kan. App. 2d 201, 83 P.3d 800 (2003).
223. Workers compensation benefits denied to employee killed while going to work to perform voluntary overtime. Tate v. City of Junction City, 32 Kan. App. 2d 832, 90 P.3d 359 (2004).
224. Injury occurring in parking lot near place of employment but not under ownership or control of employer is subject to general going and coming rule, i.e. not compensable. Rinke v. Bank of America, 34 Kan. App. 2d 591, 121 P.3d 472 (2005).
225. Worker returning home to get keys to employer's warehouse was on an errand on his employer's behalf and not subject to exclusion of going and coming rule. Ridnour v. Kenneth R. Johnson, Inc., 34 Kan. App. 2d 720, 124 P.3d 87 (2005).
226. Appellate Court's reversal of Workers Compensation Board's finding that injury occurred during a purely personal trip constituted a reweighing of evidence and improper application of substantial competent evidence standard of review. State v. Meier's Ready Mix, Inc., 282 Kan. 283, 296, 144 P.3d 668 (2006).
227. Injury occurred on employer's premises: designated area of parking lot substantially leased by employer and adjacent to place of employment. Rinke v. Bank of America, 282 Kan. 746, 763, 148 P.3d 553 (2006).
228. Plain meaning analysis; injuries do not arise out of employment if strain or physical exertion is normal activity of day-to-day living. Johnson v. Johnson County, 36 Kan. App. 2d 786, 790, 147 P.3d 1091 (2006).
229. Mentioned in case involving construction design professional immunity in K.S.A. 44-501(f). Edwards v. Anderson Engineering, Inc., 284 Kan. 892, 166 P.3d 1047 (2007).
230. Employee's injury on trip to pick up paycheck at off-site location is work-related errand entitled to compensation. Mendoza v. DCS Sanitation, 37 Kan. App. 2d 346, 351, 152 P.3d 1270 (2007).
231. Cited; when two parallel scheduled injuries occur and presumption of permanent total disability rebutted award is calculated under K.S.A. 44-510d. Hall v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 286 Kan. 778, 780, 189 P.3d 508 (2008).
232. Recreational and social events exception construed; dance contest on employer's premises found not to fall within exception. Hizey v. MCI, 39 Kan. App. 2d 609, 616, 181 P.3d 583 (2008).
233. Cited in workers compensation opinion discussing the "going and coming rule" and exceptions thereto. Halford v. Nowak Construction Co., 39 Kan. App. 2d 935 to 938, 942, 186 P.3d 206 (2008).
234. Terms "out of" and "in the course of" employment construed; premise exception applied. McCready v. Payless Shoesource, 41 Kan. App. 2d 79, 200 P.3d 479 (2009).
235. Repetitive use injury, law allows worker to designate date of accident as date employer notified. Saylor v. Westar Energy, Inc., 41 Kan. App. 2d 1042, 207 P.3d 275 (2009).
236. Court discusses and applies principles regarding independent contractor versus employee status involving cab drivers. Hill v. Kansas Dept. of Labor, 42 Kan. App. 2d 215, 210 P.3d 647 (2009).
237. K.S.A. 44-508(f) construed and applied involving recreational or social events; claimant felt pressured to attend. Douglas v. Ad Astra Information Systems, 42 Kan. App. 2d 441, 213 P.3d 764 (2009).
238. The date of injury in a repetitive, microtrauma situation like carpal tunnel syndrome, is the last day worked. Mitchell v. Petsmart Inc., 291 Kan. 153, 239 P.3d 51 (2010).
239. Date of employee's notification to employer of jury is the date of accident, regardless of the date of last day of work. Saylor v. Westar Energy, Inc., 292 Kan. 610, 256 P.3d 828 (2011).
240. The inherent travel exception to the going-and-coming rule is not an exception to the statutory rule. Craig v. Val Energy, Inc., 47 Kan. App. 2d 164, 274 P.3d 650 (2012).
241. The going and coming rule does not apply when the travel is an intrinsic part of the worker's job. Scott v. Hughes, 294 Kan. 403, 275 P.3d 890 (2012).
242. Case remanded to the board to make determination based on recreational or social events criteria. Douglas v. Ad Astra Information Systems, 296 Kan. 552, 293 P.3d 723 (2013).
243. Workers compensation claimant's injuries sustained while riding home as a passenger who was not paid mileage to drive crew members to and from drill sites were not compensable under going-and-coming rule. Williams v. Petromark Drilling, 49 Kan. App. 2d 24, 303 P.3d 719 (2013).
244. Under the facts of the case, a claimant's preexisting osteoporosis that was aggravated by a broken wrist was compensable under a finding that claimant was permanently and totally disabled. Le v. Armour Eckrich Meats, 52 Kan. App. 2d 189, 200 (2014).
245. Analysis interpreting pre-2011 version of Kansas workers compensation act is equally applicable to determine whether worker's injury arose out of and in the normal course of employment or was the result of the normal activities of day-to-day living. Moore v. Venture Corp., 51 Kan. App. 2d 132, 138-39, 343 P.3d 114 (2015).
246. Ideopathic, within the context of workers compensation law, is defined as personal or innate to the claimant and neutral risks are generally defined as risks with no particular employment or personal characteristic; statute has eliminated universal compensation for neutral risks. Graber v. Dillon Companies, 52 Kan. App. 2d 786, 795, 377 P.3d 1183 (2016).
247. The secondary-injury rule was not affected by 2011 amendments to the workers compensation act and the rule is compatible with the prevailing-factor analysis, meaning all injuries, including secondary injuries, must be caused primarily by the work accident. Buchanan v. JM Staffing, 52 Kan. App. 2d 943, 950-51, 379 P.3d 428 (2016).
248. Employee's use of false name on employment application and contract did not render employment relationship void to preclude worker's compensation claim. Mera-Hernandez v. U.S.D. 233, 305 Kan. 1182, 1187-88, 390 P.3d 875 (2017).
249. Claimant who was not legally authorized to work in the United States and who had used false name and documents to apply for job was not barred by the workers compensation act from receiving workers compensation benefits. Mera-Hernandez v. U.S.D. 233, 305 Kan. 1182, 390 P.3d 875 (2017).
250. Subsection (f)(3)(A)(iv) renders an injury noncompensable only upon proof that the injury or accident arose directly or indirectly from an idiopathic cause. Estate of Graber v. Dillon Cos., 309 Kan. 509, 524, 439 P.3d 291 (2019).
251. The claimant was entitled to workers compensation benefits for unexplained falls because they had an employment character; the burden is on the employer to prove the existence of a neutral risk with no particular employment character. Johnson v. Stormont Vail Healthcare Inc., 57 Kan. App. 2d 44, 52, 445 P.3d 1183 (2019).
252. The 2011 amendments to subsection (f)(2) did not unconstitutionally restrict claimant's right to a remedy. Perez v. National Beef Packing Co., 60 Kan. App. 2d 489, 505, 494 P.3d 268 (2021).