60-219. Required joinder of parties; feasibility. (a) Persons required to be joined if feasible. (1) Required party. A person who is subject to service of process must be joined as a party if:
(A) In that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:
(i) As a practical matter, impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
(2) Joinder by court order. If a person has not been joined as required, the court must order that the person be made a party. A person who refuses to join as a plaintiff may be made either a defendant or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.
(3) Venue. If a joined party objects to venue and the joinder would make venue improper, the court must dismiss the party.
(b) When joinder is not feasible. If a person who is required to be joined if feasible cannot be joined, the court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed. The factors for the court to consider include:
(1) The extent to which a judgment rendered in the person's absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties;
(2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by:
(A) Protective provisions in the judgment;
(B) shaping the relief; or
(C) other measures;
(3) whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence would be adequate; and
(4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading the reasons for nonjoinder. When asserting a claim for relief, a party must state:
(1) The name, if known of any person who is required to be joined if feasible, but is not joined; and
(2) the reasons for not joining that person.
(d) Exception for class actions. This section is subject to the provisions of K.S.A. 60-223, and amendments thereto.
(e) Nominee. In an action in which any relief sought would determine title or affect a security interest in real property, a person who is subject to service of process must be joined as a party if the person is a nominee of record on behalf of a beneficial owner of a claimed interest in the property that is the subject of the action. The nominee need not be a party required to be joined under subsection (a)(1).
History: L. 1963, ch. 303, 60-219; amended by Supreme Court order dated July 17, 1969; L. 2010, ch. 135, § 86; July 1.
Source or prior law:
(a). G.S. 1868, ch. 80, § 37; L. 1909, ch. 182, § 36; R.S. 1923, 60-412.
(c). G.S. 1868, ch. 80, § 37; L. 1909, ch. 182, § 36; R.S. 1923, 60-412.
Cross References to Related Sections:
Class actions, 60-223.
Defenses and objections, 60-212.
Interpleader, see 60-222.
Intervention, see 60-224.
Misjoinder not ground for dismissal, see 60-221.
Permissive joinder, 60-220(a).
Substitution of parties, see 60-225.
Law Review and Bar Journal References:
"Survival of Actions and Wrongful Death," Lawrence E. Curfman, 12 K.L.R. 21, 23 (1963).
Paragraphs (a) and (b); effecting no fundamental change in Kansas law, Earl B. Shurtz, 14 K.L.R. 171, 174 (1965).
Discussion of wrongful death act, Robert C. Casad, 13 K.L.R. 515, 516, 527 (1965).
Survey of civil procedure, Elizabeth R. Herbert, 15 W.L.J. 315, 318 (1976).
"Brown and Miles: At Last, An End to Ambiguity in the Kansas Law of Comparative Negligence," Hal D. Meltzer, 27 K.L.R. 111, 115, 116, 131 (1978).
"Kansas Groundwater Management Districts," John C. Peck, 29 K.L.R. 51, 61 (1980).
"Nonmutual Issue Preclusion in Kansas," Myron L. Frans, 30 K.L.R. 443, 451 (1982).
CASE ANNOTATIONS
Prior law cases, see G.S. 1949, 60-412 and the 1961 Supp. thereto.
1. Subsections (a) and (b) to be treated same as prior law; insured real party in interest when only part of loss is covered by insurance. Ellsaesser v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 195 Kan. 117, 119, 120, 403 P.2d 185.
2. Cited in dissenting opinion in case in equity concerning the ownership of certain stock. George v. W-G Fertilizer, Inc., 205 Kan. 360, 368, 469 P.2d 459.
3. Cited in case concerning joinder of parties. McGregor v. Turner, 205 Kan. 386, 388, 391, 469 P.2d 324.
4. Covenantee in covenant not to sue is not a contingently necessary person within purview of this section. Cullen v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Rly. Co., 211 Kan. 368, 372, 378, 507 P.2d 353.
5. Third party held to be joint tortfeasor and not to be contingently necessary; failure to join not basis for dismissal under K.S.A. 60-212. Froelich v. Werbin, 212 Kan. 119, 121, 122, 509 P.2d 1118.
6. Agent-employee of employment service division not contingently necessary party in action against local office to obtain employment records. City of Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, Office of State Employment Service, 213 Kan. 399, 405, 517 P.2d 117.
7. Farmers Home Administration not contingently necessary party to action challenging water rates fixed by district. Shawnee Hills Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Rural Water District, 217 Kan. 421, 426, 428, 537 P.2d 210.
8. Attorney's contingent fee contract does not make him a contingently necessary person. Giles v. Russell, 222 Kan. 629, 633, 634, 567 P.2d 845.
9. In action for wages due from one corporation, another corporation having same owners is not a proper party. Wells v. Davis, 226 Kan. 586, 590, 603 P.2d 180.
10. Where notice requirements of K.S.A. 12-105 not met, court could not order joining of city as "contingently necessary" party. Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 492, 630 P.2d 186 (1981).
11. Subsection does not apply when comparative fault of settling defendants can be raised under K.S.A. 60-258a. Glenn v. Fleming, 240 Kan. 724, 729, 732 P.2d 750 (1987).
12. Declaratory judgment determination (K.S.A. 60-1701) between insurer and insured not binding on injured third person not a party to action. Heinson v. Porter, 244 Kan. 667, 671, 772 P.2d 778 (1989).
13. Purchaser at tax sale (K.S.A. 79-2801) not indispensable party in action to set aside sale where interest disposed of prior thereto. Newman v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 14 Kan. App. 2d 648, 654, 804 P.2d 353 (1990).
14. Degrees of negligence examined where plaintiffs served dishwashing liquid rather than similar-looking alcoholic beverage. Cott v. Peppermint Twist Mgt. Co., 253 Kan. 452, 486, 856 P.2d 906 (1993).
15. Cited where court determined no remedy available to heirs of employee covered by workers compensation act. Karhoff v. National Mills, Inc., 18 Kan. App. 2d 302, 309, 851 P.2d 1021 (1993).
16. Appellee joined as party in priority dispute between two creditors concerning surplus proceeds from foreclosure sale of real estate. Kinsley State Bank v. Waters, 18 Kan. App. 2d 413, 418, 854 P.2d 311 (1993).
17. Failure of bank to join occupant of property subject to foreclosure where band had notice of occupancy examined. Citizens Bank & Trust v. Brothers Constr. & Mfg., Inc., 18 Kan. App. 2d 704, 710, 859 P.2d 394 (1993).
18. No error in trial court adding co-plaintiff as contingently necessary party. McHorse v. Koontz, 27 Kan. App. 2d 817, 7 P.3d 1272 (2000).
19. Remanded to trial court to determine if appellant is a contingently necessary party. Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Liebau-Woodall & Assocs. L.P., 28 Kan. App. 2d 674, 20 P.3d 88 (2001).
20. Trial court's use of doctrine of equitable subrogation to give priority of purchase money mortgage to judgment lien reversed (title company neglected to check judgment docket). Harms v. Burt, 30 Kan. App. 2d 263, 40 P.3d 329 (2002).
21. Failure to intervene effectively waived plaintiff's procedural due process claim. Continental Coal, Inc. v. Cunningham, 511 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1078, 1079, 1083 (2007).
22. In oil and gas lease case court interrupts and applies K.S.A. 60-219 regarding contingently necessary parties. Dexter v. Brake, 38 Kan. App. 2d 1005, 1011, 1012, 1017, 174 P.3d 924 (2008).
23. Cited; mortgage that designates entity that is not the lender as mortgagee; held mortgagee not contingently necessary party. Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 40 Kan. App. 2d 325, 328, 331, 192 P.3d 177 (2008).
24. Nonlender is not a contingently necessary party in a mortgage foreclosure action and is not required to be allowed to intervene. Landmark Nat'l Bank v. Kesler, 289 Kan. 528, 216 P.3d 158 (2009).
25. Parties unnecessarily named in lawsuit were dismissed because complete relief against the state could be granted through the injunction statute. Gannon v. State, 303 Kan. 682, 698, 368 P.3d 1024 (2016).
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