Source or prior law:

G.S. 1868, ch. 80, § 18; L. 1897, ch. 91, § 1; L. 1909, ch. 182, § 17; R.S. 1923, 60-306 (4 th clause).

Law Review and Bar Journal References:

"A Practitioner's Guide to the Kansas Tort Claims Act," Jerry R. Palmer, 48 J.B.A.K. 299, 303 (1979).

"Governmental Liability: The Kansas Tort Claims Act [or The King Can Do Wrong]," John A. Hageman and Lee A. Johnson, 19 W.L.J. 260, 281 (1980).

"The Kansas Tort Claims Act and School Districts," Susan C. Jacobson, 28 K.L.R. 619, 623 (1980).

"Not Only Can The King Do Wrong, But When He Does, He's Probably Liable," Jerry R. Palmer, 2 J.K.T.L.A. No. 7, 24 (1979).

"Procedural Pitfalls in Defamation Litigation," Leon B. Graves, 3 J.K.T.L.A. No. 1, 6 (1979).

"Duran v. Bradford—The Common Law Duty of a Law Enforcement Officer," Sheila M. Janicke, 4 J.K.T.L.A. No. 6, 10, 13 (1981).

"Is Kansas Probate Non Claim Statute Unconstitutional?" John F. Kuether, 54 J.K.B.A. 115, 121 (1985).

"In Search of the 'Paradigmatic Wrong?': Selecting a Limitations Period for Section 1983," Julie A. Davies, 35 K.L.R. 133 (1987).

"The potential civil liability of law enforcement officers and agencies," Stephen R. McAllister and Peyton H. Robinson, 67 J.K.B.A. No. 7, 14 (1998).

"Survey of Kansas Tort Law: Part II," William E. Westerbeke, 50 K.L.R. 225 (2002).

"Legal Malpractice in Kansas: Principles and Examples," Monte Vines, 72 J.K.B.A. No. 10, 16, 22 (2003).

CASE ANNOTATIONS

Prior law cases, see G.S. 1949, 60-306 (4 th clause) and the 1961 Supp. thereto.

1. "Horseplay" producing injury is negligence, not assault and battery. Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 192 K. 360, 365, 366, 367, 388 P.2d 824.

2. Discussed; held not applicable to suit for demurrage charges under 66-101 et seq. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Rld. Co. v. Standard Industries, Inc., 192 K. 381, 383, 388 P.2d 632.

3. Amended petition filed fifteen months after defamatory statements, barred. Vaughan v. Hornaman, 195 K. 291, 298, 403 P.2d 948.

4. Action by county under 19-232 to recover overcharges and penalties; this section and 60-521 inapplicable. Board of County Commissioners v. Lewis, 203 K. 188, 189, 190, 195, 453 P.2d 46.

5. Subsection (3) cited by defendant in case concerning dismissal of actions. Gideon v. Bo-Mar Homes, Inc., 205 K. 321, 323, 469 P.2d 272.

6. Cited in applying statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case. Seymour v. Lofgreen, 209 K. 72, 76, 495 P.2d 969.

7. Probability of Kansas adopting "single publication" rule giving rise to only one cause of action in libel case stated. Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F.Supp. 850, 853.

8. Statute of limitations in libel action began to run upon publication and not discovery. Rinsley v. Brandt, 446 F.Supp. 850, 852.

9. Action based on oral contract of employment subject to 60-512 (1); dismissal motion denied. Head v. Knopp, 225 K. 45, 46, 587 P.2d 867.

10. Mentioned in holding expungement statute not violative of right to assert truth as a defense in libel or slander action. Stephens v. Van Arsdale, 227 K. 676, 693, 608 P.2d 972.

11. Applied in affirming summary judgment for creditor; debtor's claim of false imprisonment. Porter v. Stormont-Vail Hospital, 228 K. 641, 645, 646, 621 P.2d 411.

12. Cited; motion for judgment on pleadings because assault charge barred by statutes; trial court erred in not permitting amended petition for civil rights violation. Cooper v. Hutchinson Police Department, 6 K.A.2d 806, 808, 809, 636 P.2d 184 (1981).

13. Action based on federal civil rights act 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where facts support action only under this section, one-year statute of limitations applies. Miller v. City of Overland Park, 231 K. 557, 559, 563, 646 P.2d 1114 (1982).

14. Statute of limitations for civil rights cases under federal statutes considered. Sullivan v. LaMunyon, 572 F.Supp. 753, 755, 760 (1983).

15. Civil rights claims for false imprisonment (false arrest, wrongful detention) governed by one-year limitation. Cowdrey v. City of Eastborough, Kan., 730 F.2d 1376, 1380 (1984).

16. Attorney malpractice examined; contract (60-512) and tort (60-513) theories distinguished, malicious prosecution noted. Pancake House, Inc. v. Redmond, 239 K. 83, 88, 716 P.2d 575 (1986).

17. Cited; applicability of statute to claims under consumer protection act examined. Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 634 F.Supp. 1208, 1218 (1986).

18. Two-year statute (60-613) applicable to action brought under state age discrimination in employment act (44-1111 et seq.). Ditch v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of County of Shawnee, 650 F.Supp. 1245, 1252, 1253 (1986).

19. Statute applicable where lessee of farm equipment seeks civil and statutory penalties under consumer protection act (50-627). Wight v. Agristor Leasing, 652 F.Supp. 1000, 1018 (1987).

20. One-year limitations period applies to arrestees' state law claims against arresting officers for assault, battery and false imprisonment. Harris v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 703 F.Supp. 1455, 1458 (D. Kan. 1988).

21. Civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is subject to two-year statute of limitations (60-513(a)(4)). Massey v. Shepack, 12 K.A.2d 770, 774, 757 P.2d 329 (1988).

22. Neither general civil nor general criminal statutes of limitations applies to habitual violator proceedings (8-284 et seq.). State v. Graham, 12 K.A.2d 803, 809, 758 P.2d 247 (1988).

23. Court entitled unfair competition held to be claim for business libel governed hereunder; date of accrual. Manildra Mill, Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 723 F.Supp. 567, 569 (1989).

24. Claims that partnership statements regarding plaintiff's expulsion from firm were defamatory examined. Miller v. Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt, 246 K. 450, 466, 790 P.2d 404 (1990).

25. Libel claim based on false credit reporting accrued when plaintiff discovered alleged defamatory material, not when report published. McKown v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 744 F.Supp. 1046, 1049 (1990).

26. Whether malicious prosecution statute of limitations runs from judgment or expiration of time for appeal examined. Webb v. Airlines Reporting Corp., 825 F.Supp. 273, 275 (1993).

27. Cited; whether shooting was intentional or accidental for insurance coverage purposes examined. Harris v. Richards, 254 K. 549, 550, 867 P.2d 325 (1994).

28. Whether plaintiff's assault and battery claim are barred by statute of limitations examined. Ulrich v. K-Mart Corp., 858 F.Supp. 1087, 1094 (1994).

29. Whether one-year statute of limitations for actions based on penalty or forfeiture applied to 66-176 treble damages action examined. Rothwell v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 859 F.Supp. 470, 477 (1994).

30. Whether written notice to municipality of claim under KTCA (75-6101 et seq.) against municipal employees is a prerequisite to filing suit examined. King v. Pimentel, 20 K.A.2d 579, 587, 890 P.2d 1217 (1995).

31. Sexual abuse claim which occurred before 60-523 effective date may not be revived by 60-523. Ripley v. Tolbert, 260 K. 491, 496, 921 P.2d 1210 (1996).

32. Claim by plaintiff held to be for false imprisonment by police; one-year subsection (b) statute of limitations applied. Brown v. State, 261 K. 6, 7, 9, 927 P.2d 938 (1996).

33. The applicable statute of limitations concerning actions for slander of title is one-year under subsection (a). LaBarge v. City of Concordia, 23 K.A.2d 8, 18, 927 P.2d 487 (1996).

34. Claim by defendant for defamation was time-barred. Franklin v. City of Kansas City, 959 F.Supp. 1380, 1384 (1997).

35. Issue of material fact on timeliness of defamation claim precluded summary judgment. Hobson v. Coastal Corp., 962 F.Supp. 1407, 1410 (1997).

36. Excessive force during arrest implicates 4 th amendment rights; 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim not barred by state tort remedies. Swinehart v. City of Ottawa, 24 K.A.2d 272, 276, 943 P.2d 942 (1997).

37. A malicious prosecution action accrues on the final day an appeal could have been filed in original action. Voth v. Coleman, 24 K.A.2d 450, 451, 945 P.2d 426 (1997).

38. Business disparagement is subject to one-year statute of limitations for libel or slander. Rodriguez v. ECRI Shared Services, 984 F.Supp. 1363, 1368 (1997).

39. Claim brought pursuant to 66-176 is subject to three-year statute of limitations. United Cities Gas Co. v. Brock Exploration Co., 984 F.Supp. 1379, 1385 (1997).

40. Time barred defamation claim was not saved by savings statute. Taylor v. International Union of Electronic Workers, et al., 25 K.A.2d 671, 674, 968 P.2d 685 (1998).

41. Claims seeking actual damages under KCPA (50-623 et seq.) subject to three-year limitations period; penalties claims subject to one-year limitations period. Griffin v. Security Pacific Automotive Financial, 25 F.Supp.2d 1214, 1217 (1998).

42. Unauthorized broadcast of pay per view boxing match claim was timely filed. Kingvision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. Bowers, 36 F.Supp.2d 915, 918 (1998).

43. Amended complaint construed as alleging negligent supervision claim against employer subject to two-year limitations period. Miller v. Dillard's Inc., 47 F.Supp.2d 1294, 1295 (1999).

44. Question certified concerning limitations period for civil penalties under KCPA (50-623 et seq.) where plaintiff also asserts actual damage claim. Alexander v. Certified Master Builder Corp., 59 F.Supp.2d 1173, 1174 (1999).

45. One-year limitation period under subsection (c) not applicable to claim for civil penalties under consumer protection act where claim is for both civil penalties and actual damages. Alexander v. Certified Master Builders Corp., 268 K. 812, 1 P.3d 899 (2000).

46. Complaining witness not liable for malicious prosecution for supplying information to prosecutor. Arceo v. City of Junction City, Kansas, 182 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1087 (2002).

47. Tortious interference claim construed as defamation claim barred by statute of limitations. Sports Unlimited v. Lankford Enterprises, 275 F.3d 996, 1000 (2002).

48. Petition consisting of nine counts, based on single letter held to be based on libel and barred by one-year statute of limitations. Meyer Land & Cattle Co. v Lincoln County Conservation Dist., 29 K.A.2d 746, 31 P.3d 970 (2001).

49. One year statute of limitations applies to claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Curts v. Dillard's, Inc., 30 K.A.2d 814, 48 P.3d 681 (2002).

50. Kansas restraint of trade act price fixing claim was subject to three-year limitations period. Four B Corp. v. Daicel Chemical Industries, Ltd., 253 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1154 (2003).

51. Plaintiff fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims were time-barred. Moore v. Luther ex rel. Luther, 291 F.Supp.2d 1194 (2003).

52. State law claims accrued on date motorist was allegedly assaulted. Reindl v. City of Leavenworth, 361 F.Supp.2d 1294, 1297 (2005).

53. One-year assault and battery limitation applies where defendants intentionally sought to hit one another but hit plaintiff. Baska v. Scherzer, 283 K. 750, 764, 156 P.3d 617 (2007).

54. Under Kansas consumer protection act; three-year statute of limitation when actual damages are sought. In re Miner, 369 B.R. 655, 658, 671 (2007).

55. Cited; statute of limitation begins to run on a battery claim at time of touching even if consent vitiated by fraud. Kelly v. VanZant, 287 K. 509, 525, 527, 528, 197 P.3d 803 (2008).

56. Medical malpractice battery claim held barred by statute of limitation. Thomas v. Sifers, 535 F.Supp.2d 1200, 1209 (2008).

57. Cited; plaintiff time barred on Kansas wage payment act action for statutory penalties. Wallace v. Microsoft Credit Corp., 563 F.Supp.2d 1197, 1203 (2008).

58. Cited; one-year statute of limitations for libel and slander begins when alleged defamatory statement is published. Tilley v. Global Payments, Inc., 603 F.Supp.2d 1314, 1330 (2009).

59. Actions brought under K.S.A. 66-176 subject to three-year statute of limitations instead of one-year limitation period due to 1995 amendment removing penalty provisions. Fanning v. Sitton Motor Lines Inc., 695 F.Supp.2d 1156 (D. Kan. 2010).

60. Arrestee's allegations of police misconduct not based on requirements for strip searches or body cavity searches. Cook v. Olathe Medical Center, Inc., 773 F.Supp.2d 990 (D. Kan. 2011).

61. One-year statute of limitations accrues when alleged defamation is published or spoken, not when the allegedly defamed person actually learns of the occurrence. Lee v. Reed, 221 F.Supp.3d 1263, 1271-72 (D. Kan. 2016).