Printable Format60-523. Limitations on actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse. (a) No action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced more than three years after the date the person attains 18 years of age or more than three years from the date the person discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or illness was caused by childhood sexual abuse, whichever occurs later.
(b) As used in this section:
(1) "Injury or illness" includes psychological injury or illness, whether or not accompanied by physical injury or illness.
(2) "Childhood sexual abuse" includes any act committed against the person which act occurred when the person was under the age of 18 years and which act would have been a violation of any of the following:
(A) Indecent liberties with a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3503, prior to its repeal, or subsection (a) of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5506, and amendments thereto; (B) aggravated indecent liberties with a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3504, prior to its repeal, or subsection (b) of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5506, and amendments thereto; (C) aggravated criminal sodomy as defined in K.S.A. 21-3506, prior to its repeal, or subsection (b) of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5504, and amendments thereto; (D) enticement of a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3509, prior to its repeal; (E) indecent solicitation of a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3510, prior to its repeal, or subsection (a) of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5508, and amendments thereto; (F) aggravated indecent solicitation of a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3511, prior to its repeal, or subsection (b) of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5508, and amendments thereto; (G) sexual exploitation of a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3516, prior to its repeal, or K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5510, and amendments thereto; or (H) aggravated incest as defined in K.S.A. 21-3603, prior to its repeal, or subsection (b) of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5604, and amendments thereto; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed.
(c) Discovery that the injury or illness was caused by childhood sexual abuse shall not be deemed to have occurred solely by virtue of the person's awareness, knowledge or memory of the acts of abuse. The person need not establish which act in a series of continuing sexual abuse incidents caused the injury or illness complained of, but may compute the date of discovery from the date of discovery of the last act by the same perpetrator which is a part of a common scheme or plan of sexual abuse.
(d) This section shall be applicable to:
(1) Any action commenced on or after July 1, 1992, including any action which would be barred by application of the period of limitation applicable prior to July 1, 1992;
(2) any action commenced prior to July 1, 1992, and pending on July 1, 1992.
History: L. 1992, ch. 307, § 1; L. 2011, ch. 30, § 216; July 1.
Law Review and Bar Journal References:
"Statutes of Limitation, Statutes of Repose and Continuing Duties under the Kansas Product Liability Act," Steve R. Fabert, 36 W.L.J. 367 (1997).
CASE ANNOTATIONS
1. Whether plaintiff's attempt to revive action barred by statute of repose by using section ineffective examined. Swartz v. Swartz, 257 K.A.2d 704, 707, 894 P.2d 209 (1995).
2. Section could not revive sexual abuse claim which occurred before section's effective date. Ripley v. Tolbert, 260 K. 491, 493, 507, 921 P.2d 1210 (1996).
3. Whether childhood sexual abuse injury was reasonably ascertainable and when cause of action accrued for limitations purposes examined. Shirley v. Reif, 260 K. 514, 516, 920 P.2d 405 (1996).
4. Alleged preferential treatment of minors under section's longer statute of limitations constitutional. Bonin v. Vannaman, 261 K. 199, 221, 929 P.2d 754 (1996).
5. Exception to statute of repose does not apply to a cause of action already abolished by the statute of repose prior to enactment of section. Doe v. Popravak, 55 K.A.2d 1, 12, 397 P.3d 847 (2017).