Printable Format77-201. Rules of construction. In the construction of the statutes of this state the following rules shall be observed, unless the construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of the statute:
First. The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously repealed, nor does the repeal affect any right which accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred or any proceeding commenced, under or by virtue of the statute repealed. The provisions of any statute, so far as they are the same as those of any prior statute, shall be construed as a continuation of the prior provisions and not as a new enactment.
Second. Words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language, but technical words and phrases, and other words and phrases that have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, shall be construed according to their peculiar and appropriate meanings.
Third. Words importing the singular number only may be extended to several persons or things, and words importing the plural number only may be applied to one person or thing. Words importing the masculine gender only may be extended to females.
Fourth. Words giving a joint authority to three or more public officers or other persons shall be construed as given that authority to a majority of them, unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving the authority.
Fifth. "Highway" and "road" include public bridges and may be construed to be equivalent to "county way," "county road," "common road," "state road" and "territorial road."
Sixth. "Incompetent person" includes disabled persons and incapacitated persons as defined herein.
Seventh. "Issue," as applied to the descent of estates, includes all the lawful lineal descendants of the ancestor.
Eighth. "Land," "real estate" and "real property" include lands, tenements and hereditaments, and all rights to them and interest in them, equitable as well as legal.
Ninth. "Personal property" includes money, goods, chattels, evidences of debt and things in action, and digital assets as defined in the revised uniform fiduciary access to digital assets act, K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 58-4801 through 58-4819, and amendments thereto.
Tenth. "Property" includes personal and real property.
Eleventh. "Month" means a calendar month, unless otherwise expressed. "Year" alone, and also the abbreviation "A.D.," is equivalent to the expression "year of our Lord."
Twelfth. "Oath" includes an affirmation in all cases where an affirmation may be substituted for an oath, and in similar cases "swear" includes affirm.
Thirteenth. "Person" may be extended to bodies politic and corporate.
Fourteenth. If the seal of a court or public office or officer is required by law to be affixed to any paper, "seal" includes an impression of the seal upon the paper alone, as well as upon wax or a wafer affixed to the paper. "Seal" also includes both a rubber stamp seal used with permanent ink and the word "seal" printed on court documents produced by computer systems, so that the seal may be legibly reproduced by photographic process.
Fifteenth. "State," when applied to the different parts of the United States, includes the District of Columbia and the territories. "United States" may include that district and those territories.
Sixteenth. "Town" may mean a civil township, unless a different meaning is plainly intended.
Seventeenth. "Will" includes codicils.
Eighteenth. "Written" and "in writing" may include printing, engraving, lithography and any other mode of representing words and letters, excepting those cases where the written signature or the mark of any person is required by law.
Nineteenth. "Sheriff" may be extended to any person performing the duties of the sheriff, either generally or in special cases.
Twentieth. "Deed" is applied to an instrument conveying lands but does not imply a sealed instrument. "Bond" and "indenture" do not necessarily imply a seal but in other respects mean the same kind of instruments as above. "Undertaking" means a promise or security in any form where required by law.
Twenty-first. "Executor" includes an administrator where the subject matter applies to an administrator.
Twenty-second. Roman numerals and Arabic figures are to be taken as a part of the English language.
Twenty-third. "Residence" means the place which is adopted by a person as the person's place of habitation and to which, whenever the person is absent, the person has the intention of returning. When a person eats at one place and sleeps at another, the place where the person sleeps shall be considered the person's residence.
Twenty-fourth. "Usual place of residence" and "usual place of abode," when applied to the service of any process or notice, means the place usually occupied by a person. If a person has no family, or does not have family with the person, the person's office or place of business or, if the person has no place of business, the room or place where the person usually sleeps shall be construed to be the person's place of residence or abode.
Twenty-fifth. "Householder" means a person who is 18 or more years of age and who owns or occupies a house as a place of residence and not as a boarder or lodger.
Twenty-sixth. "General election" refers to the election required to be held on the Tuesday following the first Monday in November of each even-numbered year.
Twenty-seventh. "Under legal disability" includes persons who are within the period of minority, or who are incapacitated, incompetent or imprisoned.
Twenty-eighth. When a person is required to be disinterested or indifferent in acting on any question or matter affecting other parties, relationship within the degree of second cousin, inclusive, shall disqualify the person from acting, except by consent of parties.
Twenty-ninth. "Head of a family" shall include any person who has charge of children, relatives or others living with the person.
Thirtieth. "Mentally ill person" means a mentally ill person as defined in K.S.A. 59-2946, and amendments thereto.
Thirty-first. "Incapacitated person" means an individual whose ability to receive and evaluate relevant information, or to effectively communicate decisions, or both, even with the use of assistive technologies or other supports, is impaired to the degree that the person lacks the capacity to manage the person's estate, or to meet essential needs for the person's physical health, safety or welfare, as defined in K.S.A. 59-3051, and amendments thereto, whether or not a guardian or a conservator has been appointed for that person.
Thirty-second. "Guardian" means an individual or a nonprofit corporation certified in accordance with K.S.A. 59-3070, and amendments thereto, which has been appointed by a court to act on behalf of a ward and possessed of some or all of the powers and duties set out in K.S.A. 59-3075, and amendments thereto. "Guardian" does not mean natural guardian unless specified.
Thirty-third. "Natural guardian" means both the biological or adoptive mother and father of a minor if neither parent has been found to be an adult with an impairment in need of a guardian or has had parental rights terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction. If either parent of a minor is deceased, or has been found to be an adult with an impairment in need of a guardian, as provided for in K.S.A. 59-3050 through 59-3095, and amendments thereto, or has had parental rights terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction, then the other parent shall be the natural guardian, unless also deceased, or found to be an adult with an impairment in need of a guardian, or has had parental rights terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction, in which case no person shall qualify as the natural guardian.
Thirty-fourth. "Conservator" means an individual or corporation appointed by the court to act on behalf of a conservatee and possessed of some or all of the powers and duties set out in K.S.A. 59-3078, and amendments thereto.
Thirty-fifth. "Minor" means any person defined by K.S.A. 38-101, and amendments thereto, as being within the period of minority.
Thirty-sixth. "Proposed ward" means a person for whom a petition for the appointment of a guardian pursuant to K.S.A. 59-3058, 59-3059, 59-3060 or 59-3061, and amendments thereto, has been filed.
Thirty-seventh. "Proposed conservatee" means a person for whom a petition for the appointment of a conservator pursuant to K.S.A. 59-3058, 59-3059, 59-3060 or 59-3061, and amendments thereto, has been filed.
Thirty-eighth. "Ward" means a person who has a guardian.
Thirty-ninth. "Conservatee" means a person who has a conservator.
Fortieth. "Manufactured home" means a structure which:
(1) Is transportable in one or more sections which, in the traveling mode, is 8 body feet or more in width or 40 body feet or more in length, or, when erected on site, is 320 or more square feet, and which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling, with or without permanent foundation, when connected to the required utilities, and includes the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and electrical systems contained therein; and
(2) is subject to the federal manufactured home construction and safety standards established pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5403.
Forty-first. "Mobile home" means a structure which:
(1) Is transportable in one or more sections which, in the traveling mode, is 8 body feet or more in width and 36 body feet or more in length and is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling, with or without a permanent foundation, when connected to the required utilities, and includes the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and electrical systems contained therein; and
(2) is not subject to the federal manufactured home construction and safety standards established pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5403.
Forty-second. "Disabled person" includes incapacitated persons and incompetent persons as defined herein.
History: G.S. 1868, ch. 104, § 1; R.S. 1923, 77-201; L. 1965, ch. 505, § 1; L. 1972, ch. 161, § 22; L. 1976, ch. 243, § 40; L. 1977, ch. 199, § 2; L. 1983, ch. 306, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 191, § 23; L. 1985, ch. 114, § 29; L. 1986, ch. 211, § 39; L. 1991, ch. 33, § 37; L. 1996, ch. 167, § 64; L. 2002, ch. 114, § 79; L. 2017, ch. 19, § 24; July 1.
Law Review and Bar Journal References:
Eighth paragraph mentioned: In comment on ancillary administration of oil and gas leases, 5 K.L.R. 452 (1957).
Thirteenth paragraph mentioned: In article on the right to work amendment, Dan Hopson, Jr., 8 K.L.R. 18, 22 (1959).
Twenty-third paragraph mentioned: In discussing adoption procedure in Kansas, Marvin E. Larson, 19 J.B.A.K. 332, 336 (1951). In 1957-59 survey of family law, Robert C. Casad, 8 K.L.R. 288, 301 (1959). In student symposium on statutes of limitation in Kansas, 9 K.L.R. 179, 252 (1960).
1963-65 survey of future interests and estate planning, James K. Logan, 14 K.L.R. 293, 299 (1965).
1963-65 survey of real and personal property law, John William Strong, 14 K.L.R. 341 (1965).
Interpretation by case in annotation No. 177 mentioned. Robert I. Guenthner. 15 K.L.R. 346, 361 (1967).
"Exemptions—Personal Earnings of Head of Family," Ward E. Loyd, 7 W.L.J. 132 (1967).
"A Glimpse at a Plaintiff's Remedies Under Kansas' Antitrust Laws," Kenton C. Granger, 8 W.L.J. 1, 18 (1968).
Discussion of real estate lease in Kansas, Richard L. Zinn, 17 K.L.R. 707, 721 (1969).
Commentary on Kansas law on statutes of limitation, 18 K.L.R. 441, 448 (1970).
Discussion of nature of facility to be financed in "A Guide to Industrial Revenue Bond Financing," Donald A. Bell and Winton M. Hinkle, 9 W.L.J. 372, 376, 377 (1970).
Note concerning effect of statutory change in age of majority upon parents' duty of support, 23 K.L.R. 181, 182 (1974).
"Effect of Change in Age of Majority Upon Parents' Duty of Support," Grant M. Glenn, 23 K.L.R. 181, 182 (1974).
"No Fault—The Insurer's Reimbursement Rights Under the New Statute," William R. Sampson, 46 J.B.A.K. 211, 212, 217 (1977).
"P.I.P.—Attorneys' Fees," Donald Vasos, 1 J.K.T.L.A. No. 3, 6 (1977).
"Pitfalls on the Road to Salvation: The Kansas Saving Statute," Steven C. Day, 59 J.K.B.A. No. 8, 19, 25 (1990).
"Condemnation of Water and Water Rights in Kansas," John C. Peck and Kent Weatherby, 42 K.L.R. 827, 832 (1994).
"Powerful Powers Under the Kansas Power of Attorney Act," Matthew H. Hoy, 74 J.K.B.A. No. 6, 20 (2005).
"Packing Heat: The Personal and Family Protection Act," Mary D. Feighny, 76 J.K.B.A. No. 4, 21 (2007).
Governmental Ethics Commission Opinions:
School district classified employee may serve on district's board of education; participation in decisions affecting classified employees; board member's spouse employed teacher; participation in teacher's contract decisions. 95-9.
Attorney General's Opinions:
(Twenty-sixth) Change in number of county commission districts; "general election" defined. 80-181.
(Second) Meanings of "receipt" and "deliver" as used in K.S.A. 12-708. 80-204.
(Twenty-third) Community colleges; residency for determination of out-district tuition; aliens. 80-230.
(First) Effect of repeal of tax statute. 80-231.
(Twenty-sixth) County commissioners; change in number of districts; general elections. 81-10.
(Eighth) Sale of land by watershed districts acquired by eminent domain; general powers. 81-24.
(Third) Municipal accounting board; obtaining audit of city of third class. 81-224.
(Twenty-third) Cities of third class; election, appointment and removal of officers; qualifications of officers. 82-18.
(Thirteenth) Ambulance service; limitations on expenditure of tax proceeds. 82-85.
(Nineteenth) Advancement of travel expenses to sheriff's officers. 82-100.
(First) DUI; use of prior convictions in sentencing violators. 82-185.
(Second, Eleventh) Apportionment of revenue from countywide retailers' sales tax. 83-47.
(First) Consideration of applications to contract for withdrawal of state water. 83-151.
(Fourth) KOMA; metropolitan Topeka airport authority quorum change. 83-174.
(Third) Judicial foreclosure and sale of real estate; initiation by county; multiple petitions. 84-14.
(Thirty-first) Sale of liquor to intoxicated persons. 84-109.
(Second, Thirteenth) Infants; Kansas code for care of children; filing of petition on referral by SRS or other person; filing by individual; authority of SRS to file child in need of care petitions. 85-26.
(Second) Licensing and regulation of private clubs; prohibited acts and practices; offering free drinks. 85-95.
(Thirty-fifth) Intoxicating liquors; cereal malt beverages; local regulations. 86-23.
Creation of indebtedness in excess of budget is void. 86-104.
Hazing is prohibited in the Shrine and Elks lodges. 86-106.
(Second) Removal of traffic hazards from private property; growing crops. 86-120.
(Twenty-third) Commissioners; vacancies; residence requirements; rearrangement of commissioner districts. 86-121.
Collection of signatures on petition of political party seeking recognition; sufficiency; validity. 87-7.
Applicability of K.S.A. 65-3480 et seq. to PCB disposal facilities. 87-12.
Cited in discussion of definition of "environs" in K.S.A. 75-2724. 87-114.
Crimes against the public morals; use of live lures. 87-150.
Private investigation or security operations polygraphists; board meetings; quorum and voting. 87-152.
Museums; unclaimed goods and chattels; ownership. 88-33.
(Thirteenth) Certain laboratory records are not open records. 88-68.
(Third) Changes on birth certificate of minor; consent of parent or parents. 88-102.
(Thirteenth) Townships, corporate status; powers; limitation on tax levies; legal counsel. 88-138.
Twenty-third) Board of regents of municipal universities; composition; appointment; qualifications; resignations; vacancies. 89-51.
(First) Child passenger safety act; effect of 1989 House Bill No. 2196. 89-104.
(Thirteenth) Small claims; trial; representation when county is party. 90-28.
(Twenty-Third) Scope and jurisdiction of UCCC; territorial application. 90-38.
(Second) Permanent registration of city, county or township vehicles; ambulances. 90-52.
(Second) Physical inspection of property for change of classification or appraised valuation, tax year 1990; drive-by inspections. 90-53.
City's authority to levy property taxes to replace intangibles tax. 90-74.
Vacated unopened county road by operation of law; vacation prior to repeal of vacating statute is valid. 90-86.
Aggregate tax levy limitations; procedure for exemption; effect of 1990 amendment. 90-97.
Kansas tort claims act; definitions; municipality; separate legal entity created by interlocal agreement. 90-124.
Workers compensation advisory panel; members; powers. 91-2.
Delinquent tax collection; poverty affidavit limiting issuance or execution of tax warrant. 91-34.
(Second) Retail liquor dealer licensee's rights; "service" or "thing of value" defined. 91-72.
(Second) Legislative post audit; performance audit; acceptance or approval of audit reports. 91-92.
(Thirteenth) legislative post audit; open public records; duty of confidentiality; mortgage credit certificate program records. 91-158.
(First) City, county and township libraries; application of K.S.A. 12-1223 and 12-1225. 92-5.
Permit to operate ambulance service; applicability to state institution operating ambulance service. 92-77.
Open public meeting defined; quorum change; recreation commission. 93-140.
Investment of public moneys by governmental subdivisions; repurchase agreements. 94-14.
Recreation commission; membership; removal; authority of individual commission member. 94-48.
Powers and duties of county commissioners; rearrangement of commissioner districts. 94-51.
Dental act not applicable to certain practices, acts and operations. 95-29.
Group-funded municipal insurance pools; board of trustees; qualifications; dual board membership. 95-61.
School district election candidates; member district; residence; change of election method. 95-62.
Changing method of selection of county hospital board members; once in a calendar year. 97-56.
Safety belts; applicable to operator of four-wheel drive vehicle; legislative intent. 97-65.
Appointment of deputy coroners and special deputy coroners; statute construed. 98-19.
Offering bi-weekly mortgage payment plans held to be debt adjusting; statute construed. 98-21.
Joint recreation system; school district cannot force city to participate but city could be part of joint recreation commission taxing district. 2000-4.
Change in number of county commissioners must be submitted in "general election" held in November of even-numbered years. 2002-6.
For five member state rules and regulations board, three members constitute a quorum, and a majority of those present at quorum may approve or disapprove regulations. 2002-41.
Independent of KORA, school board is obligated to publish names, positions and salaries of superintendent and department heads of school district. 2003-3.
Board of county commissioners may delegate certain hiring decisions, i.e. road crews, to single commissioner but must do so in conformance with KOMA. 2004-19.
Assigning property to the wrong taxing district is not a mathematical miscomputation; additional assessments not authorized. 2007-22.
Uniform electronic transaction act does not authorize the use of unsworn electronic digitally signed complaint or supporting affidavit; court rule exception. 2008-4.
Property of an LLC operating within Fort Riley is subject to taxation, absent a specific exemption. 2009-1.
Authority to set mill levy for county hospital rests with county commissioners, or, in case of an elected board, the board. 2009-9.
CASE ANNOTATIONS
Annotations through 191 Kan. 712 arranged by clause.
First clause:
1. Section applied; provisions of a former act not continued in force. Groesbeck v. Barger, 1 Kan. App. 61, 64, 41 P. 204; Life Insurance Society v. Welch, as Sup't, etc., 26 Kan. 632, 641.
2. Right to issue execution on judgment continued after repeal of statute. Hansford v. Burdge, 8 Kan. App. 162, 55 P. 472.
3. Rule for construction of ordinances same as for statutes. Denning v. Yount, 9 Kan. App. 708, 59 P. 1092. Reversed: Denning v. Yount, 62 Kan. 217, 61 P. 803.
4. Common-law rule abrogated by this section. Denning v. Yount, 9 Kan. App. 708, 59 P. 1092. Reversed: 62 Kan. 217, 61 P. 803.
5. "Proceedings" is a technical word and must be construed accordingly. Gordon v. The State, ex rel., Border, 4 Kan. 489.
6. Saving clause applies to criminal statute under which prosecution instituted. The State v. Boyle, 10 Kan. 113.
7. Rule providing for continuance of provisions of former statute, valid. City of Troy v. A. & N. Railroad Co., 11 Kan. 519, 531.
8. Rule for continuance of provisions subject to qualification prescribed. City of Emporia v. Norton, 16 Kan. 236.
9. Rule for construction of conflicting statutes considered. Kan. P. Rly. Co. v. Comm'rs of Wyandotte Co., 16 Kan. 587.
10. New statute construed as continuation of repealed statute. Jockers v. Borgman, 29 Kan. 109, 112; The State, ex rel., v. City of Lawrence, 98 Kan. 808, 810, 160 P. 217.
11. General saving clause inapplicable where statute contains special saving clause. The State v. Showers, 34 Kan. 269, 8 P. 474; Carford v. Smith, 35 Kan. 478, 11 P. 334.
12. Effect of saving clause considered at length. In re Tillery, Petitioner, 43 Kan. 188, 191, 23 P. 162; Lawson v. Comm'rs of Reno Co., 47 Kan. 271, 272, 27 P. 998.
13. Legislature may change penalty for violation of existing injunctions. The State, ex rel., v. Durein, 46 Kan. 695, 700, 27 P. 148.
14. Effect of saving clause in sale of land for taxes. Pounds v. Rodgers, 52 Kan. 558, 35 P. 223.
15. Continuation of provisions; warden of penitentiary has no vested right. Lynch v. Chase, 55 Kan. 367, 372, 40 P. 666.
16. Right of subcontractors to mechanics' lien under later act. Hotel Co. v. Hardware Co., 56 Kan. 448, 43 P. 769.
17. Saving clause of section has no application to city ordinances. Denning v. Yount, 62 Kan. 217, 61 P. 803.
18. Effect of saving clause where proceedings commenced before statute repealed. Warner v. Imbeau, 63 Kan. 415, 420, 65 P. 648.
19. Saving clause does not save right to rule on evidence. Wheelock v. Myers, 64 Kan. 47, 67 P. 632.
20. Continuation applies to provisions only, not to chapters, articles, etc. Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672, 72 P. 274. Case superseded on other grounds: Cameron v. Board of Education, 182 Kan. 39, 318 P.2d 988.
21. Meaning of "proceeding" as used here and elsewhere distinguished. The State v. Topeka, 68 Kan. 177, 186, 74 P. 647.
22. Saving clause; sufficiency of information to constitute commencement of proceeding. The State v. Stevens, 68 Kan. 576, 578, 75 P. 546.
23. Repeal pending action or legal proceeding does not abate either. Wire Co. v. Stevenson, 71 Kan. 64, 65, 79 P. 1085.
24. Proceeding in error, when deemed commenced within meaning of section. Kansas City v. Dore, 75 Kan. 23, 25, 88 P. 539.
25. Continuation of provisions applied to amendments to prohibitory liquor law. The State v. Jepson, 76 Kan. 644, 647, 92 P. 600.
26. Repeal of statute after rights have accrued; liability of stockholders. Henley v. Myers, 76 Kan. 723, 93 P. 168, 93 P. 173. Affirmed, Henley v. Myers, 215 U.S. 373, 30 S. Ct. 148, 54 L.Ed. 240.
27. Meaning of "penalty incurred"; provision applicable to criminal cases. In re Schneck, 78 Kan. 207, 209, 96 P. 43.
28. Change in form of statute; provisions continued uninterruptedly in force. Snattinger v. Topeka, 80 Kan. 341, 344, 102 P. 508.
29. Continuation of provisions of former statutes relative to corporations. The State v. Railroad Co., 81 Kan. 404, 412, 105 P. 685.
30. Reenactment of statute; intermediate statute limiting original act not repealed. The State v. Railroad Co., 83 Kan. 431, 111 P. 493.
31. Section inapplicable to repeal of special act limiting general act. The State v. Prather, 84 Kan. 169, 112 P. 829.
32. Special act not superseded by reenactment of general act. Wilson v. Edwards County, 85 Kan. 422, 425, 116 P. 614.
33. Right to bring action upon contractual obligation preserved by section. Douglas v. Loftus, Adm'x, 85 Kan. 720, 729, 119 P. 74.
34. Continuance of ordinance in force after change in statute. City of McPherson v. Hanson, 87 Kan. 769, 772, 125 P. 16.
35. Provisions of old statute continued in force by reenactment. Ziegler v. Junction City, 90 Kan. 856, 862, 136 P. 223.
36. Provisions of statute held unconstitutional cannot be continued. Richey v. Ferguson, 93 Kan. 152, 154, 143 P. 497.
37. Time for bringing existing cause of action may be shortened. Milbourne v. Kelley, 93 Kan. 753, 145 P. 816.
38. New acts concerning bond issues deemed continuation of former acts. Board of Education v. Davis, 94 Kan. 670, 672, 147 P. 57.
39. Power to enforce tax collection not preserved by saving clause. The State, ex rel., v. Railway Co., 99 Kan. 831, 832, 163 P. 157.
40. Repeal of inheritance tax act; state may collect pending tax. In re Moseley's Estate, 100 Kan. 495, 496, 164 P. 1073.
41. Statutes identical, construed as continuance. Rohr v. City of Leavenworth, 101 Kan. 222, 224, 165 P. 823; City of Topeka v. Wasson, 101 Kan. 824, 826, 168 P. 902; Railway Co. v. Cowley County, 103 Kan. 681, 689, 176 P. 99; Franklin Township v. County Treasurer, 112 Kan. 11, 13, 209 P. 976.
42. Rule not followed when inconsistent with manifest intent of legislature. Railway Co. v. Fuller, 105 Kan. 608, 610, 186 P. 127; In re Hosford, 107 Kan. 115, 117, 190 P. 765.
43. Limitation on time to contest will; not a "right" hereunder. Ferrier v. Ferrier, 108 Kan. 130, 132, 193 P. 1071.
44. Amended statute speaks as of time of original enactment. Bailey v. Turner, 108 Kan. 856, 858, 197 P. 214.
45. Section applies to limitation of action on note. Cott v. Baker, 112 Kan. 115, 117, 210 P. 651.
46. Statute specifically dealing with duties of secretary of state controls. State, ex rel., v. Ryan, 116 Kan. 208, 210, 225 P. 1043.
47. Later enactment governs in case of irreconcilable provisions on same subject. Arkansas City v. Turner, 116 Kan. 407, 410, 226 P. 1009.
48. Later expression of legislature held unconstitutional. Lindley v. State Board of Administration, 117 Kan. 558, 559, 231 P. 1026.
49. Statutes passed at different time continue original relative status in revision. Lemen v. Kansas Flour Mills Co., 122 Kan. 574, 577, 253 P. 547.
50. Regarded as continuation where provision of new law same as old. Fuller v. Atchison, Topeka & S.F. Rly. Co., 124 Kan. 66, 72, 257 P. 971; Chicago R.I. & P. Rly. Co. v. Percival, 140 Kan. 508, 509, 37 P.2d 686.
51. Elimination of retrospective clause in limitations act does not affect accrued rights. Serault v. Price, 125 Kan. 548, 550, 265 P. 63.
52. Amendment held not to segregate section from its original sections. City of Manhattan v. United Power & Light Corp., 129 Kan. 592, 596, 283 P. 919.
53. History of laws reenacted by revision may be referred to. Chicago, R.I. & P. Rly. Co. v. Nichols, 130 Kan. 509, 287 P. 262.
54. Rights acquired under tax levy act later repealed not affected. Chicago, R.I. & P. Rly. Co. v. Paul, 139 Kan. 795, 797, 33 P.2d 304.
55. Applied in holding K.S.A. 62-1449 operates prospectively, not retrospectively. State v. Brown, 146 Kan. 525, 527, 528, 73 P.2d 19.
56. Action pending when procedure statute amended held governed by old law. Tivis v. Hulsey, 146 Kan. 851, 852, 73 P.2d 1111.
57. Cross-appeal held governed by law in effect when appeal taken. Galloway v. Wesley, 146 Kan. 937, 946, 947, 73 P.2d 1073.
58. Regarded as continuation where old law same as new. Harvey County Comm'rs v. Commission of Revenue and Taxation, 150 Kan. 458, 460, 94 P.2d 332.
59. Section discussed but not applied in construing amendment to K.S.A. 79-3230. S.H. Kress & Co. v. State Tax Comm., 150 Kan. 621, 624, 95 P.2d 529.
60. Action begun under K.S.A. 22-223 not abated by enactment of probate code. Mirise v. Rathbun, 152 Kan. 441, 443, 104 P.2d 420.
61. Right of action barred under former law not revived by probate code. In re Estate of Pennington, 154 Kan. 531, 533, 119 P.2d 488.
62. Amendment of statute held continuation not new enactment. City of Council Grove v. Schmidt, 155 Kan. 515, 519, 520, 127 P.2d 250.
63. Limitation statute affects remedy only not rights or obligations; inapplicable. In re Estate of Reed, 157 Kan. 602, 608, 142 P.2d 824.
64. Injunction, nuisance abatement and padlock provisions of liquor control act held continuation. State v. Coleman, 168 Kan. 159, 163, 211 P.2d 81.
65. Applied in construing amendments to K.S.A. 44-505. Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 305, 307, 303 P.2d 197.
66. Applied in construing K.S.A. 16-202, 16-203, 16-205; legal rates of interest. Young v. Barker, 185 Kan. 246, 251, 342 P.2d 150.
67. Mentioned in upholding act abolishing office of workmen's compensation commissioner and creating office of workmen's compensation director (K.S.A. 74-710). Schumacher v. Rausch, 190 Kan. 239, 245, 372 P.2d 1005.
Second clause:
68. Statute of limitations; general words are to have general operation. Mary E. Lane, Adm'x, v. The National Bank of Metropolis, 6 Kan. 74.
69. Block in a city defined according to provisions of section. Olsson v. City of Topeka, 42 Kan. 709, 21 P. 219.
70. Word "eligible" has no technical meaning in law. (Dissenting opinion.) Demaree v. Scates, 50 Kan. 275, 285, 32 P. 1123.
71. Meaning of "assignee" limited to assignee in fact. National Bank v. Beard, 55 Kan. 773, 42 P. 320.
72. Court may change punctuation to conform with legislative intent. The State v. Deuel, 63 Kan. 811, 813, 66 P. 1037.
73. Words "appointment" and "authority" construed according to accurate legal sense. Vaughn v. Railroad Co., 65 Kan. 685, 687, 70 P. 602.
74. Words "in the last sickness" have not acquired any peculiar meaning. Baird v. Baird, 70 Kan. 564, 576, 79 P. 163.
75. Section applies to construction of criminal statute containing word "unlawful." The State v. Tinkler, 72 Kan. 262, 263, 83 P. 830.
76. "Concubinage" understood in its ordinary or popular sense. The State v. Tucker, 72 Kan. 481, 486, 84 P. 126; State v. Dusin, 125 Kan. 400, 402, 264 P. 1043.
77. Meaning of words "common nuisance"; peculiar and appropriate meaning. The State v. Coler, 75 Kan. 424, 427, 89 P. 693.
78. Section applied to construction of words in city ordinance. Larned v. Boyd, 76 Kan. 37, 40, 90 P. 814.
79. Section applied to construction of "basic" and reference textbooks. The State, ex rel., v. Innes, 89 Kan. 168, 174, 130 P. 677.
80. Section applied to construction of "any instrument or means whatsoever." The State v. Miller, 90 Kan. 230, 233, 133 P. 878.
81. Section applied to act for granting pensions by county commissioners. Gleason v. Sedgwick County, 92 Kan. 632, 636, 141 P. 584.
82. Word "action" taken in ordinary acception and meaning. Rose v. Boyer, 92 Kan. 892, 893, 894, 141 P. 1006.
83. Section applied to statute of descents and distributions and wills. Compton v. Akers, 96 Kan. 229, 235, 150 P. 219.
84. Section applied to construction of word "aid" concerning high schools. The State, ex rel., v. Levitt, 96 Kan. 450, 452, 152 P. 18.
85. Words and phrases construed according to approved use of language. Bank v. Francis, 100 Kan. 225, 231, 164 P. 146.
86. Word "restitution" given ordinary lay meaning. Holloway v. Water Co., 100 Kan. 414, 424, 167 P. 265.
87. Phrase, "subject to rights of creditors," construed according to usage. Postlethwaite v. Edson, 102 Kan. 619, 622, 171 P. 769.
88. Word "practicable" construed in the ordinary meaning. Beck v. Shawnee County, 105 Kan. 325, 335, 182 P. 397.
89. Restriction in meaning of "high school" by board prohibited. Thurman-Watts v. Board of Education, 115 Kan. 328, 332, 222 P. 123.
90. "Heirs in fee" and "issue" possess a peculiar and appropriate meaning. Gardner v. Anderson, 116 Kan. 431, 435, 227 P. 743.
91. "Occurring vacancies" in primary election law construed according to context. Koehler v. Beggs, 121 Kan. 897, 901, 250 P. 268.
92. Wages-preference law construed according to approved usage. Acme Foundry and Machine Co. v. Wampler, 124 Kan. 486, 488, 260 P. 972.
93. "Debt" construed according to context and approved usage. Farmers State Bank v. Callahan, 126 Kan. 729, 731, 271 P. 299.
94. "In any such county" refers to one previously described. Missouri Pac. Rld. Co. v. Atchison County Comm'rs, 130 Kan. 554, 555, 287 P. 612.
95. "Legal widow" under K.S.A. 44-508 includes common-law wife. Freeman v. Fowler Packing Co., 135 Kan. 378, 380, 11 P.2d 276.
96. Phrase "encouragement of agriculture and horticulture" in K.S.A. 17-202 construed. State, ex rel., v. Wheat Farming Co., 137 Kan. 697, 713, 22 P.2d 1093.
97. Applied in construing word "adjoining" as used in school laws. State, ex rel., v. Bunton, 141 Kan. 103, 106, 40 P.2d 326.
98. Cited in construing trust created by will. Hollenbeck v. Lyon, 142 Kan. 352, 357, 47 P.2d 63.
99. Words and phrases of statute construed in harmony with purpose of statute; "petition" held equivalent of "election"; "warrants" held equivalent of "bonds." State, ex rel., v. Republic County Comm'rs, 148 Kan. 376, 382, 82 P.2d 84.
100. Applied; K.S.A. 21-915 held to include slot machines for purposes of injunctive relief under K.S.A. 21-918. State, ex rel., v. Myers, 152 Kan. 52, 55, 102 P.2d 1028.
101. Term "hydrant rental" as used in K.S.A. 80-1605 construed; tax levy upheld. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ferguson, 161 Kan. 562, 573, 171 P.2d 271.
102. Discussed in construing will; life estate created by instrument as whole. In re Estate of Thompson, 161 Kan. 641, 644, 171 P.2d 294.
103. "Consumption" in use tax law a technical word and so construed. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Commission of Revenue and Taxation, 163 Kan. 458, 465, 183 P.2d 234.
104. Discussed; word "children" in workmen's compensation act held to include illegitimate children. Green v. Burch, 164 Kan. 348, 351, 189 P.2d 892.
105. Applied; term "loss or damage by fire" in insurance policy construed. Youse v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 172 Kan. 111, 117, 238 P.2d 472.
106. Word "or" used in will, construed. Davis v. Vermillion, 173 Kan. 508, 249 P.2d 625.
107. Mentioned in construing terms of insurance contract. Saul v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 173 Kan. 679, 684, 250 P.2d 819.
108. Discussed; grain damaged by flood waters not "out of condition" grain under K.S.A. 34-273. Flour Mills of America v. Burrus Mills, 174 Kan. 709, 716, 258 P.2d 341.
109. Phrase "conviction of a crime" defined. Leland v. Kansas State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 176 Kan. 334, 336, 270 P.2d 255.
110. Mentioned in defining words "compensation," "bonus" and "remuneration." Erickson v. General Motors Corporation, 177 Kan. 90, 95, 276 P.2d 376.
111. Words "enumerate" and "enumeration" defined. State, ex rel., v. Minneola Hospital District, 177 Kan. 238, 244, 277 P.2d 607.
112. Applied in construing word "obscene" in motion picture censorship act. Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 177 Kan. 728, 731, 282 P.2d 412.
113. Mentioned in defining term "money rate" as used in workmen's compensation act. Leslie v. Reynolds, 179 Kan. 422, 429, 295 P.2d 1076.
Third clause:
114. The word "action" in statute read as plural. Douglass v. Leavenworth County, 75 Kan. 6, 9, 88 P. 557.
115. Expression "a place" read as plural. Erhart v. Drainage District, 91 Kan. 914, 918, 139 P. 175.
116. Expression "violation of the prohibitory law" includes the singular. The State v. Watson, 92 Kan. 983, 984, 142 P. 956.
117. Word "site" may be interpreted in a plural sense. Griebel v. School District, 110 Kan. 317, 321, 203 P. 718.
118. "Owner thereof'' in practical application becomes "owners thereof." Robinson v. Jones, 119 Kan. 609, 614, 240 P. 957.
119. By analogy, widow may include surviving husband. Fuller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Rly. Co., 124 Kan. 66, 72, 257 P. 971.
120. "Attorney" held to include more than one. Fidelity Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Morris, 130 Kan. 290, 297, 286 P. 206.
121. Applied in construing letter constituting a contract of employment. Fey v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 147 Kan. 31, 36, 75 P.2d 810.
122. Cited; word "heir" interchangeable with "heirs." In re estate of Doyle, 152 Kan. 23, 30, 103 P.2d 52.
123. Applied to word "hernia" in workmen's compensation act. Rogers v. Board of Public Utilities, 158 Kan. 693, 698, 149 P.2d 632.
124. Mentioned in construing word "and" in mineral deed to mean "or." Rostocil v. United Oil & Gas Royalty Ass'n, 177 Kan. 15, 23, 274 P.2d 761.
125. Word "widow" in L. 1909, ch. 182, § 420 construed to also mean "surviving husband." Suffelberger v. Hopkins, 177 Kan. 513, 519, 280 P.2d 933.
126. The word "owner" as used in K.S.A. 26-102 to be construed as plural (dissenting opinion). Moore v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 181 Kan. 840, 853, 317 P.2d 384.
127. "Project" in urban renewal law (K.S.A. 17-4754) extended to projects. City of Kansas City v. Robb, 183 Kan. 834, 838, 332 P.2d 520.
Fourth clause:
128. Two members of court may try election contest. Norton v. Graham, 7 Kan. 166.
129. Road report signed by two viewers held sufficient. Vernard v. Cross, 8 Kan. 248.
129a. Section applied to school board contracting with teacher. Aikman v. School District, 27 Kan. 129, 132.
130. Statutory rule applies only where membership of board, etc., is full. Railway Co. v. Meyer, 58 Kan. 305, 310, 49 P. 89; Hartzler v. City of Goodland, 97 Kan. 129, 133, 154 P. 265.
131. Section applied to contest court; hearing by two members. Balcom v. Peacock, 59 K.136, 142, 52 P. 76.
132. Majority of county canvassing board may act. Capper v. Stotler, 88 Kan. 387, 402, 128 P. 200.
133. Minority of board have no power to act. Green v. Hodges, 91 Kan. 658, 662, 138 P. 605.
134. Majority city commissioners may make valid contract. Water Co. v. City of Wichita, 98 Kan. 256, 258, 158 P. 49.
135. Majority of board acting with superintendent may dismiss teacher. Parrick v. School District, 100 Kan. 569, 573, 164 P. 1172.
136. Majority of corporation commission may grant writ of convenience. Union Public Ser. Co. v. Corporation Comm., 140 Kan. 722, 725, 37 P.2d 1010.
137. Majority of council of city of the third class may approve appointment of council members. Tucker v. Raney, 145 Kan. 256, 257, 65 P.2d 329.
138. Clause is applicable to township board. State ex rel., v. Woodruff, 164 Kan. 339, 347, 189 P.2d 899.
139. Applied; hearing under K.S.A. 41-203, not illegal because only two members of board sat. Chambers v. Herrick, 172 Kan. 510, 514, 241 P.2d 748.
140. Applied to state forestry, fish and game commission. State v. Boicourt Hunting Ass'n, 183 Kan. 187, 189, 326 P.2d 277.
141. Majority of board of county commissioners may perform official act of board. Wycoff v. Board of County Commissioners, 191 Kan. 658, 673, 383 P.2d 520.
Fifth clause:
142. "Highway" and "road" held to include public bridges in township. Uhl v. Township of Douglass, 27 Kan. 80.
143. Section applied to construction of bridges by irrigation company. The State v. Irrigation Co., 63 Kan. 394, 397, 65 P. 681.
144. Public bridge is part of highway; county line bridge; maintenance. Cloud County v. Mitchell County, 75 Kan. 750, 90 P. 286.
145. Generally public bridge will be regarded as part of highway. Cloud County v. Mitchell County, 75 Kan. 750, 757, 90 P. 286.
Seventh clause:
146. Section applied in determining rights of adopted child. Riley v. Day, 88 Kan. 503, 506, 129 P. 524.
147. "Issue" does not mean mere statutory heirs or heirs at law. Gardner v. Anderson, 116 Kan. 431, 435, 227 P. 743.
Eighth clause:
148. Section held applicable to provisions of civil code; lien of judgment. Kiser v. Sawyer, 4 Kan. 503; Bank v. Murray, 86 Kan. 766, 769, 121 P. 1117.
149. Leasehold estate within statutory definition of term. Hogan v. Maner, 23 Kan. 551, 558.
150. Equitable interest in land may be levied upon and sold. Poole v. French, 71 Kan. 391, 399, 80 P. 997.
151. Word "land" is broad enough to include town property. Case v. Mickley, 72 Kan. 372, 373, 83 P. 970.
152. Owner of any interest in land deemed property owner. Clarke v. Lawrence, 75 Kan. 26, 33, 88 P. 735.
153. Equitable interest in land is real estate; subject to sale. Robertson v. Howard, 82 Kan. 588, 109 P. 696. Overruled: Robertson v. Howard 83 Kan. 453, 112 P. 162. Reversed: Robertson v. Howard, 229 U.S. 254, 33 S. Ct. 854, 57 L.Ed. 1174.
154. Interest of devisee in real estate subject to attachment. Ward v. Beener, 89 Kan. 369, 372, 131 P. 609.
155. "Real estate" includes equitable interests in land. Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 561, 164 P. 1100.
156. Remainderman's interest passes to his trustee in bankruptcy. Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93, 98, 181 P. 621.
157. Easement is such an interest in land that may be taxed. Railway Co. v. Labette Co., 113 Kan. 423, 425, 215 P. 447.
158. Wife of life tenant has mortgageable interest in land. McCartney v. Robbins, 114 Kan. 141, 146, 217 P. 311.
159. Oil-and-gas lease is incorporeal hereditament. Supply Co. v. McLeod, 116 Kan. 477, 478, 227 P. 350.
160. Contingent executory devise may be conveyed by quitclaim deed. Platt v. Woodland, 121 Kan. 291, 297, 246 P. 1017.
161. Any nonexempt interest whether legal or equitable may be sold under execution. Thompson v. Zurich State Bank, 124 Kan. 425, 428, 260 P. 658.
162. Uncertainty of remainderman's interest does not affect property right. Caple v. Warburton, 125 Kan. 290, 293, 264 P. 47.
163. Future contingent interest may be assigned. Knutson v. Hederstedt, 125 Kan. 312, 316, 264 P. 41.
164. Life tenant has right of redemption from mortgage-foreclosure sale. National Bank of America v. Barritt, 136 Kan. 870, 874, 18 P.2d 552.
165. Cited in defining "real property" as used in mortgage-registration act. Shawnee County Comm'rs v. Wright, 147 Kan. 542, 547, 78 P.2d 44.
166. Interest in statutory spendthrift trust held subject to attachment and garnishment. Koelliker v. Denkinger, 148 Kan. 503, 508, 509, 83 P.2d 703. Modified: 149 Kan. 259, 86 P.2d 740.
167. Applied in determining what constitutes real property under mortgage-registration act. Shawnee County Comm'rs v. Wright, 153 Kan. 19, 32, 109 P.2d 184.
168. Life estate in land is real estate. Alexander v. Goellert, 153 Kan. 202, 205, 109 P.2d 146.
169. Right to portion of crops and possibility of reverter is real estate. Sawyer v. Goyette, 153 Kan. 243, 246, 109 P.2d 157.
170. Mechanic's lien may attach to leasehold interest in real estate; redemption. Ehrsam & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Rice, 153 Kan. 483, 487, 112 P.2d 95.
171. Life estate in remainder an interest in land subject to conveyance. Hull v. Prather, 161 Kan. 264, 268, 167 P.2d 600.
172. Construed; overriding royalty interest not land, when. Connell v. Kanwa Oil, Inc., 161 Kan. 649, 654, 170 P.2d 631.
173. Tax on lands includes tenements and hereditaments. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Moyle, 162 Kan. 133, 143, 175 P.2d 133. Affirmed: 163 Kan. 368, 182 P.2d 127.
174. Applied in determining whether owner of life estate may maintain action under K.S.A. 21-2435. Croasdale v. Butell, 177 Kan. 487, 490, 280 P.2d 593.
175. Applied; driveway agreement construed; easement appurtenant created thereby passes on mortgage foreclosure. Smith v. Harris, 181 Kan. 237, 253, 311 P.2d 325.
176. "Land" in eminent domain proceeding held not to include "fee simple estate." Sutton v. Frazier, 183 Kan. 33, 39, 43, 325 P.2d 338.
177. Any interest in land may be conveyed by deed. Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Hollow, 70 F.2d 811.
178. Oil and gas lease is incorporeal hereditament. Rowan v. Harburney Oil Co., 91 F.2d 122, 124.
Ninth clause:
179. Remainderman's interest passes to his trustee in bankruptcy. Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93, 98, 181 P. 621.
Tenth clause:
180. "Property" included both personal and real property. Bodwell v. Heaton, 40 Kan. 36, 38, 18 P. 901; Bennet v. Wolverton, 24 Kan. 284, 287.
181. "Property" includes ordinances in the nature of contracts. The State v. Water Co., 61 Kan. 547, 561, 60 P. 337.
182. Remainderman's interest passes to his trustee in bankruptcy. Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93, 98, 181 P. 621.
183. "Land" in eminent domain proceeding held not to include "fee simple estate." Sutton v. Frazier, 183 Kan. 33, 43, 325 P.2d 338.
Eleventh clause:
184. "Month" as used in ordinance held to mean calendar month. Holton v. Beimrod, 8 Kan. App. 265, 267, 55 P. 505.
185. "Year" as used in statute held to mean calendar year. Garfield Township v. Dodsworth, 9 Kan. App. 752, 58 P. 565; Garfield Township v. Hubbell, 9 Kan. App. 785, 59 P. 600.
186. Applied in construing statute (L. 1937, ch. 268, § 2) limiting time for perfection of appeal. Allbritten v. National Acceptance Co., 183 Kan. 5, 9, 325 P.2d 40.
Thirteenth clause:
187. Section applies to civil code; action against foreign corporations. N. M. R. R. Co. v. Akers, 4 Kan. 453, 470.
188. United States held within meaning of term "person." The State v. Herold, 9 Kan. 194.
189. City held to be included within meaning of term "person." Delaney v. City of Salina, 34 Kan. 532, 540, 9 P. 271; The State, ex rel., v. Comm'rs of Atchison Co., 44 Kan. 186, 188, 24 P. 87.
190. "Person" includes foreign corporation; when deemed "out of the state." Williams v. Railway Co., 68 Kan. 17, 21, 74 P. 600.
191. Word "person" in motor-vehicle-fuel tax law includes county. State, ex rel., v. Barton County Comm'rs, 142 Kan. 624, 625, 51 P.2d 33.
192. Applied in upholding contract between two cities for sewage disposal. City of North Newton v. Regier, 152 Kan. 434, 437, 103 P.2d 873.
193. Incorporated orphans' home is person within meaning of school attendance statute. Mariadahl Children's Home v. Bellegarde School Dist., 163 Kan. 49, 52, 180 P.2d 612.
Eighteenth clause:
194. Endorsement made by means of rubber stamp considered written. Bank v. Krug, 108 Kan. 108, 112, 193 P. 899.
195. Written statement held not within meaning of section. Torgeson v. Missouri-K.-T. Rld. Co., 124 Kan. 798, 803, 262 P. 564.
Twenty-first clause:
196. "Usual place of residence" defined; residence substantially equivalent to domicile. Arnette v. Arnette, 162 Kan. 677, 679, 178 P.2d 1019.
Twenty-third clause:
197. "Residence" and "domicile" are equivalents in this state; temporary presence. Modern Woodmen v. Hester, 66 Kan. 129, 136, 71 P. 279.
198. Application of section to service of process; service held void. O'Neil v. Eppler, 90 Kan. 314, 316, 133 P. 705.
199. This definition cannot be applied to a county. Osborne County v. City of Osborne, 104 Kan. 671, 673, 180 P. 233.
200. Application of section to domicile for divorce. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 109 Kan. 600, 602, 201 P. 62.
201. Rules of law relating to change of domicile applied. Ford, Adm'x , v. Peck, 116 Kan. 74, 76, 225 P. 1054.
202. Which of two places deemed person's residence is question of fact. Strackeljohn v. Campbell, 136 Kan. 145, 147, 12 P.2d 829.
203. What constitutes domicile for soldiers' compensation considered. Knuth v. Kansas Compensation Board, 137 Kan. 392, 394, 20 P.2d 471.
204. Domicile of minor controlled by that of father although living apart. Trammell v. Kansas Compensation Board, 142 Kan. 329, 46 P.2d 867.
205. Applied in action under soldiers' compensation act. Hipchen v. Soldiers' Compensation Board, 144 Kan. 517, 519, 61 P.2d 878.
206. Ordinarily residence of father is residence of wife and children. Sulzen v. School District, 144 Kan. 648, 651, 62 P.2d 880.
207. Cited in discussing question of residence of plaintiff in divorce action. Blair v. Blair, 149 Kan. 3, 5, 85 P.2d 1004.
208. Applied in determining school elector a qualified voter. Littell v. Millemon, 154 Kan. 670, 675, 121 P.2d 233.
209. Citizen may change residence temporarily or permanently; acts and intentions govern. State, ex rel., v. Corcoran, 155 Kan. 714, 719, 128 P.2d 999.
210. Divorce action; trial court's finding as to residence held conclusive. Gleason v. Gleason, 159 Kan. 448, 450, 155 P.2d 465.
211. Applied in defining "usual place of residence" in L. 1909, ch. 182, § 65. Lamberson v. Lamberson, 164 Kan. 38, 44, 187 P.2d 366.
212. Applied; generally, petition need not state resident plaintiff's residence. Welsh v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Rly. Co., 167 Kan. 303, 305, 205 P.2d 1019.
213. Applied in construing word "resident" as used in K.S.A. 14-1301. State, ex rel., v. Jones, 169 Kan. 521, 525, 219 P.2d 706.
214. Cited in holding school board cannot be resident owner of property. Horejsi v. City of Holyrood, 171 Kan. 190, 195, 231 P.2d 215.
215. Ruling that person not resident owner of real property sustained. Baker v. City of Leoti, 179 Kan. 122, 127, 292 P.2d 720.
216. Requisites for accomplishing change of residence stated. Irvin v. Irvin, 182 Kan. 563, 566, 322 P.2d 794.
217. Residence substantially equivalent of domicile, when; service of summons returned as served at "usual place of residence," void under facts. Stumfoll v Inman, 188 Kan. 553, 558, 363 P.2d 443.
218. Texan's signature to deed to wife's Kansas property not required; "sojourner" not "resident." Dwyer v. Matson, 163 F.2d 299, 300, 301.
Twenty-fourth clause:
219. Section applied to service of process; service held void. O'Neil v. Eppler 90 Kan. 314, 316, 133 P. 705.
220. Disqualification of voters for lack of residence sustained by evidence. Gentry v. Hornung, 136 Kan. 340, 341, 15 P.2d 445.
221. Citizen may change residence temporarily or permanently; acts and intentions govern. State, ex rel., v. Corcoran, 155 Kan. 714, 719, 128 P.2d 999.
222. Applied in defining "usual place of residence" in L. 1909, ch. 182, § 65. Lamberson v. Lamberson, 164 Kan. 38, 44, 187 P.2d 366.
223. Service of summons returned as served at "usual place of residence" void under facts. Stumfoll v. Inman, 188 Kan. 553, 557, 363 P.2d 443.
Twenty-fifth clause:
224. Term "his property" may mean land occupied but not owned. State, ex rel., v. Rural High School Joint District, 117 Kan. 332, 334, 231 P. 337.
225. Cited; allegation stating person "householder" equivalent to "legal voter." Joint Consolidated School Dist. No. 2 v. Johnson, 163 Kan. 202, 207, 181 P.2d 504.
Twenty-sixth clause:
226. Section applied to filling of vacancy until next "general election." Bond v. White, 8 Kan. 333.
227. Difference between "next regular election" and "next general election." McIntyre v. Iliff, 64 Kan. 747, 749, 68 P. 633.
Twenty-seventh clause:
228. "Under legal disability" applied to person afflicted with "morphinomania." Gillmore v. Gillmore, 91 Kan. 707, 708, 139 P. 386.
229. Not applicable to statute creating liability and fixing time for bringing action. Bohrer v. State Highway Comm., 137 Kan. 925, 927, 22 P.2d 470.
230. Unmarried minor cannot legally surrender her child without probate court's consent (concurring opinion). Wilson v. Kansas Children's Home, 159 Kan. 325, 331, 154 P.2d 137.
Twenty-eighth clause:
231. Section cited in determining qualification of justice to sit in action. Barber County Comm'rs v. Lake State Bank, 123 Kan. 10, 14, 254 P. 401.
232. Section limits common-law rule as to kinship by consanguinity. State v. Hooper, 140 Kan. 481, 500, 37 P.2d 52.
233. Applied; challenge of prospective juror for cause should have been sustained. State v. Springer, 172 Kan. 239, 243, 239 P.2d 944.
Twenty-ninth clause:
234. Section applies to son keeping mother and sister. Seymour, Sabin & Co. v. Cooper, 26 Kan. 539, 543.
235. Sister keeping younger sister held head of family. Fish v. Street, 27 Kan. 270, 275.
236. Section applied to wife owning household goods. Harrison v. Foster, 94 Kan. 284, 287, 146 P. 355.
237. Applied in holding farm was homestead although devised by uncle to nephews. In re Estate of Dittemore, 152 Kan. 574, 577, 106 P.2d 1056.
ANNOTATIONS subsequent to 191 Kan. 712 (not annotated to specific clauses)
238. Words in amendment of "long-arm" statute deemed to speak as of time of statute's original enactment. Jones v. Garrett, 192 Kan. 109, 113, 386 P.2d 194.
239. Corporation commission order is "made" when the interested parties are apprised of it through formal means. Cities Service Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 192 Kan. 707, 712, 391 P.2d 74.
240. Leasehold estate is an interest in land; mortgage registration fee required. First National Bank in Dallas v. Lowman, 193 Kan. 349, 352, 394 P.2d 313.
241. When one position of three-member board is vacant, remaining members concurring in decision have power to act. In re Application of Murray, 193 Kan. 535, 537, 540, 394 P.2d 88.
242. In determining venue the terms domicile and residence are substantial equivalents. Estate of Schoof v. Schoof, 193 Kan. 611, 613, 396 P.2d 329.
243. A chose in action is personal property. O'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644, 648, 396 P.2d 285.
244. "Employer" has definite meaning in common use. Roda v. Williams, 195 Kan. 507, 511, 407 P.2d 471.
245. Savings statute preserving rights and remedies under repealed statute; issuance of worthless check. State v. Cramer, 196 Kan. 646, 647, 648, 649, 413 P.2d 994.
246. "State" considered in upholding constitutionality of price control of liquor under K.S.A. 41-1111 et seq. Laird & Company v. Cheney, 196 Kan. 675, 682, 414 P.2d 18.
247. Repeal of statute does not affect prosecution commenced under repealed statute. State v. Augustine, 197 Kan. 207, 210, 416 P.2d 281.
248. Statutory provisions same as prior statute construed as a continuation of such statute. Curless v. Board of County Commissioners, 197 Kan. 580, 587, 419 P.2d 876.
249. Words importing singular number include plural; Watershed District Act construed. Barten v. Turkey Creek Watershed Joint District No. 32, 200 Kan. 489, 506, 438 P.2d 732.
250. The term "person" in K.S.A. 60-308 includes bodies politic and corporate. Tilley v. Keller Truck & Imple ment Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 646, 438 P.2d 128.
251. Repeal of K.S.A. 72-5707 did not relieve county of liability incurred before repeal. School District v. Board of County Commissioners, 201 Kan. 434, 441, 441 P.2d 875.
252. In construing statute, words are construed according to context, and words in common use are given their natural and ordinary meaning. Hessell v. Lateral Sewer District, 202 Kan. 499, 502, 449 P.2d 496.
253. Word "child" given ordinary lay meaning. In re Nelson, 202 Kan. 663, 666, 451 P.2d 173.
254. Garnishment order not legally served on garnishee; garnishee's business office is not his "usual place of residence" or "usual place of abode." Thompson-Kilgariff General Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Haskell, 206 Kan. 465, 466, 479 P.2d 900.
255. Twenty-fifth clause cited in holding college fraternity houses not exempt from taxation. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternal Ass'n. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 207 Kan. 514, 523, 485 P.2d 1297.
256. Cited; statutory definition of "incapacitated person" considered in applying statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case. Seymour v. Lofgreen, 209 Kan. 72, 78, 495 P.2d 969.
257. Term "sale" is included in broader term "transfer." Fairlawn Plaza Development, Inc. v. Fleming Co., Inc. 210 Kan. 459, 464, 465, 502 P.2d 663.
258. Word "terrorize" defined; test in what men of common intelligence would consider meaning. State v. Gunzelman, 210 K 481, 485, 486, 502 P.2d 705.
259. Word "or" as used in insurance policy construed. Wheeler v. Employer's Mutual Casualty Co., 211 Kan. 100, 105, 505 P.2d 768.
260. Words "relinquishment" and "abandonment" defined and distinguished. Botkin v. Kickapoo, Inc. 211 Kan. 107, 110, 505 P.2d 749.
261. Terms "merchantable title" and "marketable title" construed. Darby v. Keeran, 211 Kan. 133, 137, 138, 505 P.2d 710.
262. Word "abstain" defined; determination of vote of county commissioners. Ertl v. Board of County Commissioners, 211 Kan. 202, 205, 505 P.2d 700.
263. Phrase "de bene esse" defined in construing statute conferring right in criminal actions to "conditionally" depose witnesses. State v. Hill, 211 Kan. 287, 507 P.2d 342.
264. Term "novation," as recognized in contract law, defined. Davenport v. Dickson, 211 Kan. 306, 507 P.2d 301.
265. Terms "imputed negligence" and "imputed contributory negligence" used interchangeably without connotation of difference. Scott v. McGaugh, 211 Kan. 323, 506 P.2d 1155.
266. Term "nuisance" defined and discussed. Culwell v. Abbott Construction Co., 211 Kan. 359, 506 P.2d 1191.
267. Promissory and equitable estoppel distinguished. Marker v. Preferred Fire Ins. Co., 211 Kan. 427, 506 P.2d 1163.
268. Term "reasonable medical certainty" in connection with admissibility of expert opinion construed. Nunez v. Wilson, 211 Kan. 443, 445, 507 P.2d 329.
269. Term "accident," as used to determine accidental death benefits under the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System Act, defined. Shapiro v. Kansas Public Employees Retirement System, 211 Kan. 452, 507 P.2d 281.
270. Term "quasi contract" defined. Minnesota Avenue, Inc. v. Automatic Packagers, Inc., 211 Kan. 461, 507 P.2d 268.
271. Word "codicil" defined. In re Estate of Heilig, 211 Kan. 608, 506 P.2d 1147.
272. Terms "motion" and "resolution" for practical parliamentary purposes are synonymous. Kimsey v. Board of Education, 211 Kan. 681, 507 P.2d 180.
273. Terms "excise tax" and "occupational tax" defined with regard to power of cities to levy taxes, excises, fees or other exactions. Callaway v. City of Overland Park, 211 Kan. 646, 651, 508 P.2d 902.
274. Term "running at large" construed in relation to duty of landowner to take precautions to prevent escape of horses. Cooper v. Eberly, 211 Kan. 657, 508 P.2d 943.
275. Term "permanent custody" defined; district court has power to restore previously terminated parental rights where jurisdiction retained. Bandel v. Pettibone, 211 Kan. 672, 508 P.2d 487.
276. Term "used exclusively" construed in determining whether church-owned property exempt from taxation. Seventh Day Adventist v. Board of County Commissioners, 211 Kan. 683, 508 P.2d 911.
277. Rule of ejusdem generis applied in construing the word "mineral" in oil and gas lease. Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896.
278. Terms "avulsion" and "accretion" defined in case determining effect of change in watercourse on boundary lines. Schaake v. McGrew, et al., 211 Kan. 842, 508 P.2d 930.
279. Term "unfit" defined with regard to unsuitability of parent in child custody case. In re Bachelor, 211 Kan. 879, 508 P.2d 862.
280. Term "voluntary payment" defined in action to recover expenditures for child support. Clark v. Chipman, 212 Kan. 259, 510 P.2d 1257.
281. Term "ostensible" or "apparent agent" defined. Theis v. duPont, Glore Forgan Inc., 212 Kan. 301, 510 P.2d 1212.
282. Term "ratification," as used in agency law, defined. Theis v. duPont, Glore Forgan Inc., 212 Kan. 301, 510 P.2d 1212.
283. Term "hearing," as applied to administrative proceedings, construed. Clairborne v. Coffeyville Memorial Hospital, 212 Kan. 315, 510 P.2d 1200.
284. Terms "nuisance per se" and "nuisance par accidens" defined. Vickridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., v. Catholic Diocese of Wichita, 212 Kan. 348, 510 P.2d 1296.
285. Terms "wanton conduct" and "reckless" defined. Montgomery v. Barton, 212 Kan. 368, 510 P.2d 1187.
286. Word "shall" frequently read to mean "may" where context requires. Paul v. City of Manhattan, 212 Kan. 381, 385, 511 P.2d 244.
287. Terms "ordinance" and "resolution" defined and distinguished. Benson v. City of DeSoto, 212 Kan. 415, 420, 510 P.2d 1281.
288. "General supervision" defined, in relation to power of state board of education. State, ex rel., v. Board of Education, 212 Kan. 482, 511 P.2d 705.
289. Rights of minority not fixed or vested rights but privileges subject to termination. Jungjohann v. Jungjohann, 213 Kan. 329, 335, 516 P.2d 904.
290. Terms "majority" and "infancy" defined. Jungjohann v. Jungjohann, 213 Kan. 329, 333, 516 P.2d 904.
291. "Cashier's check" defined and distinguished from an ordinary check. Meador v. Ranchmart State Bank, 213 Kan. 372, 376, 517 P.2d 123.
292. Term "insured" in regard to uninsured motorist coverage insurance construed. Forrester v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 213 Kan. 442, 447, 517 P.2d 173.
293. Doctrine of "res judicata" defined. Taber v. Taber, 213 Kan. 453, 454, 516 P.2d 987.
294. Term "automobile," defined in insurance policy as a motor vehicle, construed to include motorcycle absent express exclusion. Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Budig, 213 Kan. 517, 522, 516 P.2d 939.
295. Term "personal effects," when used within a will, defined. In re Estate of Reitz, 213 Kan. 534, 535, 536, 516 P.2d 909.
296. Terms "maliciously" and "willfully" defined and construed. State v. Osbey, 213 Kan. 564, 572, 517 P.2d 141.
297. City held to be included within meaning of term "person" in K.S.A. 15-126. City of Kansas City v. Board of County Commissioners, 213 Kan. 777, 780, 518 P.2d 403.
298. Terms "able" and "ready, willing and able" construed within the context of the general rule that a real estate agency or broker is entitled to a commission if he produces a buyer who is ready, willing and able. Winkelman v. Allen, 214 Kan. 22, 30, 32, 519 P.2d 1377.
299. Applied in construing K.S.A. 60-513, 60-510; tort act held filed within two-year period. Ruthrauff Administratix v. Kensinger, 14 Kan. 185, 188, 519 P.2d 661.
300. First clause; Applied; payment of death benefits under K.S.A. 48-261 (L. 1968, Ch. 69, Sec. 1) directed; no sovereign immunity. Smyth v. Adjutant General, 214 Kan. 715, 719, 522 P.2d 372.
301. Words "residence" and "domicile" construed; action to set aside sheriff's deed issued on execution sale. Beard v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 215 Kan. 343, 348, 524 P.2d 1159.
302. Word "sale" construed; prosecution for unauthorized sale of marijuana. State v. Nix, 215 Kan. 880, 882, 886, 529 P.2d 147.
303. Term "interest" defined. Shapiro v. Kansas Public Employees Retirement System, 216 Kan. 353, 357, 532 P.2d 1081.
304. Second clause; "Explicitly," as used in K.S.A. 84-2-725(2), defined. Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corporation, 218 Kan. 644, 651, 545 P.2d 371.
305. Applied in determining that the term "intersection," as used in K.S.A. 12-602, includes "T" intersections. Dodson v. City of Ulysses, 219 Kan. 418, 427, 529 P.2d 430.
306. Section cited; standard for determination of "unusual exertion" defined as used in K.S.A. 44-501. Chapman v. Wilkenson Co., 222 Kan. 722, 725, 567 P.2d 888.
307. Twenty-third clause; term "residence" as used in charter ordinance not so vague as to render the ordinance unconstitutional. Lines v. City of Topeka, 223 Kan. 722, 777, 577 P.2d 42.
308. First clause; provisions inapplicable to request for amendment of pleading for actual damages. Thurman v. Cundiff, 2 Kan. App. 2d 406, 413, 580 P.2d 893.
309. Fourth clause; three members of public employees relation board may lawfully conduct business of board. Coggins v. Public Employee Relations Board, 2 Kan. App. 2d 416, 421, 581 P.2d 817.
310. Twenty-third clause; insured was not a "resident of the same household" as owner of vehicle; coverage under policy. Teter v. Corley, 2 Kan. App. 2d 540, 542, 584 P.2d 651.
311. Twenty-fifth clause; insured was not a "resident of the same household" as owner of vehicle; coverage under policy. Teter v. Corley, 2 Kan. App. 2d 540, 542, 584 P.2d 651.
312. First clause; rule modified where statutory change is procedural or remedial and substantive rights not prejudiced. Nitchals v. Williams, 225 Kan. 285, 291, 590 P.2d 582.
313. Third clause; construing K.S.A. 21-4101; trial court erred in dismissing complaint of disorderly conduct on ground that only one person heard alleged statements. State v. Polson, 225 Kan. 821, 826, 594 P.2d 235.
314. First clause; repeal of subsection limiting workmen's compensation benefits does not increase benefits accrued while in effect. Brown v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 3 Kan. App. 2d 648, 651, 599 P.2d 1031. Affirmed: 227 Kan. 645, 608 P.2d 1356.
315. Third clause; parental rights of one parent may be severed under juvenile code although statute refers to "parents." In re Wheeler, 3 Kan. App. 2d 701, 703, 601 P.2d 15.
316. Twenty-third clause; merely meeting bare requirement does not establish residency for resident estate purposes. In re Estate of Phillips, 4 Kan. App. 2d 256, 261, 264, 604 P.2d 747.
317. Twenty-third clause; temporarily residing, as used in theft insurance policy, construed. Winsor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 397, 400, 628 P.2d 1080 (1981).
318. Second clause; words not defined by other statutes must be afforded meanings hereunder. Personal Thrift Plan of Wichita, Inc. v. State, 229 Kan. 622, 624, 629 P.2d 184 (1981).
319. "Usual place of residence" applied to residential service of process under K.S.A. 38-810a. Wilson & Walker v. State, 230 Kan. 49, 53, 630 P.2d 1102 (1981).
320. A lessor's right to unaccrued royalty under an oil and gas lease is an interest in real estate; reversed. In re Estate of Sellens, 7 Kan. App. 2d 48, 50, 637 P.2d 483 (1982).
321. Second clause; term "teacher" under K.S.A. 72-5436 includes all professional employees, whether part time or full time, required to hold a teaching certificate. Schmidt v. U.S.D. No. 497, 231 Kan. 267, 269, 270, 271, 644 P.2d 396 (1982).
322. Second clause; phrase "doing business in this state" as defined in K.S.A. 17-7303 applied. Panhandle Agri-Service, Inc. v. Becker, 231 Kan. 291, 294, 644 P.2d 413 (1982).
323. K.S.A. 21-4610 construed to include secondarily aggrieved party in the phrase aggrieved party used therein for restitution purposes. State v. Yost, 232 Kan. 370, 375, 654 P.2d 458 (1982).
324. Vote necessary to fill vacancy on school board is majority of full membership rather than majority of quorum. U.S.D. No. 407 v. Fisk, 232 Kan. 820, 827, 829, 660 P.2d 533 (1983).
325. Cited in case upholding the constitutionality of K.S.A. 44-706. Leiker v. Employment Security Bd. of Review, 8 Kan. App. 2d 379, 381, 659 P.2d 236 (1983).
326. County is an employer under K.S.A. 44-1201 et seq. State ex rel. Ludwick v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs., 233 Kan. 79, 84, 85, 661 P.2d 377 (1983).
327. Second clause; construction of language and tariff by KCC unreasonable as matter of law. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Kansas Corporation Commission, 233 Kan. 375, 379, 380, 381, 382, 664 P.2d 798 (1983).
328. Cited in holding that outright repeal and substantial reenactment of city ordinance on DUI creates no presumption of remission of crimes not reduced to judgment. City of Kansas City v. Griffin, 233 Kan. 685, 687, 664 P.2d 865 (1983).
329. Statutory changes in K.S.A. 38-1602(b)(1) not retroactively applied to juvenile charged before change effective. In re Hockenbury, 9 Kan. App. 2d 450, 452, 680 P.2d 561 (1984).
330. Cited; effect of changes in statutes involving indecent liberties with child (K.S.A. 21-3503, 21-3504) discussed. State v. Armstrong, 238 Kan. 559, 566, 712 P.2d 1258 (1986).
331. Cited; definition of "resident of household" in homeowner's insurance policy examined. Friedman v. Alliance Ins. Co., 240 Kan. 229, 729 P.2d 1160 (1986).
332. Cited; repeal of K.S.A. 40-3107(i)(1) covering household exclusion clauses in motor vehicle liability insurance policies applied prospectively. Hilyard v. Estate of Clearwater, 240 Kan. 362, 365, 366, 729 P.2d 1195 (1986).
333. Terms "preliminary hearing" and "preliminary examination" are synonymous. State v. Phifer, 241 Kan. 233, 238, 737 P.2d 1 (1987).
334. Term "prevailing party," within the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, construed. Allison v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs, 241 Kan. 266, 273, 737 P.2d 6 (1987).
335. Cited; construction of K.S.A. 17-1268(b) relating to liability of directors and others for sale of unregistered securities examined. Taylor v. Perdition Minerals Group, Ltd., 244 Kan. 126, 131, 766 P.2d 805 (1988).
336. Provisions in Fourth not applicable to statutory authority governing Kansas parole board's power to grant or deny parole. Haney v. Hamilton, 13 Kan. App. 2d 269, 273, 768 P.2d 832 (1989).
337. Authority of county commission to increase quorum requirements under home rule powers (K.S.A. 19-101 et seq.) determined. State ex rel. Stephan v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 244 Kan. 536, 541, 770 P.2d 455 (1989).
338. Phraseology of K.S.A. 60-203 regarding extension of time for service of process examined; time frame for granting extension determined. Read v. Miller, 247 Kan. 557, 561, 802 P.2d 528 (1990).
339. Noted in holding that amendment to K.S.A. 22-3404 eliminating right to jury trial for traffic infractions operates prospectively only. State v. Chapman, 15 Kan. App. 2d 643, 814 P.2d 449 (1991).
340. Noted in court's interpretation of K.S.A. 74-8810(g) prohibiting use of animals or fowl in training or racing of racing greyhounds. Boatright v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 251 Kan. 240, 245, 834 P.2d 368 (1992).
341. Cited; whether trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because out-of-state service by corporation was invalid examined. In re Marriage of Welliver, 254 Kan. 801, 806, 869 P.2d 653 (1994).
342. Whether a statute repealed by implication is revived by a later repeal of the repealer statute examined. Sunflower Racing, Inc. v. Board of Wyandotte County Comm'rs, 256 Kan. 426, 440, 885 P.2d 1233 (1994).
343. When college is entitled to out-district tuition for course offered to out-district student examined. Board of Trustees of Butler Co. Comm. College v. Board of Sedgwick Co. Comm'rs, 257 Kan. 468, 480, 893 P.2d 224 (1995).
344. Whether court's error in concluding that parole is a "pending proceeding" was harmless examined. State v. Gamble, 20 Kan. App. 2d 684, 686, 891 P.2d 472 (1995).
345. Trial court erred by ruling gas station constituted a dwelling for burglary purposes. State v. Schultz, 22 Kan. App. 2d 60, 63, 911 P.2d 1119 (1996).
346. "Rural water district" held to be a technical term. In re Application of Riverton Water Co. for Tax Exemption, 23 Kan. App. 2d 496, 932 P.2d 452 (1997).
347. City condemnation of water rights for city water supply; water rights included within definition of "land"; application for change of waters use under K.S.A. 82a-708b. Sullivan v. City of Ulysses, 23 Kan. App. 2d 502, 505, 932 P.2d 456 (1997).
348. Adjudication and disposition are separate legal events as used in K.S.A. 38-1681(b). State v. Fultz, 24 Kan. App. 2d 242, 246, 943 P.2d 938 (1997).
349. Trial court's instruction defining "deadly weapon" overbroad. State v. Guebara, 24 Kan. App. 2d 260, 264, 944 P.2d 164 (1997).
350. Term "instrumentality" examined in property tax exemption case. League of Kansas Municipalities v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 24 Kan. App. 2d 294, 299, 944 P.2d 172 (1997).
351. Term "bodily injury" defined for purposes of protection from abuse act (K.S.A. 60-3101 et seq.). Barnett v. Barnett, 24 Kan. App. 2d 342, 349, 945 P.2d 870 (1997).
352. "Joint venture" definition considered in fraud action; instruction substantially correct and fairly instructed jury. George v. Capital South Mtg. Investments, 265 Kan. 431, 448, 453, 961 P.2d 32 (1998).
353. Plaintiff failed to meet requirements justifying tolling of statute of limitations based upon legal incapacitation. Lowe v. Surpas Resource Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1249 (2003).
354. Definition of "manifest injustice" discussed. State v. Barahona, 35 Kan. App. 2d 605, 609, 132 P.3d 959 (2006).
355. Leasehold estates are not subject to real estate taxation in Kansas. In re Tax Appeal of Lipson, 44 Kan. App. 2d 515, 238 P.3d 757 (2010).
356. Requirement that offender register "new address" only applied when offender established a residence with the intention of returning. State v. LeClair, 295 Kan. 909, 287 P.3d 875 (2012).